289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Legation in Laos1
419. Vientiane 514.2 In light current indications French not willing engage hostilities, undefined character and uncertainty Manila Pact assistance to Lao, and patent inability Lao Army reoccupy provinces alone, recommend you not encourage Crown Prince to military action at this time. If he requests advice, you might suggest he instruct officers begin military planning for possible future resort force should exhaustion peaceful remedies now in process yield nothing.3 (Unfortunately hard fact exists that if operation not started soonest, monsoon rains will make it impossible until fall.) Meanwhile covert build-up Royal Forces two provinces (Vientiane 498 repeated Saigon [Page 637] 493 Phnom Penh Unnumbered Bangkok 212 Parks 991A4) could continue.
Explanation and summary G–2 comments Vientiane 460 repeated Saigon 471 Paris 89 London 10 Bangkok 18 Phnom Penh Unnumbered5 contained Deptel 417.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–855. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Byrne; cleared in PSA; and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.↩
- In telegram 514, April 8, Yost requested guidance from the Department on whether to encourage Savang to push the Lao Government toward military action against the Pathet Lao. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–855)↩
- In telegram 551 from Vientiane, April 19, Yost reported a conversation with Savang on April 16 in which he was unable to persuade the Crown Prince to take military action. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–1955)↩
- Dated April 6, not printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/4–655)↩
- Document 286.↩
- In telegram 417, April 5, the Department summarized an April 5 G–2 estimate that the Royal Lao Army would be unable to occupy the two northern provinces due to lack of effective cooperation by the French Military Mission, problems of supply and logistics, the nature of jungle warfare, and Pathet Lao and Viet Minh determination to hold the area. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–855)↩