Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

90. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 28, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Repercussions in North Africa of Prolonged Crisis in Algeria

Discussion:

I feel I must emphasize the seriousness of the situation resulting from a prolongation of the crisis in Algeria, not alone from the point of view of the problem which it presents for us in the forthcoming General Assembly, but in a much broader sense the symptomatic effect of the Algerian situation on Tunisia and Morocco.

The annual recurrence of the problem in the public forum of the General Assembly and the fiction that the matter is solely one of French domestic concern have tended to conceal a much more serious aspect, which is nothing less than the progressive deterioration of the entire Western position on one of NATO’s flanks and the jeopardizing of our own strategic and political interests throughout North Africa. The promulgation of a Loi-Cadre for Algeria² seems unlikely to halt the Algerian conflict and it therefore appears that the present deterioration will continue over the coming months.

Aside from the two principal combatants, the sharpest effects of the struggle have fallen on Algeria’s neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia. In these two countries, as in France itself, the question of Algeria is a basic issue of foreign and domestic policy. The fundamental conflict between the French policy of refusing to consider the granting of independence to Algeria, and the Tunisian and Moroccan policies of support for Algerian independence, results in preventing a settlement between France and either of her ex-protectorates on major issues of finance and defense which have been pending ever since independence. The result is a dangerous instability in these two countries and a steady worsening of the political situation from the point of view of the West, for whose interests in the area France is progressively becoming less and less satisfactory as an intermediary. This deterioration adversely affects not only the national policies of Morocco and Tunisia but also the interests of the United States.

Political. Moroccans and Tunisians naturally associate themselves closely with the Algerian rebels whose struggle they regard as a fight for national liberation similar to their own and whose victory they believe essential to preservation of their own independence. The people of Morocco and Tunisia thus tend increasingly to judge nations on the basis of their stand on the Algerian issue.

Outspoken demands for Algerian independence from nations of the Middle East and even the illusory postures taken in this matter by members of the Soviet bloc contrast sharply with the cautious neutrality of most Western nations. Western and especially American hesitations are interpreted as approval of French policy in Algeria. French use of arms of United States origin in Algeria implicates us in a manner most offensive to the Moroccans and Tunisians and no amount of rationalization can satisfy their feelings on this score. On the single great issue of Algeria, therefore, public opinion in Morocco and Tunisia feels itself drawn closer to the Middle East and away from the West to the detriment of our attempts to maintain strong United States and Western influences in these nations. France is of course the principal target of hostility, but even though our relations with the political leaders of Tunisia and Morocco remain friendly, popular feeling, which must sooner or later be reflected in government, is growingly dissatisfied with the United States.

Popular pressure is also a constant threat to the stability of the pro-Western regimes on which our own position and our direct strategic interests so heavily depend. Pro-Westernism becomes less and less attractive so long as the West fails to produce a solution to the Algerian war. Moreover, both King Mohammed V and Bourguiba appear genuinely concerned that continued conflict may in the end produce extremist leadership in Algeria, whether nationalist or pro-Communist, which will pose a permanent threat to the stability of North Africa and to the existence of their own governments.

Economic. One of the last weapons remaining to France in her attempts to influence Moroccan and Tunisian policy has been the withholding of French credits necessary to the economic development of both countries. Thus Tunisia which was to have received French assistance amounting to $43 million in 1956 and $25 million in 1957 has not yet received all payments for 1956; in Morocco, which has received about $75 million in 1956 and for which $57 million has been appropriated for 1957, negotiation of the commercial and financial conventions has proceeded by ups and downs, and the outcome is still uncertain.

While French public opposition to financing two states sympathetic to the rebellion is understandable, the use of this weapon is not effective, since leaders in Morocco and Tunisia, when forced to choose, respond to their own public opinion and forego the needed aid rather than make concessions on policy toward Algeria. Thus the flow of essential French credits remains spasmodic and uncertain.

The inevitable result is that both Morocco and Tunisia are increasing pressure on the United States to supplant rather than merely to supplement French aid as at present. Present United States aid programs are of modest proportions in both countries (for 1957 $20 million in Morocco and $8 million in Tunisia). It is evident that these figures represent only a fraction of French assistance, and one should remember that the approximate $120 million of annual French financial aid to these two countries does not include contributions in military and civil payments, pricing subsidies, and private investment. It is thus clear that a rupture of Moroccan and Tunisian financial relations with France would confront the United States with the alternative of footing a bill for which present plans leave us entirely unprepared, or allowing the situation to deteriorate to the point where our own political and strategic interests would be threatened and even lost to hostile influences both internal and external.

The prospect of such a rupture and of such alternatives for the United States and the West increases every day the Algerian conflict continues. If Algeria is lost after a further protracted struggle and on terms which do not permit the protection of local Frenchmen and the continuation of French influence and French investment in North Africa, the United States and the West would be faced with an immensely difficult and costly task in preserving an important sector of the Mediterranean and the NATO area.

Military. Another consequence of the Algerian conflict has been the presence of French troops in Morocco and Tunisia. The mission of these forces, which includes protecting the flanks of Algeria and preventing arms from crossing the border, inevitably involves clashes with Moroccans and Tunisians. Despite temporary agreements and partial withdrawals of French troops from Morocco and Tunisia, a major source of friction persists. No real solution to this problem is possible and no definitive defense arrangements with France can be made until the Algerian conflict ends.

This situation has a direct adverse effect on the United States-operated bases in Morocco, which are still legally dependent on the French status. The chief reason that, after nearly four months of negotiation, we have made no real progress toward a base agreement is that the Moroccans are still groping for a satisfactory defense framework, acceptable to public opinion, in which United States bases and troops, as well as French and Spanish, will fit. No such framework can be devised so long as the Algerian war perpetuates the status of French troops as an occupying army.

Thus it will be seen that the political, economic, and military interests of the entire West, as well as the direct interests of the United States, are increasingly threatened throughout North Africa by the continuation of the Algerian war.

Recommendation:

That upon occasions in the future when the Algerian conflict is discussed with the French we mention appropriate aspects of the situation indicated above and make clear that we are preoccupied not only by the problems of UNGA strategy but also by the serious threat to area stability and Western interests in North Africa posed by the Algerian conflict.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/8–2857. Secret. Originally prepared as an attachment to briefing papers for the Secretary’s September 1 conversation with Pineau. (Telegram 1009 to Paris, September 12; ibid., 751S.00/9–1257)
2. The proposed basic law proclaimed that Algeria was an integral part of France composed of federated territories each administering its own affairs. Since a single electoral college was to be instituted, Muslim local control would have been established subject to French overrule. This issue brought down the Bourgès-Maunoury government on September 30. In January 1958, however, a revised Loi-Cadre was implemented.
3. The source text bears no indication of approval or disapproval.