Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

82. Memorandum of Discussion at the 288th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 15, 1956¹

Washington, June 15, 1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows Allen Dulles’ oral briefing on developments in the People’s Republic of China, the situation in Israel, the forthcoming visit of the new Soviet Foreign Minister to Egypt, and the political and economic situation in Pakistan.]

As the final and most important topic of his intelligence briefing, Mr. [Allen]Dulles said that he would summarize the latest agreed National Intelligence Estimate with respect to the availability of fissionable material for the Soviet programs both for peaceful uses and for the development of a nuclear capability for war.² Recent intelligence had resulted in revising the estimate of availability of fissionable material upward by a [3 words not declassified]. Very great importance was attached to the estimate by the intelligence community, and accordingly, and because the subject was extremely complicated, Mr. Dulles said he would read the estimate. He touched upon weapons developments since the airburst of November 22, 1955. He then discussed the estimated production of plutonium and of U–233 [235?]. He then touched on the revised estimate of the Soviet production of U–235, which he emphasized had now been revised upward by a [3 words not declassified]. In this respect he called attention to the dissenting view of two members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, who believed that the production of U–235 should be revised upward by [7 words not declassified]. Lastly, he mentioned the possible allocation of Soviet fissionable material among the various types and sizes of nuclear weapons. He noted the relation of this increased Soviet capability to the conclusions reached in the last study by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee on the net capability of the USSR to inflict damage on the United States by a nuclear attack. He also pointed out the impact of the revised estimate on the Soviet program for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, both in the USSR and abroad.

Mr. Dulles summed up his findings with the statement that it was estimated that the Soviet Union now has a significant multimegaton capability and will in the near future have a major multimegaton capability. In concluding, Mr. Dulles suggested that other members of the Council might like to comment on this new estimate.

Admiral Radford said he wished to remind the members of the Council of the possibilities of error in this new estimate, which possibilities he said were admitted by those who were responsible for the new estimate. Mr. Dulles said that the possibility of error was clearly admitted by the estimators, and Admiral Radford continued with a statement that the Council should not get the erroneous impression that they had been listening to undoubted facts with respect to the revised estimate of Soviet nuclear capabilities.

The Vice President speculated that [23 words not declassified] the new estimate might represent a Soviet effort to mislead the Western powers. Mr. Dulles said that for technical reasons it would not be easy for the Russians to fudge our knowledge of their stockpile. [3 sentences (68 words) not declassified]

With reference to the views of the dissenting members of the IAC, the Vice President said that an increase in the Soviet stockpile of U–235 by a [3 words not declassified] was in itself so significant that he failed to see that it made any real difference whether the increase was by a [9 words not declassified] as the majority believed.

Admiral Strauss agreed emphatically with the Vice President that the estimated increase was of enormous significance, whichever estimate was correct. On the other hand, Admiral Strauss said, he was not greatly concerned over the effect of this increase in the amount of fissionable material on the Soviet program for the construction of power reactors for peaceful purposes. Indeed, said Admiral Strauss, he wished the Soviets would divert more of their fissionable material from their stockpile for the power reactor program, since this would mean less for their weapons program. However, he doubted that they would follow this course, and expressed the opinion that the Soviet power reactor program was “largely moonshine”.

Admiral Strauss then referred to the so-called Killian Committee timetable with respect to the period at which the Soviet Union could be expected to achieve a multimegaton capability sufficient to launch a crippling or a decisive attack upon the United States. He insisted that when the Killian Committee’s timetable had first come to the attention of the National Security Council, he had not believed that it was altogether realistic. He now believed even more emphatically than he had earlier that the critical period for the United States with respect to the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union would be reached at the end of 1957 or at the beginning of 1958, rather than in 1959 as initially set forth in the Killian Committee timetable.

Mr. Dulles then brought up the factor of deliverability of atomic weapons as a crucial part of the Soviet Union’s capability to launch a nuclear attack on the United States. He suggested that Admiral Radford comment on this subject.

Admiral Radford replied that he had already pointed out the importance of the deliverability factor, in his 31 May memorandum to Mr. Anderson (transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 7)³ which the Council now had before it in connection with the subject of continental defense. Moreover, continued Admiral Radford, the so-called new intelligence on the size of the Soviet stockpile of U–235 was in one sense not really new at all. The National Security Council has known for a long time that the United States would at no very distant time have to face up to the situation which was now at hand if the revised estimate was correct. Indeed, in all our planning to date we have assumed that the Soviet Union would have a multimegaton nuclear capability at some future date. According to the new estimate, this date was now nearer rather than more remote.

Secretary Humphrey commented that the net of the new intelligence estimate which had been read by Mr. Dulles, was to emphasize a radical change in the estimate of the time at which the Soviet Union would achieve a multimegaton nuclear capability. Secretary Humphrey then inquired of Mr. Dulles whether the latter felt more secure about the reliability of this new estimate of availability than he had about the previous estimates on this subject. Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative, on grounds that much more evidence was available to support this estimate than had been available for its predecessors. It was clear, he added, that the Soviets have been putting a lot more energy into their program for the development of nuclear weapons than they had previously. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the new estimate he had read did not go into the matter of deliverability of weapons because this matter had not been in the specific terms of reference of the new estimate.

Governor Stassen inquired whether if, as the estimate suggested, the Soviets were relatively short in the production of plutonium, this shortage would not be remedied by the securing of plutonium as a by-product of the processing of U–235 in Soviet power reactors. Such plutonium would then be available for the Soviet nuclear weapons program.

Admiral Strauss replied that this was probably true, but that the United States did a better job in this area by making use of a reactor specifically designed to produce plutonium rather than to secure it as a by-product. Admiral Strauss then went on to say that he had been so worried and concerned about the new intelligence on the Soviet stockpile of U–235, that he had gone over the findings of the estimate with a fine-tooth comb. He added that he was convinced that the new estimate was as nearly correct as we could possibly expect. We were badly enough off if the availability of U–235 to the USSR must be increased by a [3 words not declassified]. It was much worse, of course, if the stockpile was [2 words not declassified] as large as we had estimated before the new intelligence became available. Dr. Flemming suggested that it was always possible that they might have even more than [2 words not declassified] as much as the new estimate suggested. Admiral Strauss admitted that Dr. Flemming might be right, but he felt that this was less likely than that they had less than [2 words not declassified] the amount we had previously estimated that they had.

Mr. Dulles commented that while essentially he did not disagree with the view of Admiral Strauss with respect to the Soviet program for the development of power reactors, the Council should realize that the Soviets are quite prepared to resort to an economic program for the construction of power reactors simply because of the political and propaganda advantages which they might derive from such a power reactor program. Admiral Strauss expressed great doubt that the Soviets would ever be willing to divert large amounts of fissionable materials from their weapons program to be used for their power program. In the same vein, Secretary Humphrey said that the Council did not need to get very excited about any economic activity that was not really economically sound in character.

The National Security Council:⁴

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to increasing Chinese Communist industrial potential; the situation in Israel; the forthcoming visit of the new Soviet Foreign Minister to Cairo; the situation in Pakistan; and the revised estimate of the Soviet stockpile of fissionable material and of the Soviet nuclear power program.

As the discussion of the previous item drew to a close, the Vice President said that this discussion led naturally to a consideration of the next item on the Council agenda—namely, continental defense. He said, however, that he would like to interrupt the transition long enough to warn the Council of what bad shape the Administration’s mutual security program was in, so far as Congress was concerned. Lyndon Johnson⁵ had informed him that at a recent poll of Democratic Senators, 31 of these Senators were recorded as favoring the billion-dollar cut made by the House, while only 17 were in favor of restoring at least part of the cuts made by the House.

With respect to this situation, the Vice President said he would like to make two suggestions. First, if General Persons called on any member of the Council to speak in favor of the bill to certain Senators, he hoped that this member would respond favorably. Second, if any member of the Council had any useful proposals to make on the subject, would he please get in touch with Governor Adams or General Persons.

The Vice President then went on to say that what was happening to the mutual security bill represented in a sense another failure on the part of Congress to follow the President’s leadership. Despite the fact that the leadership in both houses of the Congress is behind the President’s mutual security program, it was significant that while Sam Rayburn⁶ favored the Senate committee’s proposal to restore part of the cut, all 21 Texas Representatives opposed restoration of the cut. The Vice President said that this vote represented a reaction by these members of the Congress to grass roots opposition to the foreign aid program. Accordingly, we must undertake the urgent job of convincing the Democrats, and especially of convincing the Republicans, to support the Administration’s position.

2. Continental Defense (NSC 5408; NSC Actions Nos. 1417–c⁷ and 1430–i;⁸ Annex D of NIE 11–56;⁹NIE 11–2–56;¹⁰NSC 5606;

Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Implications of the Revised Estimate of Soviet Nuclear Capabilities with Respect to the Conclusions of the 1955 Net Evaluation”, dated June 7, 11 and 13, 1956;¹¹ Memo for All Holders of NSC 5606, date June 8 1956;¹² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Continental Defense”, dated June 13, 1956;¹³ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Status of National Security Programs and Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook Through Fiscal Year of 1959”, dated June 13, 1956¹⁴)

Mr. Anderson briefed the Council in considerable detail and at great length on the contents of NSC 5606. (A copy of Mr. Anderson’s briefing note is included in the minutes of the meeting.)¹⁵ At the conclusion of Mr. Anderson’s briefing, the Vice President turned to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Secretary Humphrey said he wished to state that NSC 5606 represented a most timely development and one of the greatest possible significance. We were now face to face clearly with a situation that all of us had for a long time realized was a strong possibility. This derived not merely from the new intelligence on increased Soviet nuclear capabilities, but was also the result of the tendency of the National Security Council and the Executive agencies to construct piecemeal national security programs as we went along. As Admiral Radford had so often remarked in the Council, we have been adding on new requirements steadily, and they had now led to incredible future expenditures which were in fact far beyond anything which the Administration was actually contemplating. This particular report on continental defense policy very well illustrates the general point he had just been making, with this terrific jump in expenditures for the continental defense of the United States. Moreover, for the moment at least there was apparently no reduction contemplated in any other national security program to compensate for the proposed great increase in the program for continental defense. On the contrary, all the other national security programs were continuing to require increased expenditure. Accordingly, the President’s recent request in connection with the annual reports on the status of each of the national security programs, as of the 30th of June, should contain three-year projections of costs, was absolutely essential, [sic] Only thus could the National Security Council at an early date get a glance at the over-all picture of our programs and their estimated cost over the next few years. If the picture for all these other national security programs looked like the picture presented by the present report on the continental defense programs, this would involve a drastic reconsideration of our national security objectives, where we are and where we were going in the future.

In short, continued Secretary Humphrey, the people of the United States haven’t any idea in the world that their Government plans expenditures of the magnitude suggested by the estimates in NSC 5606. If we propose to make such expenditures in the future, this will involve drastic changes in our national security policies and a very great effort to readjust the thinking of the American people along very different lines. In point of fact, they are at present thinking in terms of a tax reduction rather than a tax increase. In fact, the Administration is going to have a real battle on its hands in trying to avoid a tax reduction this year. In conclusion, Secretary Humphrey repeated his view that the present report on continental defense policies was one of the most important things that the Council had ever done, and we must go on from here to get similar reports on the other major national security programs, in order that at long last we could see the over-all picture of where we are going and what we are going to do about it.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget then stated that he wished in the first instance strongly to support the position taken by Secretary Humphrey. Thereafter, however, Mr. Brundage said he thought that the reports mentioned by Secretary Humphrey should be supplemented by still other reports to make the over-all picture complete. Thus Mr. Brundage called for a report from Governor Stassen on the prospects for peace and disarmament. He called for a report by Secretary Dulles (who had joined the meeting when the subject of NSC 5606 came up) for a report on the diplomatic and political outlook. Finally, he called for a report “by our sociologists and educators” as to what kind of a country the citizens of the United States would like to have in the course of the coming years.

Dr. Flemming said that he would like to make two comments to the Council. First, he wished to state his complete agreement with the views just enunciated by the Secretary of the Treasury. Indeed, we did need the frame of reference for which Secretary Humphrey was calling, and Mr. Lay’s directive that the June 30 status reports should each contain three-year cost projections was of great significance. These reports would provide the checklist of all our basic national security policies and programs. When we sat down and put all these together, we would know what we were doing and where we were going.

Secondly, Dr. Flemming said he wished to comment on the specific paper before the Council, NSC 5606. He felt that this report on continental defense placed before the National Security Council the most serious situation that the Council had faced since it had originally got together at the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration. This was especially true in terms of the so-called timetable. It was now clear that we had much less time than we thought we had before the Soviet Union will have achieved a capability to deliver a crippling or decisive attack on the United States. At this point Dr. Flemming summarized the so-called Killian Committee timetable, with particular respect to Period III—B, the period in which, unless our continental defense programs were fully effective and kept up, the Soviet Union would have achieved the capability of a decisive surprise attack on the United States. The Killian Committee had said that such a period as III—B could come as early as 1958. Dr. Flemming believed that it was now clear that this period could approach earlier than 1958, and might even now be imminent. Accordingly, the present paper must be considered by the National Security Council in the light of this possibility.

Dr. Flemming then said that he had appreciated the position taken by his representative on the NSC Planning Board, Dr. Elliot, when he had stated, contrary to the view of the majority, that even before 1958 the USSR may be able to develop a net capability to strike a possibly decisive blow at the United States; whereas the majority on the Planning Board had used the term “a crippling attack” (paragraph 1 of NSC 5606). However, Dr. Flemming went on to say that he was not concerned with arguing about wording, in view of the fact that the Council had heard in the last Net Evaluation Subcommittee report that casualties in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States would run as high as 24 million people. Even if casualties of this magnitude implied only a crippling rather than a decisive attack, such casualty figures were quite enough in their significance for Dr. Flemming.

Thereafter, Dr. Flemming pointed out that the proposed continental defense program in its entirety provided one of the most effective deterrents to war that could be imagined. Accordingly, it was essential that the continental defense program be kept strong. This, of course, raised the question of accelerating certain continental defense programs. This precise question was not before the Council today, and would only come before the Council in July, after reports by the Department of Defense on the vulnerability of SAC bases and other problems.¹⁶ Certainly, however, if the Council agreed that phase III—B of the Killian Committee timetable was likely to come earlier than 1958, then clearly the NSC must come to grips with the issue of accelerating the programs for continental defense. When this issue is thoroughly investigated, it may become clear that the main problem is the specific timing of expenditures for continental defense, rather than the amount of accumulating expenditure for continental defense over a long period of years.

Dr. Flemming concluded by stating his desire strongly to emphasize the significance of the new civil defense program. As he had suggested earlier, human resources may emerge as the limiting factor on the ability of the United States to withstand a Soviet nuclear attack. Despite this fact, the Council and the Administration had never really come to grips with the problem of civil defense. Dr. Flemming was sure that NSC 5606 was sound in calling for greater Federal emphasis and direction of the civil defense program. He urged that the issue of civil defense be met by the Council head-on, something which it had refused to do up to this point. Such a head-on confrontation was, of course bound to have significant fiscal implications.

The Vice President commented that from his reading of the Financial Appendix to NSC 5606, the programs in which the rising costs were most notable for the future were in (1) the area of civil defense and (2) defense against air vehicles. Dr. Flemming agreed with the Vice President, but pointed out that the projected increase in civil defense would occur only after the policy set forth in NSC 5606 was agreed to by the Council and the President, and not otherwise. By and large, Dr. Flemming said, he thought the civil defense program was the single most important proposal in this new policy statement.

Mr. Ralph Spear then asked the Vice President’s permission to give to the National Security Council the views of Governor Peterson on the civil defense program, explaining that, unhappily, Governor Peterson was unable to be present himself. Mr. Spear said that Governor Peterson felt strongly, as did Dr. Flemming, he judged, that this Administration had simply not come to grips with the civil defense problem in the United States. All kinds of studies had been made within the Government and outside. The results of nearly all of these studies agreed that a stronger Federal role was essential if civil defense was ever to be at all effective. With respect to the costly shelter program alluded to in NSC 5606, Mr. Spear pointed out that existing law places on the Federal Civil Defense Administrator responsibility for the development of measures to minimize casualties and damage. Governor Peterson felt that in this situation he had one of two major choices. On the one hand, he could put reliance on measures to evacuate people from our cities or to measures for dispersal. The other alternative was to provide shelter against the weight of nuclear weapons. These were the two alternatives, and certainly the present law contemplated some kind of shelter program, the costs of which were to be shared by the Federal Government and the States and municipalities. Unhappily, however, it had never been possible to get appropriations, up to now, for such a shelter program. Moreover, as we now look ahead to the period when intercontinental ballistic missiles might be employed, and when warning time would be a matter of only a few minutes, it seemed foolish to put very much reliance on measures of evacuation as opposed to the development of a shelter program.

Nevertheless, said Mr. Spear, Governor Peterson did not feel that if the Council adopted NSC 5606, paragraph 24 of that paper would give him carte blanche to start out on an extensive shelter program. Such a shelter program would, of course, go through the normal budgetary processes, just as did all other continental defense programs. Indeed the estimate of the cost of the shelter program, as set forth in the Financial Appendix to NSC 5606, could be described as so soft as to be virtually liquid. The truth of the matter was that FCDA simply did not yet have the basic figures on which to reach firm conclusions as to the probable cost of a shelter program. For example, they did not know as yet how much shelter was already available and at hand in many of our large cities. Findings on this subject could, of course, greatly influence the estimated cost figures for a shelter program. In point of fact, then, all that we really have at the present time are the rough estimated costs of beginning a shelter program; that is, Mr. Spear emphasized, the total cost to be borne both by the States and by the Federal Government. It could be that these total costs could reach ultimately a figure of $20 billion. In conclusion, Mr. Spear repeated again that, regardless of Council action on NSC 5606, Governor Peterson would not regard such action as giving him a green light to proceed on an elaborate shelter program. He would, however, feel obliged to come up with a shelter program which would thereafter be subject to the normal budgetary process.

Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson said that in the Department of Defense it was felt that the approach of NSC 5606, in looking at the total continental defense program, was the wise approach. Moreover, he said, he agreed with Secretary Humphrey’s point that other programs related to continental defense were bound likewise to show large increases. An example of this was the program for increasing the production of B–52 bombers. In regard to defense against air vehicles, Secretary Robertson said that the work of the Defense Department boiled down to three major areas: (1) provision of tactical warning of attack; (2) ways and means of destroying attacking enemy planes; (3) remedying the vulnerability of SAC. All three of these areas, continued Secretary Robertson, were now the subject of intensive study and work in the Defense Department. Even at this point in the study it had become clear that costs in all these areas would end up being substantially higher than originally estimated. Thus, originally it was estimated that the Distant Early Warning line would cost $100 million. It was now estimated that the DEW line would cost $400 million. In the face of facts such as these, the Defense Department was making every conceivable effort to eliminate duplication. Even so, we will have, predicted Secretary Robertson, very fundamental decisions to make in the near future.

With respect to these comments of Secretary Robertson, the Vice President observed that there was now in the Congress very strong pressure for increased strength and effectiveness of the nation’s retaliatory striking power. This pressure came from both political parties. Secretary Robertson replied to the Vice President by stating that the Defense Department felt that the current program for increasing our retaliatory striking power was a sound program, in that it kept our striking power in harmony and in step with the development of our defenses against Soviet striking power.

At this point, Mr. Anderson suggested that the Vice President might wish to call on Mr. Robert Sprague, NSC Consultant on Continental Defense, who had made valuable contributions to the Planning Board in the course of the formulation of NSC 5606.

Mr. Sprague said that it seemed to him that in analyzing this enormously complex problem of continental defense, there was one point which struck home most forcibly. Both in our basic national security policy, NSC 5602/1, and in this new proposed continental defense policy, NSC 5606, there was an underlying assumption from which everything else followed in logical sequence. This was the assumption that, as of mid-1956, the United States would have achieved the capability to launch a decisive attack on the USSR. Further in the assumption was the estimate that the USSR would be able by mid-1958, now up-dated to mid-1957, to launch a crippling attack on the United States, though it was assumed that the United States would be able to recover from such a crippling attack to the point of being able to retaliate against the USSR and to destroy it. Mr. Sprague said that as he understood our national policy and programs, there was little that we could do, in view of Soviet capabilities, to prevent the killing of millions of our people if the Soviet Union chose to launch an attack. We could, however, and it was indeed our policy to preserve our massive retaliatory capability and to be able to destroy the USSR if the latter should undertake to attack the United States.

This being the assumption underlying NSC 5602/1 and NSC 5606, Mr. Sprague went on to emphasize his conviction that if certain of our continental defense programs, as set forth in NSC 5606, were not promptly accelerated, the assumption would no longer hold good and the USSR would be in a position not merely to launch a crippling attack, but actually a decisive attack, not later than mid-1958 and possibly sooner. This was so vitally important that Mr. Sprague suggested a recognition of this importance should be made by the inclusion of new language in both NSC 5602/1 and NSC 5606. For this reason, he said, he had written out what seemed to him appropriate language.

Mr. Sprague went on to say that while granting the fact of an increasing nuclear capability on the part of the U.S. Navy, for instance, he was nevertheless sure that SAC was still the main reliance of the United States in carrying out its basic policy of being able to launch a massive retaliatory attack. Accordingly, the ability of SAC to retaliate must, above all other things, be made secure. After this, Mr. Sprague read to the Council the proposed language mentioned above, which he recommended should be included at the end of paragraph 1 of NSC 5606. In general, Mr. Sprague’s language stressed the need to accelerate certain continental defense programs, because otherwise the USSR might be in a position to launch a decisive attack on the United States as early as mid-1958.

In conclusion, Mr. Sprague commented on the vital importance that SAC be in a position to get the required percentage of SAC planes off bases and in the air within the estimated warning time of Russian attack. Mr. Sprague said that he did not know what the required percentage was—whether 50% of the planes on the ground, more or less. But in any case, enough must be got off the ground so that they would not be destroyed and would be able to retaliate massively against the Soviet Union. That a sufficient percentage of SAC planes could thus be got off the ground within the estimated tactical warning time, was not likely under present programs and schedules.

When Mr. Sprague had concluded his observations, the Vice President said that his immediate reaction was to invite the response of the Department of Defense. The Vice President added that he understood that the Department of Defense would give its reactions to Mr. Sprague’s recommendations in the course of next month.

At this point, Secretary Humphrey inquired of Mr. Anderson as to when the Council might expect to obtain the reports of the so-called Prochnow Committee dealing with anticipated expenditures by the United States on military and economic assistance to certain foreign nations. Secretary Humphrey pointed out that the Council had now received a full report on the continental defense programs. It would get status reports on all of our Defense Department policies as of June 30 or shortly thereafter. However, we did not have the status reports on foreign assistance, and until we got the whole picture the magnitude of the whole national security problem would not be clear. He then inquired of Mr. Anderson when the Defense Department status reports and the Prochnow Committee reports would come to the Council for consideration.

Mr. Anderson replied that the annual status reports on the national security programs of the various departments and agencies covering the period through June 30, 1956, would probably not be available for Council consideration earlier than August or September.¹⁷ To this information, Secretary Humphrey responded by stating that piecemeal status reports don’t do very much good. Even this present report on continental defense, good as it was, wasn’t much use to the Council except as a warning. Certainly these status reports wouldn’t be really effective until all of them could be looked at together.

Agreeing with Secretary Humphrey, Dr. Flemming commented on the necessity of speeding up Council consideration of all the status reports on the national security programs. If the Council had to wait for all these reports to come in until next September, this might be too late a date for effective action in terms of the budgetary processes.

The Vice President likewise agreed on the need for a speed-up in the receipt of these reports. He pointed out that if what the Council had been hearing this morning was correct, a decision on the continental defense policy of the United States certainly could not wait very long, especially if the Council proposed to accelerate the development of these continental defense programs.

Secretary Humphrey again inquired why the Council could not get the status reports earlier than next autumn. Could we not advance the cut-off date from June 30 to the present time and thus hasten the compilation of the final returns?

Mr. Anderson explained the great difficulties involved in getting out the annual status reports and the three-year cost projections. He was seconded by Secretary Robertson, who explained to the Council that the authorities in the Defense Department had just presented him with their first “look-see” as to the prospects for the Fiscal Year 1958 Defense Department budget. Although this look-see was in a very preliminary stage, a very great rise in expenditures, even greater than the Joint Chiefs of Staff had estimated, seemed to be in the cards.

Secretary Humphrey commented that the Financial Appendix to NSC 5606 indicated a rise in costs for continental defense from about $3 billion currently to approximately $11 billion in 1960. If this was the situation in continental defense, Secretary Humphrey deduced that the total expenditures for the Department of Defense would probably rise from their current $40 billion a year to $60 billion or $80 billion in 1960 and thereafter. If anything like this really happened, the Administration would be faced with the gravest problems. The approach of the Administration to such problems, combined with achieving understanding of them by the American people, would be a tremendous undertaking. Accordingly, he repeated that at the very earliest possible date the Council must become aware of the trends of where our policies for national defense were going to lead us.

Admiral Radford expressed the feeling that there was no particular need to await all the details of the June 30 status reports in order for the Council to be in a position to tackle the problem just mentioned by Secretary Humphrey. In broad terms, at least, the relevant figures could be presented to the Council much sooner than next fall. Secretary Humphrey said that that was essentially what we needed and what he believed was possible. Admiral Radford went on to comment in the same vein that essentially he had heard nothing new about the situation in the course of the Council’s deliberations on NSC 5606. He had anticipated everything that the Council had been listening to this morning about the magnitude of the problem. Secretary Humphrey agreed with Admiral Radford, but stressed the fact that it was important to get the conclusions on paper so that we could see where to go.

Governor Stassen commented that the Administration was currently carrying out in the military field a number of concepts, strategies, and preparations which were no longer valid, although they had been valid when first undertaken five or six year ago. Five years ago we had all believed that the first line of defense of the United States lay in Western Europe. Now, with what we know about the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union, we have come to feel that our front line is in our massive retaliatory capability and in the stability of the American economy. The situation currently in the air is a very different situation from that which existed five years ago. This indicates that we should contemplate a major shift in the emphasis of our programs and, accordingly, in our allocation of our resources for defense. We do not have to wait for the returns of the status reports to realize that we simply cannot carry out all of our military programs, both those that were valid five years ago and those that we deem valid now, without facing an absolutely impossible financial burden.

Secretary Humphrey said that Governor Stassen had put his finger on the essence of the problem. He again called for getting all the facts and figures together so that the Council could decide on what we could continue to do and what we could not do. Secretary Robertson said he believed that the requirements called for by Secretary Humphrey could be provided at least before August. Admiral Radford concurred in this opinion of Secretary Robertson.

Dr. Flemming said that he wished to be sure that these figures were to include all national security programs and not merely those national security programs for which the Department of Defense was responsible. Secretary Humphrey said that this was indeed the case, and called on Mr. Anderson to get all this material together as soon as possible and present it to the National Security Council.

Admiral Radford intervened to express his agreement with the points made by Governor Stassen in arguing that we have been following both old outmoded concepts of getting ready for a possible future war, as well as new and more valid ones. He also agreed that such a dual course of action was impossible.

Governor Stassen pointed out that when the results of the three-year projections of the costs of all national security programs has been put together and brought before the Council, these reports should have included in them the factors reflecting the growth of the U.S. economy and national income over the next three years. Otherwise the forthcoming reports would not be all-inclusive. Secretary Humphrey indicated his agreement with this suggestion, but pointed out that the rate of the growth of our economy and our national income had been much slower than the rate of our expenditures for national security.

The Vice President observed that it was all very well for the members of the National Security Council to discuss here what we should do and should not do with respect to getting rid of outmoded military concepts. On the other hand, the Secretary of State may well have something to say about what is feasible and what is not feasible from a political point of view with respect to dumping old concepts and defense strategies.

Dr. Flemming then expressed the hope that all these figures which the Council had been calling for could be got together in perhaps thirty days. Thereafter he recommended that the National Security Council have a two or three-day meeting to consider all the implications of these figures.

Mr. Anderson then suggested an appropriate form of Council action on NSC 5606. He pointed out that NSC 5606 contained an estimated three-year projection of the costs of the continental defense policies that were recommended. He went on to say that the Council could and would obtain similar three-year projections for all the other national security programs by next month. Thus all the cost elements could be brought together in a single paper by late July. This being the case, Mr. Anderson recommended that the National Security Council postpone any action on NSC 5606 until this date.

The Vice President said that this seemed suitable to him if there were no objections from other members of the Council. Dr. Flemming interjected the hope that by this time the Federal Civil Defense Administration could have priced out more firmly the probable costs of its proposed shelter program.

The Vice President then went on to suggest that the Council might now set a target date for its meeting on the status reports on the national security programs. He pointed out that certainly the President himself should be on hand when the Council considered matters of such great significance. Accordingly, the Vice President suggested that this problem be scheduled on the agenda of the National Security Council for the first meeting at which the President would be available to preside. This he thought might well be some time around July 15 or 20.

Governor Stassen said that he had one last thought to express before the Council finished its discussion. He referred to paragraph 26 of NSC 5606, which dealt with the problem of public education and participation in the continental defense effort. He invited the Planning Board to consider the kind of education the U.S. public should have— namely, to be convinced that whatever kind of attack would be made against the United States, the United States would survive the attack, win the war, and rebuild from the ruins. In short, we must instill courage and belief in victory in our people. We must exercise leadership. The people of the United States must know that their leaders are convinced that the country will come through any ordeal that it may be called upon to face.

The National Security Council:¹⁸

a. Noted and discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5606, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to the reference NSC Actions, and the views of the Chairman, Net Evaluation Subcommittee, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, transmitted by the reference memoranda of June 7, 11 and 13, respectively; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum on June 13 on “Continental Defense”.

b. Deferred action on NSC 5606 pending earliest practicable Council consideration of the estimated three-year projection of all national security programs and the fiscal and budgetary outlook thereon being prepared pursuant to the President’s directive circulated by the reference memorandum on “Status of National Security Programs and Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook Through Fiscal Year 1959”, dated June 13.

c. Agreed that each department or agency responsible for preparing an annual status report should be requested to submit, not later than July 15, 1956, the estimated projection of its program for the next three years, being prepared pursuant to the President’s directive; without awaiting the completion of the regular annual report on the status of its program as of June 30, 1956. The object of this action is to facilitate the early action contemplated in b above. Each estimated three-year projection should clearly identify and project the status of the principal elements of each program in achieving the objectives in applicable national security policies, particularly NSC 5602/1; together with expenditure estimates related to each of these elements.

Note: The action in c above transmitted to all appropriate departments and agencies for implementation.

[Here follow the remaining three agenda items concerning the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, and East Germany, scheduled for publication in Volumes XXVI and XXVII.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 18.
2. Reference presumably is to NIE 11–2–56, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,” dated June 8. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)
3. See footnote 4, supra.
4. The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1573, approved by the President on July 9. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
5. Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D–Tex.), Senate Majority Leader.
6. Representative Sam Rayburn (D–Tex.), Speaker of the House.
7. Regarding NSC Action No. 1417, see footnote 8, Document 28.
8. Regarding NSC Action No. 1430, see footnote 9, Document 30.
9. NIE 11–56, “Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1959,” dated March 6, is not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)
10. NIE 11–2–56, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,” dated June 8, is not printed. (Ibid.)
11. The June 7 memorandum is filed in the minutes. The June 11 memorandum transmitted a memorandum from Allen Dulles to Dillon Anderson and a May 31 memorandum by Radford; see footnotes 4 and 5, Document 81. The June 13 memorandum transmitted a June 12 memorandum from Admiral Strauss. The June 11 and June 13 memoranda are in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5605 Series.
12. Not found in the Eisenhower Library or in Department of State files.
13. This memorandum transmitted the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Continental Defense (NSC 5606). The Joint Chiefs found NSC 5606 to be generally acceptable, from the military point of view, as a statement of policy on continental defense to replace NSC 5408. However, they suggested certain specific changes to be incorporated in NSC 5606 before its approval. These changes were contained in an Appendix attached to their memorandum to Secretary Wilson, dated June 12. Their memorandum of June 12 and the June 13 memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council are in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Continental Defense (NSC 5606).
14. This memorandum contained a directive by the President on the subject of (1) departmental and agency annual reports on the status of national security programs, and (2) a report by the Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget on the fiscal and budgetary outlook through fiscal year 1959. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5609 Series)
15. The briefing note is filed in the minutes.
16. See Document 86.
17. See Documents 84 and 85.
18. Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1574, approved by the President on July 9. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)