Office of the Historian

247. Message From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Ambassador in Indonesia (Allison)1

Washington, August 16, 1957.
1.
We have considered at length the analysis of the situation and the specific recommendations contained in … .2 If we understand you correctly, you attach great weight to the potential force of non-Communist public opinion upon Sukarno, and equally upon Sukarno’s own ability to reverse the current pro-Communist tide. Basing yourself upon this analysis we understand you to recommend courses of action which essentially are along the lines which we have attempted in the past and found wanting. We would appreciate your comments and amplifications.
2.

Our thinking here, which is being further developed in the NSC group chaired by State in which Baird is an active participant, is that the situation in Indonesia transcends both in quality and intensity any of the crises of the past. While the PKI has benefited hugely from Sukarno’s prestige and tacit if not witting support, it seems to us that the Communists now are a powerful political and subversive force in their own right, and that as a matter of prudence in evaluating a possible threat to U.S. Govt security interests we must be skeptical [Page 412] whether Sukarno, even had he the will, would be able to appreciably curb their power. On the contrary, we would expect, all other things being equal, continued growth of Communist strength on Java to the point that ultimately they may have the capability to take power through legal or quasi-legal means. One of the most disquieting features of situation is apparent inability of non-Communists to coalesce in any effective grouping. Despite realization under pressure recent events of some of their leaders that Communist inroads threaten end of democratic processes, we see no firm evidence these leaders will, of their own volition, carry their concern beyond the stage of procrastination and fruitless discussion.

. . . . . . .

4.
Group formed under NSC directive must submit its report by September 1, and is actively engaged in formulating both its analysis of the situation and recommendations for coping with it. You will be given an opportunity to comment on both these aspects, but … undesirable for you to absent yourself from your post during this period. …
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/8–1657. Top Secret.↩
  2. See Supra.↩