245. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
354. Three hour frank informal discussion with Masjumi leaders last night brought out several significant points as outlined below. Masjumi leaders present were Natsir, Roem, Harahap and party spokesman Harjono. Most of talking was done by Natsir and Roem but other two at no time disagreed with them.
Results of recent elections have definitely thrown scare into leaders of non-Communist political parties, particularly PN. According to Natsir there will be greater cooperation between PNI and Masjumi in future but this will begin first in provinces and will not at first be evident in Djakarta. Too many personal jealousies are involved in capital and it will thus be easier to make start elsewhere. However, Natsir apparently believes cooperation throughout country will eventually come about.
All agreed that one of chief reasons for PKI victories was actions of Sukarno and he emerged as principal factor to be considered. Masjumi leaders believe that Sukarno will bow only to superior force and their objective is to convince him that there is such force aligned against him. At first Natsir said they had tried to win his friendship and confidence by cooperation but they were now convinced that only superior strength would be effective. I received impression that Masjumi present were not optimistic about achieving this superior strength in near future. They obviously expect present struggle to be long drawn out.
In spite of conviction that Sukarno is chief danger to continuance of representative party government there was absolutely no indication that any of men present would take or approve of taking any direct steps against Sukarno personally. Question was raised as to whether anything might happen if President was absent from [Page 408] country for long period such as would be involved in visiting Latin America. All leaders present instantly agreed with statement of Natsir that while Sukarno was out of country loyalty to him and to Indonesia would dictate that all parties would unite to support him while absent. There was disagreement as to whether this meant that if Sukarno should take trip in October and November, as he is considering, Djuanda Cabinet would remain in office until at least first of new year. Natsir seemed to think it possible while Roem pointed out that one Ali Cabinet had fallen while President was out of country.
I came away from meeting with conviction that while these men would compromise with Sukarno, they would not attack him personally and would depend upon having enough time to build up strength sufficient to convince Sukarno he must change his direction. It is not at all certain they will have time they hope for but Indonesia is not subject to normal Western criteria and it also not certain they won’t win in end. There was discouraging lack of definiteness in their plans for future but this might have been result of caution in talking to foreigners. There was definite indication, however, that they believed American policy in Indonesia was on whole good and that best way we could help anti-Communist groups was to continue our aid programs, particularly technical assistance and exchange of persons programs, along present lines.
Evidence that America is effectively interested in helping raise living standard of people would be most helpful. They said more projects like Gresik cement plant are needed.
Other aspects of what we can and should do will be discussed in separate messages.2