Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

497. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 3, 1957—2 p.m.

717. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Embtel 700.² Morning third I had illuminating talks with Crown Prince and Phoui. Most important current fact is that Assembly closes today with no presentation to it of coalition government. This not only wins time but gives important trump to Crown Prince whose cooperation is needed for opening of extraordinary session. Following are key points of talk with Savang:

1. Assembly has not approved military and political accords. Only Souvanna so believes. Actually numerous deputies put him on defensive with questions about PL performance, conformity with Geneva Accords, etc. There was no vote and therefore no final action. Souvanna was not authorized by Cabinet to present accords and there is only his word that PL have accepted them. Savang said Souphanouvong has avoided signing and egged Souvanna on in hopes of committing Government and Assembly without himself committing PL in writing. (This I believe is conjecture on Savang’s part but, fantastic as such scheme might be elsewhere it might have succeeded in Laos.) Savang further states Assembly’s real desire to topple Souvanna before That Luang Festival and his fall after trickery and weakness of these past few days is assured. (No other source has yet told us Assembly desired fall of Souvanna before That Luang although we and Phoui have thought Katay was maneuvering for power.) Savang believes that after That Luang Souvanna will face dilemma. If he cannot present enlarged government and PL solution he must fall. If he does present it and cannot prove PL acceptance in good faith and performance he will fall. Moreover he has lost face because his undue haste and sharp tactics failed as all can see.

2. Political and Military Accords have not been countersigned by Cabinet. They must be approved by it, by King’s Council and by Council of Ministers. Neither Katay nor Phoui were told Souvanna would actually present Accords to Assembly.

3. Savang denies there has been symbolic act of submission on part of PL. It must take place before King or latter’s representative. Various Assembly members yesterday insisted on this taking place in their presence and that there be proofs of performance under agreements before admission of PL to Government. (Phoui tells me his brother Ngon confronted Souvanna with this demand in Assembly.)

4. Savang admits Souvanna may publish joint communiqué next week but says it is now quite sound well-considered document and more likely to provoke difficulties for PL than for RLG.

5. Three times during talk Savang said we must maintain our firm position and play on US aid not by threats such as Communists would again soon make against Deputies but nevertheless by playing on desire Lao politicians maintain their recently improved standard of living. My statement to Phoui for Souvanna (reftel) had been repeated to him and I should maintain this hardline. I told Savang it had received immediate and unequivocal support on urgent telegram from Washington (Deptel 469³) and he could count on our maintaining position. I added I was planning to repeat it to Katay Monday or Tuesday⁴ in hopes Nationalist Deputies would be informed. (Phoui subsequently urged me to see Katay for this purpose.)

6. Savang revealed to me that at 8 a.m. first Souvanna had for first time told him (and only at Phoui’s prompting) of intent present coalition that morning and that Souvanna had further claimed both Katay and Phoui supported this. When summoned to Palace both Katay and Phoui not only denied their support but immediately promised they and their supporters would oppose. Katay had not even been told of Souvanna’s intent. In conclusion Savang said he hoped and rather thought what had happened was all for best as it had revealed for all to see Souvanna’s gullibility, irresponsibility, and trickery. He was definitely optimistic for future although he expects difficult times when government crisis breaks.

Phoui confirmed much of foregoing, in particular fact Souvanna was sharply questioned in Assembly. He said procedure was most irregular and no final action was taken. He agrees government crisis is likely come soon and said only candidate was Katay. Independents would support him fully. He also wished me to see Katay not only to repeat statement my 700 but also in hopes I could smoke out his true attitude and intentions.

I hope to send a more considered appraisal of where things stand next four days but situation clearly not so desperate as it was two days ago.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–357. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh,
2. Document 491.
3. Document 492.
4. November 4–5.