Office of the Historian

232. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)1

Washington, May 20, 1957.

SUBJECT

  • Prospects for an Independent Sumatra

Attached Intelligence Brief No. 2122, “Prospects for an Independent Sumatra”,2 concludes that, despite a strong military position and substantial popular support, Sumatran dissident leaders are unlikely to declare Sumatra independent in the immediate future.

The question of Sumatra’s independence has been raised by the unexpectedly swift pace of events in the area in the last nine months. In response to long-standing resentment in Sumatra at the failure of the central government to carry out development programs and as a result of personal antagonisms in the Indonesian Army, a series of bloodless uprisings began on 20 December in Central Sumatra and ended 10 March in South Sumatra. As a result of the uprisings the central government lost effective control of all of Sumatra, except for the rubber and tobacco estate area near Medan in North Sumatra.

There has been no resolution of the political-military impasse. The promulgation of an emergency decree on 8 May, establishing a National Council (a pet project of Sukarno’s), appears to have led the Sumatrans to conclude that Sukarno plans to establish a dictatorship. Tension is believed to have risen higher than at any time in recent months. This tension, coupled with the presence of former Vice-President Hatta and Masjumi leader Natsir in Sumatra, has tended to lend credence to recurring but unconfirmed reports that Sumatran leaders intend to establish an independent Sumatra. However, in a speech delivered on 16 May in Central Sumatra, Hatta limited his support of the Sumatran insurgents to advocacy of regional autonomy, and by implication opposed any immediate move to establish an independent Sumatra. Dissident military leaders who shared the platform with Hatta denied any separatist intent.

Paramount considerations discouraging a Sumatran declaration of independence are: a lack of unity of purpose on the part of Sumatran leaders; their denials of intent to take action to fragment Indonesia politically; ethnic differences among the people of Sumatra; and the serious political and economic problems that would face an independent Sumatra. The central government in Djakarta may eventually [Page 388] seek to relieve some of the tension with the provincial administrations by implementing an expanded program of public works, using domestic and foreign sources of capital, including US developmental aid and possible Japanese reparations payments. For the immediate future, however, the present stalemate is likely to continue.

A similar memorandum with attachment has been addressed to the Secretary.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756F.00/5–2057. Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that Herter read this memorandum.↩
  2. Dated May 17, not printed.↩
  3. A notation on the source text indicates that the Secretary’s copy was destroyed in 1958 and that it bore no indication that he had seen it.↩