Office of the Historian

498. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, November 5, 1957—3 p.m.

734. At beginning of That Luang Festival which ushers in four day intermission on political scene it is time to take stock of where we stand in PL settlement. Although events during last week have been confusing, it appears to me that what happened can be put in one of two categories: Favorable or unfavorable developments insofar as the United States concerned.

A. Favorable developments

(1)
Despite Souvanna’s efforts to have Assembly extended until November 23 Crown Prince refused and clotured Assembly November 3. Theoretically next regular session will be May 11. Although government can request Crown convene a special session of Assembly, Crown does not necessarily have to agree. It can certainly ask questions regarding need for such a session. Hence special session depends to some extent on Crown Prince and could be delayed.
(2)
Despite Souvanna’s great efforts to get PL into government they are not in yet.
(3)
Souvanna must count with opposition of Katay and Phoui on his solution to PL problem. Both of these important leaders believe that political and military agreements have not been approved in [Page 1024] Cabinet or by Council of Ministers and such approval is required before they can be implemented; hence Souvanna must still convince his colleagues in Cabinet before final action can be taken. (Nevertheless Souvanna’s office announced that political agreement was approved by Cabinet October 30; see B–3 below.)
(4)
Frantic efforts to enlarge Cabinet by including former Ministers (not PL) prior That Luang failed. Former Ministers who were thwarted in their desire to participate at That Luang Festival as Ministers and who had been promised to recoup Ministerial positions within 60 days at time 6-man government was invested, are now dissatisfied and probably hold Souvanna more than anybody else responsible for it.
(5)
There is serious doubt among Lao and foreign observers that Assembly has ratified the political and military agreements as Souvanna claimed it has. This doubt can be exploited later.
(6)
Intermission in negotiations due to That Luang Festival gives additional time to try to influence Deputies and important Lao officials as to shortcomings of the agreement. As long as nothing irrevocable has been done, nothing is lost and the Embassy can continue its efforts.
(7)
Many Deputies contacted by Embassy worried by United States reaction to RLG willingness to accept PL in government. Threat of a serious re-evaluation of United States aid policy toward Laos may prove to be a formidable weapon.
(8)
Souvanna’s high-handed and precipitate action in trying to bring PL into government has alienated some important Lao politicians.
(9)
There are serious indications that Katay, as leader of the Nationalist party, would like to become Prime Minister again and relations between him and Souvanna are not good. In addition, Souvanna must count on opposition of Phoui and Crown Prince.
(10)
British Embassy Vientiane has changed from former favorable attitude toward coalition government and has closed ranks again with United States in opposing too hasty or soft deal. If conservative opponents of Souvanna reconstitute solid front as before Phoui’s departure for US, British will support them.

B. Unfavorable developments

(1)
Joint communiqué was signed between Souvanna and Souphanouvong on November 2 and has been published. This is another milestone in RLG–PL negotiations.
(2)
Both Crown Prince and President National Assembly reflected in their speeches at time closing National Assembly desire Lao nation to see county united again. This drive for national reconciliation is important factor.
(3)
While Katay and Phoui claim that political deployment has not been approved in Cabinet, Souvanna maintains it has been. Lao Presse issue of November 2 published notice to that effect.
(4)
Souvanna claims that action of Assembly on November 1 and 2 is tantamount to ratifying military and political agreements and that therefore they only remain to be executed.
(5)
Assembly motion of October 28 in which early 30 Deputies signed a motion favoring national reconciliation is indication of Deputies’ thinking on this subject.
(6)
By Souvanna’s taking agreement into National Assembly he has transferred his case to an arena more favorably disposed to a PL settlement regardless of cost involved. It will be more difficult for Deputies in Assembly to oppose national reconciliation on basis two technical agreements and plenary into national government when speaking into public address system. No Deputy wants to seem to be voting against national union when entire nation favors settlement. Unfortunately most of Deputies are at this time not fully aware of implications present deal.
(7)
One of politicians who could bring about major change is Katay who appears to feel United States monetary and economic reform plan is designed in part to cut down his personal powers and reduce his chances for material gain. If Katay takes our proposal for monetary reform too personally, he may be less inclined to help us than before.

C. Possible future developments

It is difficult to predict what future will hold but to topple Souvanna, or to enlarge government with or without PL requires calling of a special session of National Assembly. Furthermore Crown Prince must agree to it and so far he has been solid ally in efforts to prevent RLG accepting side settlement. Once such session has been opened, much will depend on (1) the way Souvanna presents case to Assembly, (2) the amount of pressure PL bring to bear on Deputies and Ministers to implement agreement, (3) the amount of influence we can muster among the same group of people in trying to point out the pitfalls inherent in this settlement.

Parsons
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–557. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.↩