Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

230. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Mein) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, May 17, 1957.

SUBJECT

• The Possible Break-up of the Republic of Indonesia

Recent … reports from Indonesia suggest a possibility that certain of the major outlying islands may be moving towards secession from the Indonesian Republic. The existence of such a possibility raises the question whether such a development would serve or would be detrimental to U.S. interests in the area. Sumatra appears at present to be the area most likely to secede, and discussion of the problem will be confined primarily to factors affecting this island.

Factors Suggesting that a Break-up Would Serve U.S. Interests

Arguments which might be advanced in support of the contention that the U.S. should regard with satisfaction, if not encourage discreetly, the separation of Sumatra and other of the major outlying islands from the Republic can be summarized as follows:

1) Communist strength is concentrated on the island of Java. The outer islands, on the other hand, are the strongholds of the religious parties, strongly anti-communist in orientation.

2) The central government follows a neutralist foreign policy and appears to be subject to leftist influences. The existence of anti-communist governments in the area might provide a useful counter-balance.

3) President Sukarno, because of his obsession with colonialism, his suspicion of the former colonial powers of Western Europe, and his apparent obliviousness to the internal and external communist menace, is at best a highly unreliable political influence. A reduction of the area under his control would be beneficial.

4) The outer islands of Indonesia, particularly Sumatra, account for a high percentage of Indonesia’s foreign exchange revenues through the production of rubber, oil, petroleum, tin, and other strategic raw materials. It would be advantageous to have the sources of such commodities under more reliable political control.

5) Sumatra, with the Malay Peninsula, dominates the Straits of Malacca, and is of great strategic importance.

Political and Economic Viability of Sumatra

It would appear at first glance that a break-up of the Indonesian Republic might provide an easy and convenient solution to basic U.S. policy problems in the area. Attractive as this idea may be, there are a number of political, economic, social, and psychological factors which raise serious doubts on the validity of such a judgment.

Political

The first and most important is the dubious viability of Sumatra as a political unit. Sumatra is, in effect, a group of separate communities in a sea of jungle. There are on the island at least five distinct, and in some instances mutually hostile, major ethnic and cultural groups, linked by land by a single circuitous paved road impassable in the rainy season. The principal economic centers, Medan and Palembang, are both linked closely to Djakarta but have few if any common ties. One area, Atjeh, has already been for the past four years in armed rebellion against the central government, and although it has been reported that a provisional understanding has been reached with the Central Sumatran leader Lt. Col. Hussein, it appears unlikely that the fanatically Moslem Atjehnese would make their peace with the staunchly Christian Bataks and submit to any inter-regional Sumatran authority. Therefore, once the unifying concept of “one people, one nation, one language” had been repudiated, and the disintegration of the republic begun, political fragmentation would be almost certain to continue below the major island level, and the U.S. would be confronted in Sumatra not with one authority, but with three or four semi-autonomous areas. Lt. Col. Hussein, the most resolute and intransigent of the regionalist military leaders, is reported to be strongly influenced by orthodox Moslem circles in West Sumatra, and allegedly has announced as a precondition for settlement with the central government the suppression of all political parties which do not believe in God. This would result in the suppression not only of the Communist Party, but also the political parties of millions of Indonesians who believe in God but also favor a separation of religion and politics. Hussein, in this regard, is closer to the fanatical Darul Islam than to the Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama. He has not specified the manner in which this belief in God is to be expressed, but the Moslem inspiration for such a concept could hardly be reassuring to his Christian colleagues. In any case, this demand, while perhaps strengthening his position in the strongly Moslem areas around Padang, is extreme and unrealistic in the broad Indonesian political context, and tends to establish Hussein as a leader of only limited, local significance.

Economic Viability

There are few doubts as to the long-term economic viability of Sumatra. The island is rich in proven natural resources and in undeveloped land. There would be however, a period of difficult economic readjustment should Sumatra attempt to secede from the Indonesian Republic.

For the past 100 years, the economies of Java and Sumatra have been closely integrated. Sumatra produces and exports raw materials and receives from Java rice, textiles, imported and domestic manufactured goods, and a variety of banking, insurance, export-import and other entrepot services. A break in the economic ties between the two islands would have strong, but differing, disruptive effects. On Java government finance and the money economy would suffer severely with the loss of a principal source of foreign exchange. The masses of the people, however, would remain relatively unaffected since Java produces enough rice for its own population. In Sumatra, on the other hand, the authorities would not lack foreign exchange, but the people would suffer from a shortage of food and other essentials of every day life. Entrepot services could of course be furnished eventually by Singapore, and rice could be obtained from abroad, but it would take time to establish these new supply channels, and in the meantime these local shortages would further intensify the disruptive political forces noted above.

In the absence of any bonds other than common dissatisfaction with the central government, it is doubtful further that the people in one part of Sumatra would be any more prepared to see local revenues used for the development of other parts of the island than they have in the past been satisfied to see them used for public works on Java.

Personnel Shortages

The island of Sumatra is sparsely populated, and since 1945 there has been a steady flow of the more able and ambitious young men to Java seeking the greater educational, political, and economic opportunities available to them there. Some might return to their home island, but the crippling shortage of trained professional men, administrators, and technicians which has handicapped the nation as a whole would be felt even more acutely in the outlying areas, and would adversely affect both their economic and political viability.

Psychological Factors

The idea of a single Indonesian nation was the inspiration only a decade ago for a bloody and hard-fought struggle for independence from the Netherlands. Whatever their internal differences, the vast majority of the Indonesian people, in the outer islands as well as on Java, remain loyal to this ideal. Col. Simbolon, a sincere and dedicated patriot, took action last December not to break up the Indonesian state, but in protest against government actions or lack of action which he was convinced would, if not corrected, lead to such a development. His objective was to preserve and protect the state for which he and his colleagues had sacrificed much, not to destroy it. It should be noted that the first demand of the “rebel” colonels was for the resignation of the Ali Government, and that at present their primary demand is for a reestablishment of the Sukarno–Hatta partnership, not for recognition of their independence.

All of those involved in the current crisis are not of course motivated by these high ideals, and it is inevitable that adventurers and opportunists will take advantage of the situation to further their own ambitions. In addition, once the authority of the legally constituted government has been challenged, it may be difficult for the moderate elements to remain in control of the situation. Nonetheless, it is highly doubtful that such eminent Sumatrans and farsighted patriots as Hatta, Sjahrir, and Natsir would lend their support to regionalist independence movements in their home island, and contribute to the destruction of an ideal to which they have devoted their lives.

Policy Problems for the United States

. . . . . . .

During the revolutionary period the Dutch established in the outlying islands independent “republics” favorably disposed toward the Netherlands, and conferred on these “republics” status in a federal structure co-equal to that of the Republic of Indonesia, then confined to portions of Java and Sumatra. This “divide and rule” tactic was strongly resented in republican circles, and since that time the words “federalism” and “van Mook” (the Dutch official held responsible for the program) have in Indonesia connoted disloyalty if not treason. Nationalism and hostility to foreign interference, particularly from the West, are sentiments still strongly held by all sectors of Indonesian society whatever their other differences. … U.S. assistance to the outlying islands would unquestionably be viewed as another Western effort to divide and rule, and would not only tend to weaken popular support of the rebel leaders in their own areas, but would also alienate moderate, pro-Western elements in Java and provide the ultra-nationalists with a rallying cry of great general appeal. There is a further strong probability that other Asia-African countries would view U.S. aid to the dissident elements in a Suez context as an effort to reimpose “Western colonialism”, and that they would undertake counter-action in the United Nations or other international forums.

U.S. economic interests in Sumatra are located in areas in which are high concentrations of Javanese and other ethnic elements not in sympathy with secession. Armed resistance to a break with Java is most likely in these areas, endangering both American lives and property.

Conclusions

On balance, it would appear that a break-up of the Republic of Indonesia would not serve U.S. policy objectives in the area. It could succeed only with substantial material assistance from the United States. It would increase many-fold the problems in U.S. relations with the area. The resultant political chaos and economic dislocation would probably, in the long run, serve rather than hinder communist efforts to Win control of the archipelago.

U.S. objectives could be furthered most effectively by discouraging the dissipation of anti-communist strength in the outer islands in quixotic regional rebellions, by encouraging anti-communist elements in these areas to lend their support to their colleagues and co-religionists on Java within the framework of a single national state, and by encouraging and assisting the central government to satisfy legitimate regional demands.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–1757. Secret. Sent through Howard P. Jones, who initialed the memorandum and sent it to Robertson.