219. Editorial Note
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan learned on June 1 that Harold Stassen had given the Soviet Delegation to the disarmament talks in London an informal memorandum outlining the new United States policy on disarmament. To Macmillan, Stassen’s action “was singularly inept,” permitting “the disarmament committee to develop a kind of life of its own without sufficient control from the Governments concerned.” After consulting with other members of his government, Macmillan wrote to President Eisenhower about the incident on June 3. As Macmillan recounted it, his letter:
“expressed my surprise that Stassen had taken this action apparently on his own account.
“‘This is, after all, the greatest issue that faces the civilised world; it is one on which the freedom and survival of our island may depend: and, as we correspond on so many questions very freely, I would have hoped that we could have examined together the possible consequences of these proposals before they were put [Page 590] forward. I would not be straight with you if I tried to disguise a certain feeling of distress that we were not told in advance that this document was to be given to the Russians.’
“What made Stassen’s action even worse was that he had spoken fully to the NATO representatives on this question only three days before, without disclosing anything about his new move. I went on to explain to the President the difficulty which this might make for us; for amidst the whole series of complicated proposals the vital new point of Stassen’s plan was that there should be an early date fixed when the production of fissile material for military purposes would be banned. This plan would
“‘raise some tremendous difficulties for us and for our European friends. A cynical critic might say that, at the end of the process which they envisage, two great nuclear powers would remain: the United Kingdom would be prevented from developing the nuclear strength which she is just beginning to acquire: and all the other countries of Europe would nave signed away their right to defend themselves with these weapons for the rest of time, whatever changes may take place in the political conditions of the world.’
“However, I assured the President that like him I never thought it worth while to job backwards. The question was what were we to do next? Of course the Russians might reject the plan in toto, but I doubted whether they would do so.
“‘Their usual habit, once they have got a document, is to deal with it like a dog with a bone. They never surrender any bit of it which is in any way to their advantage. It is I think more likely that they will give it partial support. Indeed, there are great gains in it for them, especially as the conditions for inspection and control which they have always particularly disliked, have now been relaxed to a point at which evasion would be easy.’
“In the final passage of my message I reminded him that we already had received from the American Government what amounted to an undertaking that, whatever agreements might emerge, ‘the development by the United Kingdom of nuclear weapon resources adequate to her needs should not be prejudiced’.” (Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956–1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971), pases 301–302) Macmillan’s letter is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.