Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

484. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, October 24, 1957—7 p.m.

654. Reference Embassy telegram 645.² As foreseen reference telegram and despite holiday Souvanna sent for me right after UN day ceremonies this morning and we had hour’s talk based on Department telegrams 403 and 414. Talk was extremely frank but calm although we got to point where Souvanna said he could not persuade me that PL were neither Communists nor Communist controlled and I admitted that despite intelligence documents to which we both had had access I could not persuade him they are. Despite his contrary view Souvanna has gone to extraordinary lengths in his opinion to include safeguards which he insists will eliminate danger and preserve RLG capacity to backtrack if events prove him wrong. While not wishing minimize in any way my own extreme concern at inadequacy of safeguards, proposed deal is now better than that of last December and shows awareness on part RLG of importance safeguards.

Given Souvanna’s basic thesis that PL are not Communist he apparently considered Department telegram 414 irrelevant and made little comment after reading our French paraphrase of Communist subversion efforts in Czechoslovakia, Italy and Guatemala. (I hope more effective use this material can be made with Phoui and others. British Ambassador is providing similar material to Lao leaders.) In course discussion Souvanna said he had in presence Petsarath asked his brother Souphanouvong if he had secret agreement with Viet Minh to which Souphanouvong replied in negative and offered take oath to that effect. Souvanna drew parallel between PL and Lao Issara and claimed US thinking now was like French thinking of [ten?] years ago when they opposed return of Lao Issara. I ridiculed comparison but Souvanna simply will not accept differences between PL and Lao Issara which seem to us so obvious.

With reference specific points made Department telegram 403 Souvanna sought reassure me as follows:

1) Our impression official transfer of provinces would be merely hyper-transfer with details to be worked out subsequently is not correct. Details are being worked out in mixed commissions now with political commissions agreement already signed and military one nearing completion. Thus provisions will be on paper before communique released let alone before official transfer. Souvana added that this disposed of argument that PL would be negotiating from both sides of table as member of government and as opposing party in commissions. Furthermore, we were not to think that 1 or 2 PL Ministers would exercise much influence with government majority.

2) Souvanna does not believe PL troops will seek frustrate RLG turn-over but if so deal is off and RLG will try to control situation. He also said that anyone who acts as subversive or rebel will be shot under authority recently passed anti-subversion law (Embassy telegram 636³). I said I could be sure that after he had worked so hard to bring about national unity he would [be?] pitiless if he found he had been tricked.

3) Souvanna frankly said Geneva agreements which others negotiate were outdated and unrealistic. He had worked instead for settlement on national basis and had excluded ICC from his deliberations and negotiations (this is true since eclipse of Sen). I asked why it was necessary to include phrases and provisions which were typical of Communist clichés the world over and he countered by saying they should be compared instead to Nehru’s five principles. I told him five principles were mere rehash of provisions of UN Charter which Nehru and Chou En-lai exploited for propaganda purposes some of which no doubt had discomfited Nehru himself. Souvanna considered it necessary appear to give PL privileges not mentioned Geneva accords in order to reunite country but he insists safeguards are there to enable RLG crack down if PL show bad faith.

4) Souvanna denies RLG has forfeited right call in foreign assistance if security threatened. He said Laos would not hesitate as protocol country appeal to SEATO and was in no way inhibited from seeking application of collective security under SEATO or UN. He recalled he had made reservations in Peking and Hanoi communiqué of 1956 and said that he could add to ban in communiqué against joining military alliance a reservation such as “so long as national security not threatened”. Without approving communiqué I urged him to add this.

5) Souvanna said law on civil rights provides amnesty but restricts immunity to period preceding date of promulgation of law. (Souvanna here obviously meant amnesty law itself (Embdes 61⁴) not yet voted.)

6) On integration PL effectives Souvanna assured me that total integrated would be less than five percent of ANL. I told him our position on this limitation plus proper screening and indoctrinations still stood.

7) I also told Souvanna we were far from clear as to measures contemplated for dissolution PL movement and asked what account he had taken of fact that movement like all Communist movements had two parts—one overt and one clandestine. While denying again Communist nature of PL Souvanna said any clandestine activity would be punished with death under subversion law and added that it was to counter subversion that RLG had set up civic action, reorganized SIDAPS, et cetera. He said these programs would be reinforced. As for my remark this story had shown PL pledges were worthless he answered that next five or six months would tell the tale and if he was proved wrong he would frankly so acknowledge. On question whether PL movement would be dissolved before coalition Souvanna denied our interpretation paragraph 6 and said that modalities for dissolution would have been fully worked out in mixed commissions before coalition.

8) In answer my query as to why Souvanna thought PL were eagerly embracing present deal whereas they failed accept what appeared to be favorable deal last December he replied PL themselves had changed. Most of leaders had now lived in Vientiane for more than year, had seen Laos truly independent, that conditions in capital were improved and had concluded that they as true Lao wished to be part of their own country. This led us back to our fundamental difference on nature of PL.

During talk I took occasion to say I was much disturbed by provision in communiqué that task of coalition government would be to implement agreements already arrived at. I could assure him that if Communist diplomatic missions came here and also bloc aid, task of preserving independence of country would be infinitely more difficult and that American reaction to such step would not fail to be extremely sharp. To this Souvanna said merely in answer necessary not to offend those governments and that his government had no intention of implementing this particular agreement. So long as even one or two ministers opposed receiving bloc doplomatic missions here their opposition would prevail. (This I took to mean that Phoui’s opposition should be enough to reassure us.)

At close of this long conversation I told Souvanna that proposed communiqué and subsidiary agreements seemed to me to confront Washington with two problems. In first place it would be necessary for us to reappraise our policy as foreseen in November 13, 1956 letter to him. I could not pre-judge outcome of that re-appraisal but should it be in favor of continued efforts to support Laos, Washington would then be faced with second problem. Given desire to support Laos would situation be such that we would have reasonable chance of success in Congressional representation for we had always to consider that request for support in certain situations might prejudice aid program generally. Under these circumstances I felt it was imperative for us to be given time to consider this matter further before communiqué was issued and I assumed that it was not his intention to publish it before we had such opportunity. He replied that he had promised Bacon communiqué would not be published before my return and it would not be published for at least day or two longer. I then said that I could do nothing more to persuade him of nature of risks he was running and therefore I had nothing further to say except that although I would not fail to report his explanations as given above I could not in any way predict Washington reactions. (This was said in order prevent him from misrepresenting our position.)

Recognizing urgency I will try send general appraisal before weekend but do not feel we yet have full story. Shift in Katay’s position and alleged enthusiasm of Colonel Ouan and ANL are hard to explain unless there is more to deal than Souvanna realizes. It is for this reason particularly I am most anxious see Crown Prince but Phoui who was to arrange audience cannot be found today and so I probably cannot talk further with Phoui or see Crown Prince before 25th.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2457. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Paris, London, and Saigon, and to Bangkok and Phnom Penh,
2. Document 482.
3. Dated October 23, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2357)
4. Dated October 15, not printed. (Ibid., 751J00/10–157)