Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

447. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, June 6, 1957—6 p.m.

2077. Reference: Embtel 2050.²

(1) United States is on record against entry Pathet Lao into government before or after elections and as warning such entry would mean reappraisal (and possible loss) of aid. Presumably Katay feels entitled to know whether same consequences would follow admission of former Pathet Lao to government headed by him after he had succeeded in restoring royal authority in two provinces, reintegrated Pathet Lao civil and military on acceptable terms and obtained dissolution Pathet Lao as such. At some time Katay or some other Lao leader likely press me on this.

(2) Following considerations are pertinent:

(a) As pointed out last paragraph reference telegram national unity key problem in Laos.

(b) No Lao could advocate abandonment negotiations with Pathet Lao or appear accept loss two provinces or openly advocate recapture HY [by?] force.

(c) All political leaders give at least lip service to inclusion former Pathet Lao representatives in government at some stage. Katay, Phoui and Kings Council all clear that this last step, not first as with Souvanna, coming only after Pathet Lao guarantees and actual performance. Privately, in my opinion, they plus Crown Prince do not think there is much chance Pathet Lao will go along, and thus hardly expect reach last step. As it is however, RLG when under Katay will probably wish take this step if they feel it safe under then conditions.

(3) Department desired me encourage Katay–Phoui rapprochement (Deptel 1467³) and I have assumed it also favored Katay–Phoui government. Certainly no other combination so promising from standpoint United States interest in saving Laos (as stated reference telegram). Were I to reiterate flatly at this stage policy set forth November 13 letter, I doubt it would alter Katay–Phoui plank. It would instead merely lend credence to reports which some of our friends are not above peddling, that United States more interested in keeping couple of Pathet Lao (Commies) out of government than in helping Laos with settlement of its national problem. I doubt even United Kingdom Ambassador would find it possible support us in such attitude. We would thus be alone, with diminished chances of influencing evolution of affairs here.

(4) In view foregoing I should appreciate Department’s reaction soonest to following line for use if statement our attitude becomes necessary in situation which I would regard as substantially different from that which obtained under Souvanna:

The United States interest in Laos is that it become a peaceful united country while maintaining its freedom, independence and democratic form of government.

To accomplish this it is necessary that RLG be in actual control of entire territory of Laos and that RLG itself be free of elements whose aim is to subvert government and overthrow constitution.

Indeed, purpose of United States aid would be defeated if representatives of any political party or movement, under whatever name, whose aim is subversion, are admitted to government. Under such circumstances the continuance of aid would have to be reconsidered. This decision would be ours. (For present, we do not necessarily include Bong among such representatives.)

Hence, if schedule such as recommended by King’s council (RLG control of the provinces, administrative and military integration of ex-PL organizations, formation of Neo Hak Sat party and participation in government) is followed one step at a time, then continuance of US attitude would be reviewed upon completion of each step and would depend on our determination of following questions:

(Step 1) Whether military and administrative control of two provinces has in fact passed completely into the hands of RLG. Our findings would be based on our own investigations, on the spot.

(Step 2) Whether integration of ex-PL cadres (administrative and military) has been carried out in a manner safeguarding integrity and security of RLG and ANL.

(Step 3) Whether the Neo Hak Sat, or any other successor to PL was in fact an independent political party, free from foreign domination, and loyal to constitution and crown.

(Step 4) Whether the ex-PL or any other candidates advanced by Neo Hak Sat for ministerial appointments in accordance constitutional procedures are themselves independent and without subversive or disloyal intentions or connections. In judging the reality of independence and loyalty, one of the criteria to be met by ex-PL would be the conduct and patriotism of former members of Lao Issara who came back as loyal citizens and have since become honored participants in RLG.

Finally, as our attitude dependent on future circumstances as outlined no need and in fact undesirable attempt define position more precisely now.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–657. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Ottawa, and New Delhi.
2. Document 444.
3. Dated May 24, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.4351J/5–2457)