228. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
2793. Deptel 1875.2 … While by no means discounting continuing possibility such extreme action, Embassy disinclined consider crisis imminent. In support this thesis are recent pronouncements two most important figures involved, Hatta and Hussein. Former addressing student assembly East Java May 9 called for efforts to “construct and give substance to Indo independence” and said “differences of opinion may exist but unity must be preserved above all”. In address enthusiastic crowd Palembang airport May 13, Hatta pledged his energy to development wider regional autonomy but emphasized this to be in framework national unity. Hatta appears believe his best fortunes lie with preservation RI and eventual return to services hereto.
Lt. Col. Hussein, Military Commander Central Sumatra and chairman revolutionary Banteng Council, in ceremony for installation military subordinate Central Sumatra May 10 declared aim of martial law is to stabilize government and surmount difficulties with which state now confronted. He said his objective was settlement problems between provinces and central government through economic development, improved security, decreased corruption.
Despite these statements which Embassy interprets as some tightening of reins on separatist tendencies, next few days may be significant in development events Sumatra and Sulawesi. In East Indo principal factor to consider is resistance Col. Sumual, Commander TT 7, to headquarters order to relinquish command to Jani and return Djakarta. Prime Minister Djuanda and party including Deputy Prime Minister Leimena, Home Affairs Minister Sanusi, Justice Minister Maengkom, Provincial Relations Minister Tobing and Ambassador to US Mukarto flew Macassar May 14. C/S Nasution originally scheduled accompany group, conspicuously absent, probably due his unwillingness risk loss face in confronting Sumual. Results Djuanda trip [Page 380] will be watched, but question of who controls military forces is significant one here.
In this connection Mukarto had hour’s talk with me night before last after discussions with Djuanda and Subandrio. He said that while conditions not good here, nevertheless he was not pessimistic. In his opinion Sulawesi problem as well as Sumatra problem was primarily economical though political element was large. He believes Djuanda will be able if given half a chance not only to increase economic and political stability but also to guide Sukarno gradually away from present emotional bias toward extreme left. Mukarto said he would see me upon his return from Sulawesi and give me full account.
In Sumatra reception to be accorded Voroshilov in Medan (if in fact Marshal does make scheduled trip there) may be interesting since in that Moslem stronghold his visit could touch off hostile demonstrations that could easily be turned against central government.
On balance Embassy sees no imminent eruption Indonesia’s volcanic political situation. However, volcanoes are unpredictable.