Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

481. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, October 23, 1957—3:51 p.m.

422. For Ambassador from Robertson. Vientiane 627 repeated Paris 117 London 111 Saigon Bangkok Phnom Penh Unnumbered passed CINCPAC² and previous telegrams on proposed RLG–PL communiqué.

We are deeply disturbed Lao leaders including Katay have been taken in by language proposed communiqué (Vientiane 614³) and apparently fail see it embodies basically same kind dangerous settlement as earlier RLG–PL declarations. Although PL have on paper made proposed communiqué look deceptively better than previous ones, RLG has again accepted only PL pledge rather than performance before PL entry into Cabinet.

Implementation communiqué in present form might set in motion unfortunate series developments culminating in necessity U.S. reassessment its policy toward Laos (November 13 letter). Absence enforceable safeguards in current settlement plans makes widespread PL infiltration and subversion Laos easily predictable.

Best course action would be Lao postponement issuance any communiqué until after all details integration PL civil military personnel and restoration RLG administration two provinces worked out in manner protecting RLG interest. If you find however that general pressure makes release communiqué this juncture inevitable, we believe it essential attempt improve communiqué’s terms, particularly re timing transfer provinces and PL integration.

Phoui at this point seems likeliest target (especially in light indication Vientiane 634⁴ that Souvanna willing include Phoui’s views) for achievement U.S. objective delay release any communiqué until work mixed commissions finished or so strengthen terms presently contemplated declaration that concrete fulfillment RLG conditions by PL required before PL entry government (with consequent hope coalition further and perhaps indefinitely staved off).

Request you discuss problem with Phoui, drawing on material Department’s 403⁵ and 414 to Vientiane.⁶ You might say we believe it premature issue any communiqué before details integration PL civil military personnel and restoration RLG administration two provinces worked out in mixed commissions. If communiqué must be released now however it imperative for continued independence Laos that language current draft be changed to call for actual submission PL to RLG authority before any enhancement present PL position. We concerned 1) Souvanna’s description formal transfer authority as “symbolic” (since Geneva Accords recognized RLG sovereignty throughout Lao territory symbolic transfer unnecessary and meaningless); 2) actual arrival RLG authorities two provincial capitals will not take place till “seven days” after PL entry coalition government; 3) PL troop integration scheduled even later; and 4) mechanics settlement except for PL participation government are left to mixed commissions to haggle over after main concession (coalition) already in possession PL.

You might tell Phoui we aware Lao desire reunification but precipitate issuance communiqué advantageous to PL will not bring about settlement of kind RLG intends. You should make clear to Phoui and others that in any agreement with PL U.S. will closely examine each step in execution in order ascertain whether RLG remaining in effective control situation and defending position recognized at Geneva.

We should appreciate your assessment present developments.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2157. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne; cleared by Young, Kocher, and Jones; and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Paris, London, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 627, October 21, the Embassy reported a conversation with the British Ambassador in Vientiane. In it the Ambassador told the American Chargé that Souvanna Phouma was set upon publishing the joint communiqué and certain of support within Laos for a settlement with the Pathet Lao along the lines of the communiqué. Support for the settlement was so widespread, according to Holliday, that U.S.-British attempts to block issuance of the communiqué might well prove counterproductive. Instead, Holliday suggested concentrating on the details of implementation to minimize the risk of Pathet Lao subversion. (Ibid.)
3. See footnote 2, Document 476.
4. Dated October 22, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2257)
5. Document 478.
6. Supra.