Because of the President’s intimate and first-hand knowledge of this
whole problem, I think you will agree that there is no one whose
judgment in these matters is equal to his. I therefore plan to discuss
this problem with him at an appropriate time, and am sending you the
attached memorandum in advance to indicate the nature of the problem as
I see it. I would, of course, wish to have you present when I
[Page 334]
raise this matter with the
President. I will get in touch with you when I ask for the appointment
to see him.2
[Enclosure]
PRESERVATION OF U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES, OPERATING RIGHTS,
AND FACILITIES
1. The Present Situation.
Throughout the world, we are faced with political developments which
threaten the continuance of many U.S. overseas military bases,
operating rights, and facilities in friendly and allied countries.
In Iceland and Saudi Arabia, our existing base rights are in
jeopardy. In Morocco, and to a somewhat lesser extent in the Azores,
we are faced with difficult negotiations whose outcome is uncertain.
In the Philippines and Okinawa, local opposition in some aspects of
our overseas base programs has become so outspoken that the
maintenance of our existing facilities is becoming a major internal
political issue. In Thailand, criticism is beginning to mount, led
by opposition elements. Even in Spain there are signs of possible
trouble. Our British allies have already suffered from the general
change of attitude and are faced with the loss of their existing
bases and military rights in Ceylon and with major complications in
Cyprus and Singapore.
2. The Basis of Our Existing
System and the Trend of the Future.
The basis of our present system of U.S. military bases, operating
rights, and facilities overseas stemmed from the Stalinist post-war
policy of the use of force and the threat of violence (insurrection
in Greece, absorption of European satellites, division of Germany,
Berlin blockade, Communist-led uprisings in Vietnam and the
Philippines,
[Page 335]
armed
aggression in Korea, etc.). Our present overseas system largely
developed following the aggression in Korea which caused a psychosis
of fear in many free nations which did not alone have the capacity
to defend themselves. They therefore welcomed the added protection
which they received as a result of granting to the U.S. military
rights and facilities which would serve to deter Communist attack or
to protect them in the event of Communist aggression. The general
pattern of cooperation from host countries that sought U.S.
protection facilicated acquisition of base rights on reasonable
terms, even from countries whose primary interest was in securing a
financial quid pro quo (such as Saudi Arabia and Libya).
However, in the past eighteen months: (a) as a result of the major
change in Soviet tactics, the general impression has been created
that the danger of aggression and war has very substantially
receded; (b) growth of nuclear capabilities has incited fear that
U.S. bases may be a primary object of Soviet nuclear attack, with
“fall-out” which would wipe out the surrounding population; (c) the
Soviets have been stressing that they wish to help countries solve
their economic problems, that there are no political strings
attached, and that they do not want any military bases or rights
because these are an infringement on sovereignty but that they are
willing to supply military equipment without strings or conditions
attached; (d) there has been everywhere a growing spirit of
nationalism which in many instances regards the granting of military
rights and facilities as a derogation of national sovereignty.
The above factors, together with natural frictions and jealousies on
the part of local populations which are inevitable where substantial
numbers of foreign troops are stationed for a long time within a
country, have combined to sharpen local opposition to U.S. military
operating rights and facilities overseas, even by non-Communist
elements and to make them internal political issues.
3. The Necessity for U.S.
Flexibility of Approach in Modifying Existing Programs.
To summarize, a strong tide is running against our present foreign
base positions. If they are not to be engulfed by this tide, if we
are to preserve our vitally important existing facilities but also
prevent present allies from becoming hostile or neutral, we must be
prepared to consider modifying some of our existing arrangements and
procedures with respect to overseas bases and rights, and bringing
them into keeping with the political and psychological realities of
today and tomorrow. As history has proved with respect to the
overseas positions of both the French and the British (Indochina,
North Africa, Cyprus, etc.), we would not be able to maintain our
existing facilities with a friendly enviroment if we wait until the
pressures against them
[Page 336]
have become so great that nothing but total ejection will meet the
local demands. We must assess the situation in the different
countries most carefully and consider whether modifications should
not, in some cases, be made to anticipate a time when irresistible
pressures are built
It seems evident that if we are incapable of being flexible in the
face of changing local conditions, we will create difficulties and
will undermine local governments and political elements which are
friendly to the U.S. It therefore seems imperative, in the interest
not only of maintaining to the maximum extent possible our existing
rights and facilities so as to deter Communist aggression but also
in the overriding interest of preserving the position of U.S.
leadership in the effort for free world unity, that we promptly
re-examine our present program.
4. The Need to Develop the Idea of
Common Interest and to Eliminate Symbols Interpreted as a
Derogation of National Sovereignty.
We must find effective ways practically to demonstrate, through
actual handling of U.S. overseas military facilities, that they are
important elements of collective security for deterring aggression,
and that the local people concerned have a full and mutual interest
in the enterprise. Where this is done in Europe, with NATO, our bases are least under fire.
We have had some success in developing a feeling of a collective and
cooperative effort for a common end. We should begin now to explore
what lines of action we can follow which will, with least sacrifice
of military utility, increase the local sense of participation and
self-interest in our other overseas military operations. In other
words, we must develop the feeling that U.S. military rights and
facilities are part of the security system of the host country. The
sense of common interest will be valuable even in countries where
local interest is primarily focused on financial returns from U.S.
bases. In other host countries, it will be invaluable.
5. Outline of Study
Required.
The Departments of State and Defense should as a matter of urgency
undertake a case-by-case study of each of the local situations where
we have military bases, operating rights, and facilities. The study
should include for each place:
- A.
- An analysis of existing arrangements:
- i.
- the actual bilateral or other agreements
involved;
- ii.
- the procedures which have been applied by the U.S.
military in terms of security precautions involving
checking and search of visitors at installations,
the flying of flags, local employment, etc.
- B.
- Analysis of the local political and economic factors which
affect, favorably or unfavorably, maintenance of U.S.
facillities.
- C.
- The desirability of various changes in existing
facilities, designed to obtain greater over-all stability of
our position.
- D.
- Analysis of the relative strategic value and political
feasibility of securing alternative bases elsewhere.
6. The study should be made at a
sufficiently high level and with enough rapidity to enable
conclusions to be promptly arrived at, for time is of the
essence.
