Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

229. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 5, 1957—10 p.m.

4710. For Secretary’s Eyes Only. From O’Shaughnessy. Reference Embassy telegram 4709, June 5.² Following is text Chancellor’s letter to Secretary which he asked be telegraphed immediately:

Begin verbatim text.

“My Dear Mr. Dulles: The news which has reached me in the last few days from London, Paris and Washington on the development in the field of disarmament disturbs me greatly. It appears that Mr. Stassen has transmitted to the Soviets in London proposals which, even if perhaps unofficial, are written and carry the full weight of his position as head of the US delegation, proposals which go far beyond that which you presented to me in our confidential conversation in Washington as the American foreign policy line.

“The NATO Council in Paris has the feeling it is being presented with a fait accompli of greatest importance by the presentation of these proposals.

“Our Ambassador in Washington informs me that the State Department on June 4³ again reaffirmed the basic lines of the American disarmament policy as you had described them to me and which formed the basis for paragraph four of the joint declaration signed by President Eisenhower and myself.

“I ask you to understand, my dear Mr. Dulles, that this discrepancy in the positions can bring me not only into a personally most distressing but under certain circumstances even into a politically fatal position. The declaration of Washington received a very positive response in the German public. If the proposals of Governor Stassen should become known, not only would the declaration be robbed of its value but it could conceivably become a dangerous instrument of all political forces working for a defeat of the present federal government and the abandonment of its foreign policy. The allegation would then undoubtedly be made that the introductory agreement already contains such substantial disarmament measures that Soviet interests in a comprehensive disarmament agreement would correspondingly be decreased and, as a result, the declaration on the connection between reunification and a comprehensive disarmament would be without meaning.

“Aside from the effects which Stassen’s proposals would have in Germany, I am particularly disturbed by their international consequences. I envisage a new and severe shaking of mutual confidence in NATO. Some of the proposals, such as those on reduction of US troops in Germany and the possible abandonment of American bases, fill me with immediate concern for the security of free Europe.

“Under these circumstances in which I consider genuinely alarming, I consider it necessary to ask your immediate intervention. If the NATO alliance is not to break apart, we must arrive at a better and more effective coordination of our policies toward the Soviet Union.”⁴

End verbatim text

Trimble

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/6–557. Secret; Niact.
2. Supra.
3. A memorandum of conversation among Heinz L. Krekeler, West German Ambassador to the United States; Elbrick; Walmsley; and Jacques J. Reinstein, Director of the Office of German Affairs, June 4, regarding the disarmament negotiations as they affected Germany, is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6–457.
4. For Dulles’ reply to Adenauer, see infra.