Office of the Historian

231. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1

Djakarta, May 20, 1957—3 p.m.

2829. Joint Embassy/USOM message. Reference Embassy telegram 28042 and Embassy telegram 2793.3 Although no imminent political-military crisis is foreseen Sumatra and East Indonesia continue restive. Lack of progress in economic development in provinces largely precipitated present difficulties with central government.

Local governments eagerly seek US assistance including technicians for economic development. They willing, if requested, to provide police or military protection and to assist wherever possible with local labor, transportation, etc., for new projects including diesel generators and highway projects. Central government also eager for US aid outer islands to mollify local leaders.

We believe it essential approval both central and local authorities in that order be obtained prior dispatching any US personnel to provinces. In case certain sensitive areas such as Central Sumatra this could cause some delay in implementation program those areas.

Attainment some measure economic stability is essential to bring Indonesia out of chaos and therefore constitutes important aim US policy re Indonesia. Since lack such stability is at root of current regional versus central government problems, we believe it is in interest of US to contribute toward easing tensions arising from those problems. Believe USOM program will make such contribution and urge means be provided to carry it out.

Because of stormy history and delicate aspects US-Indonesian relations with respect economic assistance, we feel substance of foregoing should be conveyed to Congress in executive session only.

Allison
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–2057. Confidential; Priority.↩

  2. Telegram 2804 from Djakarta, May 16, reported that the latest developments in Indonesia tended to support the Embassy’s view that a crisis was not imminent. It concluded:

    “While political picture is unclear, with pulling and hauling of contradictory elements apparent, two facts stand out: (1) Sukarno with his frenetic nationalism unabated refuses acknowledge need calm and solid statesmanship and is primary impediment to settlement political and economic difficulties; (2) for time being important political action remains outside Parliament and that body which reconvened May 13 probably only influential in negative sense of restraining Cabinet action of which it violently disapproves.” (Ibid., 756D.00/5–1657)

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  3. Document 228.↩