59. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State1

1123. Pass Defense. During private discussion yesterday afternoon between General Erskine2 and [name deleted] following points were brought out:

[Name deleted] said he had been directed contact Erskine to inform him regarding results of meeting held by 3 Cabinet members including Prime Minister Ba Swe and 3 senior military officials including General Ne Win and himself regarding anxiety existing among these officials about accepting military aid from US…. These officials were extremely concerned regarding their interpretation of term “modest” amount of military aid. They are quite insistent that a “substantial” amount of equipment must be furnished in order prevent serious embarrassment to government by opposition as well as loss of face internationally. Spokesman stated that government considers decision accept assistance from US even though it be on reimbursable basis by token payment is in reality “alignment” with US. It was emphasized that such an “alignment” would cause great damage to government unless substantial amount equipment is provided to enable government to prove wisdom of their decision.

Spokesman also stated that it is this group’s desire to accept military assistance including US instructors and advisers on contract basis but they have doubts re wisdom this course unless they are assured that substantial assistance can be furnished and that implementation [Page 93] of informal agreement can be carried out in expeditious manner.

In reply to questions [name deleted] stated that Zhukov3 had offered Prime Minister an open invitation to send mission to Russia in near future to look at all their equipment and select types and quantities desired. No mention was made by Zhukov of method of payment if any. In answer to question as to whether Burma realized that Russians would demand payment later in form which might not be acceptable to present government, spokesman stated that he and other members this high level group hated Communism and Russia and desired no dealings whatsoever with it. They were deathly afraid of any deals with Zhukov and his colleagues, he said, but if substantial aid was not furnished in reasonably expeditious manner by US pressures were so great that they might be pushed into accepting some form of offer from Russians if they could not make other arrangements. With regard other arrangements he stated they were exhausting every possible means finding money to purchase equipment from non-bloc countries and intended do so to limit their ability even though US did provide substantial aid. Spokesman implored Erskine to realize that situation now was simply one of a competition between the bloc and US and it was opinion of Prime Minister and others represented in group’s discussion that Zhukov would give equipment to Burma if he feels it is his last opportunity to beat out US.

He further asked that US understand that Burma does not wish to accept anything from any country but desires to begin a program of military assistance from US provided it can be furnished without compromising neutral policy which the Burmese feel they must follow in the existing situation.

Spokesman also said that Cabinet considered decision to accept US military aid to be most agonizing and difficult one they have been confronted with.

In reply to question regarding U Nu’s4 knowledge or participation in discussions referred to by the high level group, spokesman stated that U Nu did not participate in discussions but was aware of the decision and that U Nu had instructed the military group before he left office as Prime Minister to obtain military assistance from US if it could be procured without compromising in any way his neutral policy. [Name deleted] claimed that U Nu stated at time that this caution must be exercised because of Burma’s weakness. He said that U Nu pointed out his great fears that this association with US would probably cause an intensification of Communist penetration and subversion [Page 94] which Burma Government would not be able to deal with unless arrangements made for military assistance could be executed in such manner that they would deter any such aggressive operations by the Communists.

Erskine is well acquainted with [name and title deleted] and believes that he was speaking sincerely.

Erskine, during conferences with various staff officers and his visit to paratroop school and all air force installations in Rangoon and vicinity (including fighter-bomber squadron), was impressed with outstanding performance in every category and unusual initiative and enthusiasm which was demonstrated in spite very meager and obsolescent equipment.

Erskine left this morning for trip to military establishments in north and will return here afternoon March 6. He would greatly appreciate any guidance you can give him in light foregoing before his return.

Satterthwaite
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790B.5–MSP/3–157. Top Secret.
  2. General Erskine, accompanied by two military officers, visited Burma February 26–March 8.
  3. Zhukov visited Burma February 10–15.
  4. U Nu resumed the position of Prime Minister on March 1.