Office of the Historian

287. Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill1

Washington, March 29, 1955.

Another apparent difference between us that added to our bewilderment occurred in connection with FOSTER’s recent visit to the [Page 633] Far East. He urged the Government of Laos, while it still has the ability to do so, to clean out the areas in that country where Communist elements are establishing themselves in some strength. The Laos Government is fully justified in taking such action under the terms of the Geneva agreements. When Laotian officials expressed to FOSTER some concern lest such action on their part provoke attack from the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists, he assured them that aggression from without would bring into play the Manila Pact. This would mean assistance from the other signatories of the Pact to preserve the territorial integrity of Laos.

Some time after this conversation, we heard that both the British and French Ambassadors in Laos informed that Government that under no circumstances could Laos expect any help against outside aggression, under the terms of the Manila Pact, if such aggression should result from their own efforts to rule their internal affairs.

As a result, we have a situation in which the Communists, in the affected areas of Laos, grow stronger and stronger, and we face a possibility of ultimately losing that entire territory to the Communists, just as we lost North Vietnam.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–955. Top Secret. The source text is labeled “Extract from Message from the President to the Prime Minister dated March 29, 1955.” Attached to a memorandum from Robbins P. Gilman of S/S to Roderic O’Connor. Delivered to Robertson by the British Embassy in Washington. No text of the letter has been found in Department of State files.

    Also attached to Gilman’s memorandum is the British response, a long memorandum delivered to Robertson by the British Embassy in Washington on April 9. In it the British argued that “a precipitate recourse to force” in Laos would be a mistake, given the British view that even without Viet Minh the outcome of a fight between the Royal Lao Government and the Pathet Lao would be doubtful. Furthermore, the British believed that any “police action” in northern Laos would have international consequences and should be supported by a majority of the ICC in Laos. The British noted U.S.–U.K. agreement on the question of trying to get ICC support for restoration of the Royal Government’s authority in the northern provinces. What remained unsettled, however, was the course of action to follow should the attempt to work through the ICC fail.

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