Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

246. Message From the Ambassador in Indonesia (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Djakarta, August 12, 1957.

1. Appreciate amplification Washington thinking contained your most recent message.² Perhaps I misunderstand function of interagency group referred to or place too narrow an interpretation on three immediate policies, but whole tenor of message seems to imply that U.S. Govt can by giving some sort of aid and comfort to anti and non Commie forces “reverse present prospective growth of Communist forces”. Certainly, the anti and non Communist forces need aid and we should be prepared to give such aid if we can do so in manner which will not be counter-productive. However, problem is much broader and more complex than only doing what we can to step up anti Communist strength and activity. Our capabilities are limited in any case in an independent country but will be almost completely nil unless we can take action which will convince these sensitive and deeply suspicious people that the U.S. is truly on their side and that their best interests will be served by cooperation with U.S. …

2. Long range objective of an economically viable, politically stable Indonesia mentioned by you is good but must be constantly emphasized during carrying out of immediate policies if they are to be successful.

3. Problem here is extremely complex and of such long range character that it seems to me unrealistic to suppose that by September 1 the interagency group should be able to produce any valid estimate on course of events in Indonesia upon which government decisions can be made as to courses of action we should follow here. Many of leading figures in Indonesian puzzle, including to some extent Sukarno himself, do not have clear idea of their ultimate goal or how they expect to reach it, other than the overall goal of maintaining their independence. For example, Abdulgani who is probably one of closest men to Sukarno at present, assures me in strongest terms that National Council is only an “experiment” being tried by Sukarno in his search for way out of present troubles. Over past week end I have received completely contradictory reports concerning Sukarno’s ultimate objectives from equally well informed and intelligent observers. One report was to effect that Sukarno has definitely .decided that future of Indonesia lies with Commie bloc and not with the West. He has pointed out, according to this source, that Bao Dai and Chiang Kai-shek relied on West and look at them now. Indonesia’s future lies in cooperation with USSR and Commie China and hence Sukarno working with PKI. Other report was that there are definite indications Sukarno is in first stages of creation of national socialist movement along lines of Hitler which will eventually destroy not only non Commie political parties but PKI as well.

This report continues that many of so called Commies surrounding Sukarno are old or new Murba³ men who hate PKI and that through them Sukarno is working for his long range plans. Sukarno believes non Commie parties have lost their revolutionary ardor and hence the support of the masses and that in order to keep this support for himself he must appear to be friendly to PKI which now has this support. Later PKI leaders will be forced out and Sukarno will alone lead masses and the nation. Danger of this course is admitted but given Sukarno’s vanity, emotionalism, economic illiteracy and general predilection for the sensational these sources believe he will make the attempt.

4. Impossible at this stage to assess validity of either of above reports but they illustrate complexity of situation here. In assessing what we can do I believe we should take lesson from fact that all our controls and readily available forces did not prevent election of pro Commie Mayor in Naha⁴ as long as overall policies of U.S. Govt, did not appeal to Naha voters as being in their interest.

5. If we are to stem the tide here, I believe we must agree on and make known policies, which, as stated above, will convince masses here that their true interest lies in cooperation with U.S.

6. As a beginning, I recommend that:

a. We maintain our aid programs at their present level;

b. Secretary Dulles, in answer to a “planted” question at his next press conference, express grave concern over increasing Communist influence in Indonesia and, if question properly phrased, emphasize that we intend continue aid to Indonesia because such aid is to strengthen the Indonesian people and in no sense is an indication of approval of political developments or endorsement of political leaders;

c. You or another high level State Dept official emphasize this line as a part of a public address;

d. Indonesia [US] support the Indonesian resolution for UN consideration of West Irian question. Such action would not be interpreted as lending aid and comfort to Sukarno. Every Indonesian political party and every Indonesian political figure agrees on this matter. By supporting the resolution, we would not be supporting the Indonesian demand for West Irian but merely agreeing to consideration by the UN of a type of problem for which most Asians believe the UN was established. It is folly to accept Dutch contention that this is internal matter. Our influence and prestige in Indonesia as a factor in fighting Communism here suffers from our inability to demonstrate practically on a matter of great importance to Indonesians that we oppose colonialism. As long as we oppose even a proposal to discuss this issue in the UN, we cannot convince Indonesia that we are sincere in our protestations that we, rather than the Communists, are in sympathy with their aspirations.

7. Finally, I am concerned that interagency group is making what may be most significant long range recommendations on policy toward Indonesia without benefit of first hand discussion with those who have had recent experience here. Foreign Operations Adm. Chief is in Washington and should be consulted. … I also strongly believe I should be present …

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/8–1257. Top Secret. Summarized in John M. Allison, Ambassador From the Prairie (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), pp. 310–311.
2. Document 244.
3. Partai Murba, or Proletarian Party.
4. Naha, Okinawa.