Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

85. Memorandum of Discussion at the 292d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 9, 1956¹

Washington, August 9, 1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Reduction of SAC Vulnerability (NSC Actions Nos. 1430–d, 1488 and 1574²)

Mr. Dillon Anderson opened the meeting by noting that the first two items on today’s agenda were informational in nature and both related to continental defense. The first was a further report on measures designed to lessen the vulnerability to attack of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the last report on that subject having been made to the Council in December, 1955.³ Today’s report, he said, would take into account the Killian Committee recommendations made last year, the new intelligence on Soviet nuclear and delivery capability, and the recommendations made to the Planning Board and the Council by Mr. Robert Sprague in connection with the draft revision of continental defense policy. Mr. Anderson noted that Mr. Sprague, the Council’s Consultant on Continental Defense, was in attendance at the meeting for purposes of the continental defense items to be considered. Mr. Anderson then introduced General R. C. Lindsay who, with the use of several charts, briefed the Council on the Air Force program objectives for increasing the deterrent and strike potential of SAC (SAC vulnerability).⁴

General Lindsay advised that the Air Force has recently completed an exhaustive study of all aspects of SAC vulnerability to determine the actions necessary to insure that our strategic forces can be preserved, protected and effectively employed. Whereas the Technological Capabilities Panel report (Killian report) was concerned primarily with SAC physical vulnerability, the Air Force has directed its recently completed study to the entire vulnerability problem of increasing the deterrent and strike capability of SAC, including offensive as well as defensive measures necessary to enhance SAC’s capability.

General Lindsay’s briefing was in three parts: (1) Major vulnerability areas and remedial actions; (2) remedial actions requiring further study and research; and (3) Air Force program objectives which are being recommended to increase SAC’s deterrent capability and strike potential.

General Lindsay emphasized that the program objectives which he would discuss have not been related to budgetary considerations. He noted that practical considerations dictated that caution be exercised in embarking on a program which, while greatly improving our posture in one area, may limit our ability to maintain an equally strong posture in other equally important areas. He emphasized that the magnitude of the program objectives being discussed represented the minimum actions proposed by the Air Force.

As to SAC vulnerability considerations, General Lindsay listed the following areas of vulnerability and commented on each along the lines indicated below:

1. SAC’s Base Structure: At present many SAC bases have two assigned wings and are jammed with as many as 130 aircraft which create operational problems and present highly profitable targets to the enemy. Several SAC units are located in coastal areas where the amount of warning time would be insufficient to get the majority of the craft into the air before an enemy attack. To reduce this vulnerability the Air Force has embarked on a program to disperse to a maximum of one medium wing per base and a maximum of one heavy squadron per base plus their associated tankers. Although the Air Force does not propose to evacuate coastal SAC locations, it plans to progressively reduce congestion at those bases and to locate new SAC units in the central United States. The Air Force is examining the possible use of Canadian bases to support tanker refueling operations since this would improve SAC’s strike capability, enhance its target coverage, reduce reaction time and increase the number of weapons which could be delivered on the initial strike wave. Only a minimum caretaker type force would be assigned to those Canadian bases. Tankers would not actually be assigned; instead such bases would be used for exercise and emergency purposes only. To increase flexibility in SAC operations the Air Force is now studying the possible use of additional compatible non-SAC bases which may be required on and after D-day. There are 272 such bases in the continental United States capable of supporting SAC regrouping operations, and by 1960 there will be 75 similar bases overseas.

2. Warning Time: Warning time is the next most vulnerable area, according to General Lindsay. He indicated that since it was not prudent to plan on strategic warning, Air Force planning for the future is based on the relatively limited warning to be obtained from our radar network. To increase tactical warning time, improvements must be made in the capability of the continental warning perimeter. This requires more gap-filler radars for low altitude coverage, as well as an enhanced ground observer corps. Since the enemy can effectively end-run the DEW line extension in the Pacific and attack from the south, two possible countermeasures are being considered: (a) A further extension of the DEW line south of midway (this is now being studied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff); and (b) a southern radar net somewhat in the nature of the DEW line type of operation in the north.

3. SAC Response: General Lindsay indicated that an alert force is the best means to enable SAC to mount a significant initial retaliatory strike. This alert force concept is being studied now. Although one-third of the force on alert would be desirable, considerably less than that appears to be the best that can be attained. In addition, said General Lindsay, we must speed the decision-making process by which warning information is converted into action by the SAC forces. To achieve this, greater coordination between SAC and CONAD is required.

4. SAC’s Control and Communications Capacity:SAC’s control and communications is the next most vulnerable area, according to General Lindsay. A more comprehensive communications net is required. In addition, the Air Force is considering better protected control rooms, protected alternate headquarters, and a radiation monitoring system as well as a bomb impact location system.

5. The ICBM Threat: The ICBM threat has also been considered in terms of SAC vulnerability, leading to the Air Force’s belief that protective shelter may offer a considerable defense against this threat. An evaluation of the cost and effectiveness of protective shelters in the higher blast resistant ranges will be available about September 1, 1956, according to General Lindsay.

6. As to the vulnerability of the weapons stockpile, all of SAC’s weapons, as of the planned distribution for January 1, 1957, will be in relatively few sites, and over 50% will be located at only 13 sites. Of the total of 45 weapons sites, 38 will be on SAC bases, which are expected to be primary aiming points. A thorough evaluation of the stockpile vulnerability problem is an urgent requirement, and action is being initiated to cause this evaluation and to determine the additional actions deemed necessary.

General Lindsay next listed the following items requiring further study: (a) a southern radar net; (b) the extension of the southwest flank of the DEW line; (c) protected control rooms and protected alternate headquarters; (d) SAC requirements for use of compatible non-SAC bases; (e) the need for a radiation monitoring system.

General Lindsay next dealt with Air Force program objectives, emphasizing again that while the listed requirements are considered valid, the cost estimates to which he would make reference have not been related to budgetary considerations. (These estimates are contained in the chart which is filed in the minutes of the meeting and which is a copy of the chart which General Lindsay utilized in briefing the Council.⁵) The highlights of this portion of General Lindsay’s briefing follow:

1. As to dispersal of the SAC forces, $168 million have been provided for FY 1957 to carry out the initial increment of the dispersal program with the objective of stationing a maximum of one medium wing and their associated tankers per base and one heavy squadron and their associated tankers per base. For FY 1958 the Air Force proposes a $340 million expenditure as the second increment to obtain dispersal of the SAC force. This would provide 31 heavy squadron bases and 20 medium wing bases.

2. As to improvement of the continental warning perimeter, there is involved a total package cost of $33 million through FY 1962, which funds would be used primarily for additional gap-filler radars.

3. As to speeding the decision-making process, the estimated cost is $2 million through FY 1962, which funds would be used primarily for additional communications facilities between SAC and ADC.

4. As to the alert force concept, the Air Force is proposing an expenditure of $50 million in FY 1958 as the initial increment for construction of the unique facilities necessary for alert operations, e.g., parking aprons, alert hangers, taxi ramps located adjacent to the take-off end of runways, etc.. Initial and annual operating costs for subsequent years are also reflected on the above-mentioned chart.

5. As to increased control and communications capacity, the funds set up as a program objective by the Air Force include $2.9 million in FY 1958 and $2.9 million in FY 1959 for the purchase of necessary security equipment.

6. As to Canadian tanker support bases, the cost for initial construction is $28 million for FY 1957. In addition, $122 million would be required to complete the program.

7. As to research on protective shelters, such research is urgently needed in view of the ICBM threat. Accordingly, the Air Force contemplates use of about $10 million for research and testing in FY 1957.

8. As to reduction of the vulnerability of the atomic weapons stockpile, estimates are not available at this time. As a by-product of the SAC base dispersal program, some reduction in stockpile vulnerability will be achieved; however, further study of the problem by the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission is warranted on a priority basis.

General Lindsay concluded his formal presentation with the observation that considerably more money could be profitably spent in the areas mentioned above; that continued analysis of these problems will be made in the light of future estimates of Soviet capabilities in order to determine what changes or additions may be necessary to reduce SAC vulnerability.

There was no Council discussion following this portion of the continental defense presentation.

The National Security Council:⁶

Noted a briefing by the Department of Defense on the subject, based upon a study initiated following the previous NSC briefing at the 270th Council meeting (NSC Action No. 1488).

2. Review of Certain Continental Defense Programs (NSC 5408; NSC Action No. 1574; NSC 560⁶; Annex D of NIE 11–56;⁷NIE 11–2–56;⁸ Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Implications of the Revised Estimate of Soviet Nuclear Capabilities with Respect to the Conclusions of the 1955 Net Evaluation”, dated June 7, 11 and 13, 1956⁹)

Mr. Dillon Anderson advised the Council that the second item on today’s agenda involved a briefing by the Department of Defense on two separate aspects of continental defense: (a) The Atlantic and Pacific seaward extensions of the early warning line, and (b) the early warning and control radars.¹⁰ He advised that the date of completion of programmed improvements in these aspects of continental defense related to the Killian Timetable studies and in addition, that Mr. Sprague’s recommendations on these two aspects has been taken into account by the Department of Defense. General Lindsay thereupon introduced the Defense briefers, Lt. Col. George S. Weart,USAF, and Commander W.G. Boyer,USN.

Colonel Weart briefed the Council on the Air Force aspects of these two programs, and Commander Boyer on the Navy aspects thereof. Their briefings were substantially identical with the briefings given the NSC Planning Board by the Department of Defense on March 15, 1956.

In summary, Colonel Weart very briefly treated of each of the early warning lines, their capabilities and operational readiness dates. He singled out those areas where, by June 30, 1958, there will be a detection capability of upwards of 60,000 feet and those remaining areas where there will be a 40,000-foot detection capability. He indicated that by July 1957 the mid-Canada line and its previously planned extensions will be fully operational; that the planned NATO line was scheduled to be fully operational by the end of calendar year 1958; that an extension of the DEW line was now planned across Greenland, and that in 1960 it is planned that the early warning line from Argentia to the Azores will swing northward to Greenland, from Greenland to the Faroe Islands, and thence tie into the British radar system. He indicated that the North American Air Defense System will have a 65,000-foot detection capability by June 30, 1958.

In summary, Commander Boyer indicated that the Navy portion of this program called for five picket ship stations with supporting aircraft, radar equipment, etc., off each coast; that YAGRs and DERs are to be used for this purpose; that the entire YAGR–DER program would be completed by July 1, 1958; and that by July 1, 1957 the interim seaward line to the Azores would be fully operational, swinging northward later as indicated by Colonel Weart. He advised that the Navy portion of this program would provide some detection coverage up to 100,000 feet; that most of it would permit detection up to 70,000 feet, and that the minimum detection altitude would be at least 60,000 feet.

On the completion of the formal presentation on this subject by Colonel Weart and Commander Boyer, the Secretary of State observed that these briefings illustrated the great interdependence of our military and foreign policies—a factor which was not always recognized, particularly by some committees of the Congress. Indicative of such interdependence was the problem of negotiating for extension of base rights in the Azores in support of such things as the Atlantic air early warning barrier. Secretary Dulles noted that, when it was thought that Nehru would visit the United States, these negotiations were suspended so as not to conflict with the Goa situation. These negotiations were being held up again by the Portuguese pending completion of the visit of the Chief Justice to India. In view of the nature of Justice Warren’s visit, Secretary Dulles said he could not appreciate fully the reasons cited for the stand taken by the Portuguese. Nonetheless, he believed this did illustrate the sensitivity of the Portuguese to such matters, as well as the interdependence of military and foreign affairs operations. Secretary Dulles thought that in this respect the Canadian situation was much better, although the continental defense interests of the United States in Canada also involved related questions which were not always appreciated, particularly when such questions were handled separately by separate committees of the Congress which did not see such questions in their over-all context.

Secretary Dulles said he didn’t know what could be done about the situation to which he referred, but he did note that some of the assumptions on which military program objectives were based, as reflected by the briefings today, were complicated by economic, political, and other factors such as those previously cited by him. Being the Cabinet Member primarily responsible for foreign relations, the Secretary of State said he thought that he should make mention of these factors which consistently threatened efforts to accomplish objectives of a politico-military nature.

Secretary Wilson said that the Department of Defense was keenly conscious of the points made by Secretary Dulles. In addition, Secretary Wilson said he was also conscious of the fact that we had never before in our history had problems of the kind we were trying to cope with today. With thousands of our military and other personnel spread throughout the world, we had the problem of making our people realize that they were guests in these host countries. If we looked at our problems in a piecemeal way, he said, rather than in the proper perspective, we might become like the guest who overstayed his welcome. Accordingly, Secretary Wilson thought we must look at all of our overseas problems in this light and in a very broad way.

Secretary Dulles indicated that since such matters have worldwide repercussions, the Department of State had been looking at these problems in terms of running our overseas installations in a more austere fashion so that we might be able to remain in them longer.

Secretary Wilson observed that Americans overseas don’t mean to be offensive, but around the globe we acted as though the world was our oyster. This, he thought, was well illustrated by the story of the Britisher who, in commenting on this subject to an American in London, observed that “you are overpaid, you’re overdressed, you’re oversexed, and most of all, you’re over here.”

Secretary Dulles, addressing himself to the Director of Central Intelligence, observed that we had indications that the Soviets now have radars with a 70,000-foot capability. He wondered, based on the briefings at today’s meeting, if this meant that we were behind the Soviets in this field.

Mr. Allen Dulles confirmed that the Soviets do have a 70,000-foot radar capability. Since he was not an expert on our own radar capability, however, Mr. Dulles thought that aspect of the question could better be answered by the Department of Defense.

General Lindsay commented at this point that he didn’t think one could say the Russians have a complete 70,000-foot radar detection system in effect now. He said the Soviet’s 70,000-foot detection capability was spotty, as was our own.

Secretary Dulles said he had the impression that the Soviets now had a detection capability of 70,000 feet and that the United States did not have the same capability at this time.

Secretary Wilson noted that while he favored technical improvements in these areas, he believed another major problem entailed the human factor. Citing such examples as the recent ship collision off the Jersey coast, he noted that a wreck resulted despite the fact that the vessels had radar equipment. This illustrated to him the need not only for technical equipment but also for alert humans who had a grasp of their job and an appreciation of the need for thinking while on the job.

The National Security Council:¹¹

Noted and discussed a briefing by the Department of Defense on the results of a review, in the light of the revised estimate of Soviet nuclear capabilities contained in Annex D of NIE 11–56 and NIE 11–2–56, of the following continental defense programs:

a. The Atlantic and Pacific seaward extensions of the early warning line.

b. High altitude capability of the control radar in the aircraft control and warning network.

[Here follow agenda items 3–5. For portions of item 4 and item 5, “Suez Canal Situation,” see volume XVI, page 165.]

Marion W. Boggs

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Marion W. Boggs on August 10.
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1430, see footnote 9, Document 30. Regarding NSC Action No. 1488, see footnote 4, Document 46. Regarding NSC Action No. 1574, see footnote 18, Document 82.
3. See Document 46.
4. According to a memorandum from Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff to Secretary Dulles, dated August 7, this briefing was intended to be part of the background for the NSC review of estimated 3-year projections of all national security programs scheduled for August 16 and 17. Stelle also noted that the “security of SAC is vital to basic national policy; the protection of its retaliatory capability is the essential element of continental defense, and is so recognized in NSC 5606 (‘Continental Defense’) on which the Council has deferred action pending the three-year status of program review.” (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487,S/P Chron.)
5. The chart is not filed in the minutes.
6. The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1589, approved by the President on August 10. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
6. The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1589, approved by the President on August 10. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
7. NEE 11–56, “Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the U.S. and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1959,” dated March 6, is not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)
8. NIE 11–2–56, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,” dated June 8, is not printed. (Ibid.)
9. See footnote 11, Document 82.
10. According to the August 7 memorandum from Stelle to Secretary Dulles (see footnote 4 above) this briefing was intended to be part of the background for the NSC review of the estimated 3-year projections of all national security programs. Stelle added that the Department of Defense review of these programs was in response to the views expressed by Robert Sprague, questioning the adequacy of specific programs to maintain SAC’s operational readiness. According to Stelle, Sprague believed that “Soviet nuclear capabilities are already at a level and are continuing to develop at a rate that the period from mid-1956 to mid-1958 may be as critical for the US as the period from mid-1958 on, when the Soviets may achieve decisive capabilities. Hence he has urged the immediate acceleration of certain continental defense programs designed to preserve SAC’s retaliatory capability by extending the period of tactical warning.” Stelle also stated that the discussion of the Atlantic extension of the early warning line might invite questions on the subject of defense installations in Iceland, and the negotiations on base rights in the Azores. He attached status memoranda on these two items to his memorandum. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5606 Series)
11. The paragraphs that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1590, approved by the President on August 10. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)