Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

485. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, October 25, 1957—6 p.m.

660. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD information. Re Deptel 422.² I learned morning twenty-fifth Council of Ministers presided over by Crown Prince would meet late in day to consider (1) RLG–PL settlement, (2) monetary reform and (3) enlargement of present government (not coalition). Our information indicated Phoui and Crown Prince had agreed oppose publication communiqué at this time. It was not until lunch time that Phoui could see me.

In order maximize impact I decided give Phoui personal and unofficial résumé of US position on RLG–PL deal as follows (in French translation):

(1) We could not be quoted as approving agreements as they stand.

(2) If they got through, under our existing policy we would reappraise.

(3) Some of provisions might well raise question of whether government is vigorously seeking to maintain its independence, i.e., on one hand taking PL into Cabinet and on other hand giving them governor of Sam Neua and fifty percent of functionaries in two provinces.

(4) We are not convinced that this is best deal RLG can get. In my personal view, we would be satisfied, albeit anxious, if deal were four-step process outlined to Phoui (Embtel 643³).

(5) We are considering most seriously whether danger to Laos is greater from accepting bad deal or from consequences of failure to make any deal at this time. As Laos depends on our support, I personally feel it is entitled to our considered views on this point. There has not been time for us to reach final conclusions. Therefore we think issuance of communiqué is premature and if it is issued we think reaction in Washington would be that a government which acted so hastily might also not exercise maximum prudence in carrying out the agreement. This would be an adverse factor in considering our future policy during reappraisal.

(6) Best course action would be Lao postponement issuance any communiqué until after all details integration PL civil military personnel and restoration RLG administration two provinces worked out in manner protecting RLG interest.

(7) We would like to have our specific criticisms of agreements considered with care and Washington given a chance to appraise RLG’s comments thereon as well as on modifications in agreements to which our criticisms might give rise.

(8) We have the impression that the draft of the political agreement which the Prime Minister showed us is not the text as finally agreed on October 22.⁴ We feel we are entitled to the facts if our opinion is wanted and our support desired.

With respect paragraph 8 I told Phoui our information re political agreement indicated shocking lack of regard for RLG’s interests and cited number specific criticisms (see Embtel 659⁵). I said we were concerned to study this and also military agreement and showed him analysis of each prepared respectively by Embassy and army attaché. I assumed RLG would wish to analyze with similar care as well as consider opinions its friends. Phoui had said even before finishing reading my personal résumé of US position that he shared my viewpoint and confirmed he and Crown Price would seek postponement issuance of communiqué. He was evidently surprised at what I told him of political agreement and said neither he nor Souvanna nor any Minister save one had seen text as yet. For this reason text could only be provisional and would be considered carefully by RLG.

Phoui then said he could not understand why Katay had approved communiqué although Katay had said to him, as he had to me, that application of agreements was important and text of communiqué unimportant. Phoui said if communiqué unimportant he wondered why issue it. Because of Katay’s position he said outcome in Council of Ministers uncertain but he would do his best. I then said in view interests my government this matter and messages which I had received from Assistant Secretary Robertson (Deptels 422 and 403) which I described I wished send officer late today to ascertain outcome of meeting unless this would be inconvienient. Phoui assured me he would gladly receive Embassy officer late today.

I see Crown Prince 10 a.m. twenty-sixth.⁶ According Phoui he is annoyed with sudden resurgence of drive for settlement along present lines. Unfortunately Katay’s attitude presents serious complication from his view point as Katay for him in one sense was counterpoise to Petsarath–Souvanna–Souphanouvong branch of Royal Family, whose destiny is entwined with this crisis.

As it is imperative that we have constructive aspect to our current policy, I have now twice mentioned to Phoui four-step policy first put forward in paragraph 4 Embtel 2077. I would greatly appreciate Department’s endorsement. During talk with Phoui I also gave him gist of Deptel 414 on Communists tactics in Czechoslovakia, Italy and Guatamala.

In comment I cannot help but feel that political agreement as now drafted is such sell-out that RLG must react. While it is no time for optimism I hope that once again in negotiating political agreement PL have overplayed their hand.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2557. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.
2. Document 481.
3. In telegram 643, October 23, Parsons reported that he had mentioned to Phoui the four-step process as outlined in Document 447. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2357)
4. As reported in Document 483.
5. Telegram 659, October 25, contained a summary of the operative clauses of the agreement signed on October 22 by representatives of the Royal Government and the Pathet Lao. (Department of State, Central Files, 751j.00/10–2557)
6. See Document 488.