Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

288. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 6, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Reduction in Aid Program for Laos

I understand that it was the consensus of the OCB meeting of March 23, although this does not appear in the formal minutes,² that the proposed $50 million aid program for Laos was too high owing to the small population, low absorptive capacity, and the absence of need of a force level exceeding 12,000–15,000 men. As a result, FOA, which is preparing its presentation to Congress, considers itself bound to reduce a figure which cannot be justified on economic grounds or to have a statement from the Department to the effect that political factors make full support of the Lao armed forces necessary.

I suggest that the following facts be taken into consideration:

1. At the time the decision to give military and economic support to Laos was taken, it was well known that the projected aid was a tremendous sum for a country of 1.5 million people, that supervision of the military aspects of the expenditure would be inadequate owing to the Geneva Agreement provision precluding the establishment of a MAAG, and that, because of the necessity of working through the French, the Lao Army, in spite of all this financial assistance, would not be fully satisfactory.

2. Nevertheless, the strengthening of the Lao economy and the financial underwriting of its military establishment were made an element of United States national policy because of Laos’ strategic position and its determination to resist Communist encroachment. One-fourth of Laos’ borders are contiguous with Communist territory (Red China and Viet-Minh-controlled North Viet-Nam); it is consequently on the first line of potential Communist aggression. The defense of Southeast Asia is far more easily undertaken along the Lao-Annamite mountain spine than along the Mekong. The country is already facing an overt Communist threat in the form of the Viet-Minh-sponsored Pathet Lao, presently in de facto possession of major portions of two provinces. Its importance is underlined by its designation in the Protocol to the Manila Pact as falling within the Treaty area.

3. Following the decision to support Lao military forces, Minister Yost, after a study by officers of MAAG/Saigon, recommended a force level of 23,650 men at a cost of 41.2 million. He set forth the cost estimate with the reservation that it was an approximation only, and that qualified technical personnel, which the Legation lacked, were required to undertaken a cost study on the spot.

4. Although not wishing to make a positive recommendation, the JCS, in a memorandum attached to a letter of February 16 from the Secretary of Defense to you,³ stated that the force level and organization recommended by Legation Vientiane would be effective for the maintenance of the internal security of Laos. The JCS recommended that, in view of Vientiane’s reservations on the cost estimate, a reexamination of the cost of supporting a 23,650 force level be undertaken by qualified personnel and considered this cost should not exceed $40 million.

5. Lao Government acceptance of the force level and organization deemed most effective by United States representatives has been made a condition for continued United States military aid in the negotiations for a direct forces support agreement which should open formally this week. Although accepting in principle a reduction in force levels from the current 31,000, the Lao Government informed Minister Yost that the Cabinet on April 2 decided “it would be unwise to reduce the size of the National Army or Guard until the situation in the two northern provinces has been cleared up.” The Prime Minister stated that, “in addition to the military consideration, a reduction at this moment would give substance to Communist allegations that Laos is abandoning its defense to Americans and would breed disaffection among those discharged from the armed forces.”⁴

6. For the supervision of the military aspects of the aid program, plans for the assignment to the Legation or USOM of a small number of qualified civilians with military competence are under way. A joint survey team composed of one military officer from MAAG/Saigon and one officer from the Controller’s office, USOM/Saigon, is proceeding to Vientiane this week to determine the number and functions of what would be in essence a small “civilian MAAG.” This group, through the Country Team, will reexamine the cost of supporting the Lao Army.

Recommendation

1. Inasmuch as the JCS have expressed the view that 23,650 men are required to maintain the internal security of Laos, and in light of the Lao Government’s understandable reluctance to reduce its forces from 31,000 at the present time, it is recommended that the United States adhere to the JCS figure. Proposal of a 15,000-man force would reopen the entire force level question, requiring the JCS drastically to change their previous estimate. Reduction of the Lao Army to half its present size would clearly be unacceptable to the Lao Government.

2. Support of a force level of 23,650 presupposes military aid in the order of $40 million. This figure should not be considered sacrosanct but nonetheless should be used for present planning purposes, along with the $7.3 million allocated for economic projects, until a valid and realistic review can be undertaken in the field by qualified personnel soon to be assigned.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/4–655. Secret. Drafted by Byrne and concurred in by Hoey and Young.
2. The minutes of the OCB meeting of March 23 are ibid., OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, OCB Minutes. A better source for OCB discussions are the preliminary notes on OCB meetings. The following extract is taken from the notes of March 23 meeting:

   “In discussing the question of the aid program to Laos, General Cutler said that this expenditure ‘fills me with horror’, not so much because of the terrifically large amount but because once expenditures of this sort start it is almost impossible to stop them and they go on year after year. Governor Stassen said that FOA considered the aid figure too large and that it should be reduced. The Defense representative pointed out that the Joint Chiefs oppose any idea of developing or attempting to develop armed forces in Laos and that the figure of 15,000 was suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff only because they were told to suggest a figure and that the political requirements situation was overriding.” (Ibid., Preliminary OCB Notes)

3. The JCS memorandum is Document 264. The covering letter is Document 275.
4. The quotes attributed to Prime Minister Katay in this paragraph are from Yost’s summary of a conversation with him on April 2 as reported in telegram 482 from Vientiane, April 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–355)