Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

244. Message From the Department of State to the Ambassador in Indonesia (Allison)¹

Washington, August 8, 1957.

1. We have carefully studied your reply to our message of August 2.² Obviously there was no intent on our part to limit those with whom you might wish to consult. The limitation in the last sentence applies only to limitation of discussion of possible courses of U.S. Govt action which we continue to believe should, for the present, be confined to DCM and. …

2. Concern regarding present trends in Indonesia is not confined to State … , an impression which we may inadvertently have given in our August 2 message. Indicative of this concern is recent establishment on approval of President of group composed of representatives of State, Defense Dept., JCS, … (ICA for economic aid matters) which is to report by Sept 1 regarding 1) the implications for security of U.S. Govt of recent Indonesian developments particularly Communist political gains in Java and 2) possible actions which might be taken by the U.S. Govt.

3. Many of the observations made in your reply are valid up to a point. However, it seems to us that Indonesian position has worsened seriously in past year. While anti-Communist forces remain relatively strong in outer islands, pro-Communist forces have been steadily strengthening themselves on Java. Army in Java, which had always been strongest potential anti-Communist force, is now much less solid in this respect than it was one year ago. Non-Communist and anti-Communist forces remain fragmented as evidenced by their inability to cooperate against Communist and pro-Communist penetration of government and development by these forces of greater mass support particularly in Central and East Java. We are cognizant of fact that there are signs, some of which are quite encouraging, regarding growth of anti-Communist sentiments as evidenced by recent statements of Indo Nationalist Party and … [Indonesian] leaders as well as editorial comment recently emanating from Indonesian non-Communist press. These signs may be the forerunner of effective cooperation among anti-Communist forces. On the other hand, same signs were visible after 1955 elections and yet led to no promising developments. In any event, we believe we must be prepared to take measures to reverse present prospective growth of Communist forces.

4. Our long-range objective remains an economically viable, politically stable Indonesia. Our immediate policies are 1) to maintain and strengthen anti-Communist forces in outer islands, 2) to maintain and strengthen non-Communist and anti-Communist forces in Java, 3) to weaken pro-Communist forces in Java. …

. . . . . . .

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/8–857. Top Secret.
2. Supra and Document 241, respectively.