Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

233. Letter From the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)¹

Washington, June 9, 1957.

Dear Chris: Thank you for your courtesy this morning² and particularly for advising me about the Macmillan and Adenauer messages.³

Confirming and supplementing my comment to you this morning, it is clear that Macmillan and Adenauer had been misinformed both as to the contents of the informal talking paper and as to the U.S. position in London.

The UK Delegation was advised clearly and accurately regarding the “cut-off” of fissionable material question in advance, they knew that it made no change in the arrangement to which they had agreed in February and as it had been discussed previously in the Subcommittee except to push the date back a year, which was favorable to the UK. They also knew that the agreement in Washington with the UK stood precisely as it had before. (See Embtel 6584 USDEL Disarmament 234 reporting on US–UK Bilaterial Discussion of May 29, particularly paragraph 2 and paragraph 5.⁴)

The UK Delegation and other Western Delegations had been consulted on all points in the informal talking memorandum before it was read to the Soviet Delegation on May 31st. (Embtel 6623 USDEL Disarmament 236⁵). There is some indication that Duncan Sandys is the one who misinformed Macmillan. Sandys is against any first-step agreement of any kind. He also went to Paris to talk to various officials and to stir up opposition to the US position. I believe MacMillan now has the correct information and that Sandys is alone in the Cabinet against a first-step agreement.

Chancellor Adenauer in his messages seemed to have the impression that the U.S. Delegation informal talking paper proposed the reduction of troops in Germany and in NATO, proposed a European inspection zone, and was in other respects different than Secretary Dulles’ statements to him. In fact the U.S. Delegation informal talking paper memorandum rejected the reduction of troops in Germany, rejected the reduction of troops in NATO, made it clear that a European zone would depend on the consent of the NATO states, and declined to give any U.S. description of boundaries for a zone. The U.S. Delegation also awaited Canada’s consent. (Embtel 6494 USDEL Disarmament 228⁶ ) before proposing the North American Zone. The U.S. Delegation informal memorandum was drafted to be entirely consistent with what Secretary Dulles had said in Washington to Adenauer and was designed to maneuver the Soviet Delegation in line with this policy.

The problem confronting the U.S. Delegation was to bring NATO into full participation in the negotiations in an appropriate manner along the lines of Secretary Dulles’ direction, without breaking up the negotiations with the Soviet Union. This was not only in accordance with U.S. policy, but in fact Chancellor Adenauer had the German Ambassador call on me in London to specifically urge that we not break up the negotiations before the German election because to do so would be very bad for his election situation. This was reported in USDEL Disarmament #214, Embtel 6270, paragraph 2.⁷ At this same conference the U.S. position was thoroughly explained to the German Ambassador.

Thus, when the first week of consultations with the NATO Council and the Western Four was completed, the impatience of Zorin, his complaint about being the last to learn, the statements that the Soviet Delegation was being placed in an impossible position, the rising tome of Moscow radio broadcasts, all indicated there was definite danger if a talk with the Soviet Delegation was delayed much longer the Soviets might break off on the grounds of the interference of NATO and Adenauer and their own complete lack of information of the U.S. position. Such a breakoff would have put the U.S. in a very bad world position and would have injured Adenauer’s election picture since it had been publicly announced on May 25 that there were new U.S. decisions⁸ and it would have been impossible to convince the public that a week or ten days later it was right for the Soviet Delegation in the Subcommittee to have no information whatsoever.

The talk with the Soviet Delegation was held with advance notice to the three Western Delegations and was carefully prepared. The talking paper was read to Zorin and a copy given to the Soviet Delegation so there would not be any misunderstanding of the complex and carefully hedged statements.

The Soviet Aide-Mémoire of June 7⁹ shows that the U.S. Delegation talk with the Soviet Delegation did have the desired effect of keeping the negotiations going, and of drawing out and exploring the Soviet position without commiting the U.S. to any new position or to any position that is adverse to any of our NATO allies.

Furthermore, we now have three important gains. We are finally rid of the old 1952 U.S. paper on 1 to 11/2 million force levels without political preconditions.¹⁰ In its place we have simply a willingness to negotiate later regarding the 2.1 and 1.7 levels with political preconditions.

We now have a Soviet Position of accepting inspection stations regarding nuclear testing, thereby ending the effectiveness of their propaganda line that testing should be stopped without inspection.

We also have a broad hint of the willingness to enter political negotiations prior to a second step of reductions. It would appear that these political negotiations, separately conducted, could include the reunification of Germany question, Zorin said that he consulted with Poland, Czechoslovakia and China, and he did not mention the GDR.

In summary the U.S. Delegation endeavored within the limitations of its instructions on both procedure and substance to bring the NATO Council into the picture without breaking down the negotiations with the Soviet Union, and without making any new commitments of the U.S. Government.

Sincerely,

Harold

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–957. Secret. A covering memorandum from Howe to Dulles, June 11, indicates that this letter was also distributed to Dulles, Murphy, Elbrick, Bowie, Wilcox, Reinhardt, and Smith. Another memorandum by Donald R. Toussaint of the Executive Secretariat, June 11, indicates that it was also distributed to officials in G, EUR, S/P, IO, and C.
2. There is no record of a converstaion between Stassen and Herter on June 9 in Department of State files.
3. Reference is presumably to Macmillan’s June 3 letter to Eisenhower (see Document 219) and Adenauer’s messages transmitted in telegrams 4709 and 4710 (Documents 228 and 229).
4. Dated May 31, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5–3157)
5. Dated May 31, not printed. (Ibid.)
6. Dated May 27, not printed. (Ibid., 330.13/5–2757)
7. Dated May 16, not printed. (Ibid., 330.13/5–1657)
8. For an account of the announcement of the decisions on disarmament reached at the White House conference on May 25, see The New York Times, May 26, p. 1.
9. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–857)
10. See footnote 4, Supra.