Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

488. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, October 26, 1957—4 p.m.

666. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Embtels 660² and 663.³ Crown Prince told me categorically and twice over morning 26th that “Common declaration” of Souvanna and Souphanouvong will not be issued. He went on to say Council of Ministers had revised it drastically yesterday and so PL could not now possibly accept it. This would in turn kill military and political accords and at minimum leave RLG and PL further apart than before this latest episode. While there was no mistaking Savang’s sincerity or conviction that this particular deal is dead, interment has not yet taken place and this is still Laos. At least we can say that at moment it looks as though situation has been restored.

Crown Prince considers portion this morning’s Council of Ministers meeting to be devoted to PL question as mere formality and was evidently concentrating on other two agenda items, (a) monetary reform and (b) enlargement of government. Re former I told him we had finally defined our own position and were ready to negotiate. Re latter he showed considerable concern more because of Katay’s behavior than because of possibility (which I consider rather likely) that Souvanna may precipitate new government crisis by resigning if this latest deal is in fact finished and negotiations with PL are ruptured. He is also concerned at “malaise” in country which Communists will try to exploit with renewed vigor and with new propaganda advantage derived from their knowledge of import and other irregularities in which Katay and other top leaders have figured.

Balance of conversation devoted to amenities, references to Phoui’s and my trip, and expression his general agreement with eight-point summary United States position which I gave Phoui yesterday.⁴ (See however Embtel 665.⁵) During talk I gave him usual assurances our desire to support Laos and he gave his to effect policy has not changed and regardless what we or others do he will always be seeking preserve independence of country.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2657. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh. Robertson’s initials appear on the source text.
2. Document 485.
3. In telegram 663, October 26, the Embassy reported on the major revisions in the proposed joint communiqué made by the Council of Ministers at its meeting on the night of October 25. The major improvements, which Parsons attributed in part to his discussion with Phoui on the morning of October 25, were: (a) deletion of the phrase “the same day” in connection with the timing between transfer of control of the two northern provinces and presentation of the coalition government (in the revised version, the provinces would be handed over before coalition); (b) reduction of the Neo Lao Hak Zat party from parity with the Royal Government to the status of any other political party in Laos; (c) implication that the Royal Government would control the membership of the technical commissions detailed to implement the communiqué; and (d) obligation of the technical commissions to work out in fact Royal Government’s authority in the two provinces. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2657)
4. As enumerated in telegram 660 from Vientiane.
5. In telegram 665, October 26, the Embassy reported that Savang in his interview with Parsons on October 26 raised the issue of Lao-Thai border problems. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2657)