Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

89. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, August 10, 1957—1 p.m.

703. During past few weeks we have discussed Algeria with Bourges, Mollet, Pineau, Morice, Lacoste, Abel, Thomas, Felix of Lacoste’s Cabinet, Champeix, Langlais of Foreign Office and many others. Out of these conversations and on basis our best assessment situation at present time, we present following for Department’s consideration:

1. French appear more firmly resolved than ever not to offer independence or speak of independence in connection Algeria. Among reasons for this attitude are:

(a) Government believes neither it nor any other government which accepted independence now or for future could stay in office.

(b) Lacoste continues in office with apparent full support Bourges.

(c) French appear more confident in success their pacification operations including program for sealing Tunisian frontier and stepped-up military activities.

(d) French believe FLN disorganized and lacking coordination and effective leadership. They believe external representatives do not enjoy confidence leaders of rebellion and hope latter can be gradually weaned over to cooperate with French.

(e) French believe they can win Algerian support only by convincing Algerians France intends to stay and will be able to stay in Algeria.

(f) French argue real interests Moslem and Christian populations can best be served by democratic process insuring local autonomy with equality of rights all Algerians guaranteed by France and that independence would invite Communist penetration and control.

(g) Prospects for oil in Sahara provide strong economic incentive for holding Algeria.

2. French fully realize importance General Assembly consideration Algerian problem and necessity presenting most persuasive case possible. They hope loi-cadre now under preparation will be accepted by French Assembly and will subsequently enable France avoid unfavorable vote in United Nations. They realize difficulty formulating proposal which will attract support in United Nations General Assembly and at same time will not be so liberal as to fail in French Parliament. They probably prepared walk out General Assembly, but not Security Council, in case unfavorable vote. Pineau has told us France will not sever membership in United Nations.

3. We are unable judge progress in pacification in Algeria or predict what can be achieved against rebellion in next few months. However, it appears doubtful that any decisive change in situation will be brought about before United Nations General Assembly meeting. We believe it futile to speculate on what loi-cadre will turn out to be. Reports of its provisions vary from division into three or four regions to “Swiss” system of more numerous “ethnic cantons”, from little or no central executive or legislative to substantially strong head. We expect learn finally agreed details within ten days. However, from what we now know of general line governmental thinking, we feel sure loi-cadre will be unacceptable to FLN and will probably not go far enough win Moroccan and Tunisian support or even their abstention in General Assembly vote.

4. In above situation United States will face dilemma as French hope we will not only support their position but use our influence with other General Assembly members. If United States either openly opposes French position or takes neutral attitude, wave of anti-American feeling in France may well result. This will be serious should it coincide with further deterioration French financial situation. In other words, we might be confronted simultaneously with crisis in United Nations including possible French withdrawal and with financial and internal political crisis in France. This may be blackest picture but it is conceivable and many of our French friends are most pessimistic in their predictions.

5. For the immediate future:

(a) We believe French are right in their position that immediate independence for Algeria would be not only undesirable but dangerous.

(b) Efforts of France to develop Moslem participation through efforts on local scale and through promulgation loi-cadre may be too little and too late but they presumably are all which can be hoped for at this time.

(c) If rebellion should become quieter over next few months, if FLN reveals dissensions and weaknesses, and if loi-cadre appears be considerable step forward, it may be possible develop United Nations General Assembly resolution which we can support, which will win majority vote and on which French will not walk out. This would be best we could hope for and would get over immediate hump.

(e) [sic] However, our best estimate is that above conditions will probably not prevail at time United Nations General Assembly takes up Algerian question. On basis information now available we are not yet prepared make recommendations for United States position or for strategy and tactics to be followed in General Assembly. We should, however, like emphasize key importance positions and attitudes of Morocco and Tunisia on Algerian question.

6. For long range future, we hope French will encourage democratic evolutionary development in Algeria which over period time more and more French might support. Alternative, unless rebellion is crushed, could be return De Gaulle or coup d’état of right or military group. Evolutionary development might be brought about in several ways:

(1) First might be recognition right of self-determination and plan for independence within specified period of years or after certain conditions showing capacity self-government had been fulfilled, including guarantees for European population. French might well take leaf from history of our relations with Philippines. Development could be in context eventual North African federation tied to France, or French Commonwealth. French not prepared embark on such course now, but some future government might consider it.

(2) Second possibility might be internationalization Algerian situation in context Mediterranean security organization. This would presuppose improved relations with Morocco and Tunisia and sharp change in French attitude from that held at present. Such organization would represent clear attempt build shield against Communist penetration North Africa which some Frenchmen contend is basic problem behind Algerian situation. We note with interest Moroccan suggestion reported Rabat 131 to Department.²

(3) Third possibility would be attempt find “European” solution for Algeria in context six members Euratom and Common Market. Since democratic solution must be one supported by majority assembly, such majority must be found. In present make-up Assembly there does exist European majority upon which both Mollet and Bourges have depended. Conceivably statute could be evolved for Algeria guaranteed by the six. This might so far eliminate mutual distrust French and Moslems and with essential Moroccan and Tunisian support could provide framework for evolutionary development Algeria, both economic and political, permit France play role in six without drain of Algeria, yet at same time avoid both United Nations role (which French would probably never accept) and United States direct participation but not United States sympathetic support. Above would obviously require change French public opinion but this may become easier if realization comes that military measures and temporary palliatives will not bring about permanent solution.

7. We realize French Government and Parliament are in no mood at present consider courses such as those enumerated paragraph 6 above. However, we believe United States should think of alternatives for future since moment may come when it will be appropriate and important say some word to French about problem so threatening and potentially dangerous to free world as that of Algeria.

Houghton

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/8–1057. Secret. Repeated to Algiers, Rabat, and Tunis.
2. Telegram 131, August 8, noted that the Moroccans wanted the United States to suggest a regional association which would allow them to justify the continued presence of French and Spanish troops in their country. (Ibid., 711.56371/8–857)