Office of the Historian

499. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, November 6, 1957—1 p.m.

740. Department pass CINCPAC POLAD for info.

(1)
In attempting appraise current status RLG–PL settlement and decide what course of action we should now follow it should be recognized first of all that an unfortunate change in balance of present government occurred late in September. Theretofore strength of situation lay in fact that while Souvanna was still PM, preponderance of power lay with Katay and Phoui, leaders of two conservative parties which comprised government. Control they exercised was decisive until (a) Phoui left for Europe and US and (b) Katay embarked on maneuvers of his own for financial gain and political power. Phoui’s failure return September 16 as scheduled lost us critical week in attempt redress power relationships in government. It was this week that Souvanna, who had immediately if surreptitiously seized his opportunity, made important progress.
(2)

Souvanna as Department rightly noted was content to accept same type of agreement that he sought and nearly got year ago. So long as it was manifestly question this type of agreement we could readily muster influential help, Lao and foreign, to resist obviously dangerous degree of accommodation to Communists. Once, however, we obtained important improvements not only Lao but British, Canadians and French for different reason softened opposition or ceased to oppose.

Three foreign Allies with desire discharge their several responsibilities under Geneva apparatus had important reasons for desiring settlement once they thought obvious risks had been reasonably safeguarded. They are thus willing accept settlement involving coalition of a nature which we are not willing accept. Lao of course deeply desire national unity and at any time this appears in offing it is difficult politics for leaders to oppose unless they can demonstrate clearly risks of acceptance are overriding. In their present version, accords are probably now such I doubt that Phoui and Katay believe risks really are overriding—unless US aid were surely forfeit. Always before we could believe PL would shy away from settlement but now their purported acceptance provides another new unfavorable factor.

(3)
PL acceptance now, if genuine, may be motivated by local or external factors or both. They and Viet Minh may have concluded deal is best obtainable and that they can pursue their aims most advantageously [Page 1027] from within national community henceforth and that they can afford some risk temporary loss control in north for sake of opportunities gain control of central government and in other provinces. As regards external factors, we are suspicious of stories attributed to French sources that Souphanouvong and Kayson have been told bloc will no longer support PL if present agreements turned down. It occurs to us, however, that bloc might have decided to pose in Asia as champion of reconciliation, reduction of tension etc. and to use Laos as cheap propaganda showcase where they stood for peace and unity while US stood as one for war and division.
(4)
No doubt plans Souvanna over-reached themselves in attempt force coalition through last week. Importance this episode should not be overrated as I fear it has not affected situation in any fundamental way. Crown Prince did intervene twice successfully in thwarting presentation to Assembly and then in closing it. However, his belief that agreements were dead (Embtel 6662) stands thus far as mistaken expectation that PL would turn accords down. He now apparently looks to US to utilize drastic sanction of cutting aid although he anticipates it would lead to civil war provoked by unpaid army and police. I was willing in emergency Friday to make strong statement (Embtel 7003) to effect of investing coalition government hastily without requiring PL action to prove good faith. This statement went rather far in prejudging consequences of reevaluation should it become necessary. However it was related to danger of moment and thus was supposed to preserve our freedom of action in future circumstances. I am not sure, however, that as Crown Prince got it from Phoui he understood statement’s limited applicability to circumstances such as developed November 1. He may in fact believe that we will cut or cease aid if coalition occurs in any circumstances short of application of four step program (Embtel 20774), that is to say coalition without exacting prior PL performance in each phase of settlement. It probably does good not harm to let this impression persist for moment (especially as my statement was oral) but we may have to clarify it soon. I believe obvious time to do so is when we receive texts of political and military agreements as initialled by two delegates and analyze them in context or however RLG proposes proceed.
(5)
Publication communiqué and assertion political agreement approved by government, added to speeches at Assembly closure November 3 (Embtel 7235) indicate momentum toward settlement [Page 1028] being sustained and that our positions being gradually derided [eroded?]. Unless Souvanna or PL again make mistake, or Katay–Phoui–Savang weld together strong opposition bloc, I do not know how much longer British will stand with us. They may be prepared to accept agreement if in their eyes it is reasonably safeguarded and brought about in orderly way. Thus factors on our side likely weaken further. Moreover I doubt that Crown Prince can hold off extraordinary session indefinitely and I am becoming skeptical of his belief that Souvanna faces dilemma of such gravity as to cause his fall whichever way he moves (Embtel 7176).
(6)
In light of foregoing interpretation of recent events as well as of balance sheet of favorable and unfavorable factors (Embtel 7347) question arises what course we should now follow? Certain possibilities are offered below:
a.
If our analysis final texts military and political agreements is crucial we must redouble efforts obtain them. If Souvanna fails deliver by end of That Luang festival (November 8), I request I be formally instructed to address note in strong terms requesting them and further requesting no final steps be taken until we have had time to analyze and consult Washington. Alternatively, or later if note fails to produce results, message from Secretary to Crown Prince in same sense would be desirable and would have additional advantage of portraying graphically seriousness with which US regards situation.
b.
Should RLG persist in executing agreements without permitting us first to comment on them or should do so in face of adverse comments, I should address formal note indicating we have no alternative but to reevaluate policy per November 13, 1956, note. Note would avoid prejudging outcome and be silent on manner or scope of reevalution. Either then or subsequently it could be stated that I was being recalled on consultation for this purpose. I believe I should be recalled only if RLG proceed with execution agreements involving immediate coalition and thus openly flouts US advice. My position would be rather difficult in such circumstances unless some action is taken to indicate my repeated warnings were serious. I, of course, hope no such action necessary because in most circumstances I should be able contribute more by remaining here to oppose, improve or delay such dangerous scheme as RLG may evolve. In particular I want to keep on trying to reconstitute effective Crown Prince–Katay–Phoui effective check on Souvanna.
(7)
On purely hypothetical basis and in connection with possible tripartite consultation with UK-French I should like to suggest that if we at some time should reach conclusion we could no longer obtain adequate aid appropriations we should so state to Western Allies. While I do not recommend following now, consideration might be given to asking them further if in such circumstances they would be [Page 1029] ready to share or take over aid responsibility (as we have had to from them in other circumstances).
Parsons
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–657. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.↩
  2. Document 488.↩
  3. Document 491.↩
  4. Document 447.↩
  5. Dated November 4, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–457)↩
  6. Document 497.↩
  7. Document 498.↩