232. Letter From the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of State1

Dear Foster: Supplementing and confirming our overseas telephone conversation,2 my endeavor during these past two weeks was to bring the NATO Council into the negotiations without causing a break off with the Soviet Union, and to do so carefully within my instructions on both procedure and substance. This was a difficult move because of the antagonism of the Soviet Union toward NATO, and their impatience at being placed in what they called the impossible position of not being advised of U.S. positions that were widely known in states not on the Subcommittee. I considered that there was real danger that they would break off if many more days passed, and that this damage would be irretrievable and relatively indefensible to the general public, who would not understand that the new decisions made on May 25th about which they had read many stories, including comments by Chancellor Adenauer and members of the NATO Council,3 would not have been told in any manner to the Soviet Delegation.

The discussion with the Soviet Delegation took place only after the other three Western Delegations had been consulted on all points, and was then conducted in a manner that did not give the Soviet the opportunity to fasten on to any new commitments of the U.S. Government that would be adverse to NATO or to the Federal Republic of Germany. The memorandum of the discussion, consisting of a copy of the talking paper which was read to Zorin, was handed to the Soviet Delegation to insure accuracy of interpretation, and to assure the maintenance of the qualifications which affect nearly every paragraph.

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The informal paper includes the specific statement in paragraph 35, “The U.S. Delegation anticipates at a later and appropriate time tabling formal proposals in the Subcommittee and undertaking detailed formal negotiations.” The U.S. Delegation has consistently refused to respond on specific items of a commitment nature or on any detail in a form which could be accepted.

This discussion with the Soviet Delegation has fulfilled its purpose of keeping the negotiations going without any new commitments of the U.S. Government, and at the same time it has drawn out the Soviet position for certain significant U.S. gains.

We can now at last get rid of the 1952 U.S. paper on force levels of 1 to 1½ million without political preconditions,4 and in its place can advance simply the willingness to negotiate for 2.1 and 1.7 with political preconditions.

The Soviet acceptance of the installation of inspection posts for nuclear testing will end the effectiveness of their propaganda line for cessation of tests without inspection.

Finally, their hints at wanting to know our view on political preconditions and on the conditions of a second step would appear to open a definite possibility for developing separate negotiations for the reunification of Germany on the pattern of the requirement of the adherence of a reunified Germany as a precondition for the second step.

It seems quite clear that both MacMillan and Adenauer were given erroneous briefings on the contents of the U.S. talking paper. I believe they will both support our position in the London talks when they correctly understand it.

Sincerely,

Harold
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/6–957. Secret.
  2. No record of this telephone conversation has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
  3. For example, the comments of Stassen and European officials on the disarmament negotiations reported in the London Times, May 27, p. 10; May 28, pp. 6 and 10; May 29, p. 10; and May 30, p. 10.
  4. Regarding U.S. policy on numerical force levels in 1952, see the working paper submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the U.N. Disarmament Commission on May 28, 1952, and also the supplementary paper submitted by the same three countries to the U.N. Commission on August 12, 1952, in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 365–372. For background on the submission of the May 28 paper, see the memorandum from Acting Secretary of State David Bruce to the President, May 28, 1952, in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 2, p. 954.