Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

9. Memorandum by the Consul General at Leopoldville (McGregor)¹

Leopoldville, December 28, 1955.

The paper on Africa south of the Sahara included with Department’s CA–1535 of August 23, 1955, treats only “general goals and courses of action.” Within this limitation there is imbedded an admission which if it indeed frames the thinking of our policymaking arm presents a very sorry picture indeed. I refer to the sentence “as a result of this situation” (it is doubtful if there will be a major change in the military appreciation of Africa) “we can assume that whatever the goals of U.S. policy may be with respect to this part of the continent, our means to achieve these goals will be inadequate.”² In other words, what we are saying is that our goals can only be reached if the area becomes of first rate military significance. If this is indeed the case then we certainly need to change our thinking, planning and action. We should set goals that are American, realistic, realizable and ones that do not depend upon military action for their accomplishment.

The paper admits that “our techniques for measuring change in Africa are imperfect because our knowledge is limited.” It also states that “our policy must be based on potentials of Africa and future more than present estimates should be the major determinant of U.S. policy.”

In spite of these serious and crippling limitations, the paper strikes an optimistic note which appears to this observer as little short of wishful thinking. Speaking of the present “Western orientation of the bulk of Africans” the paper goes on to say that “at the very least this attitude gives us time to affect the evolution of the continent and opens up the possibility of securing an orientation basically sympathetic to our own interests and aspirations.”

If we have no policy and can only hammer one out as our techniques for perfecting our knowledge are designed, surely we are only deluding ourselves by pretending that time is on our side. The impending tragedy of Africa is that in its present state it is potentially the prey to anyone with a policy or perhaps it is better put—to anyone whose policy is one of direct action. Isn’t this what happened in Egypt with the Soviet arms deal?

I would rather see our policy based on present day realities rather than future potentialities; I would rather that this policy be of short range but flexible enough to adapt both to the gradual evolution of the African as well as to the perfection of our knowledge and improvement in our techniques.

The paper attempts to estimate what lies ahead of the area in the next decade: “continued Metropolitan domination of the scene albeit under conditions of declining influence resulting in greater inflexibility, more suspicions of outside influences and less sure of themselves.” So if we accept the reasoning in the Hadsel paper (i.e. “we shall have to recognize the superior demands of our alliance system in Europe”), the United States, being tied to the Metropolitan powers, will in ten years be devoid of a policy that will appeal to an emerging and awakened indigenous population in Africa.

There is, however, some evidence in the paper that the author has covered considerable ground and would like to stand for a moment, assess the situation and come up with a policy.

It is my belief that we must do so. The paper suggests that we should be more “independent” in our policy toward Africa—which is taken to mean independent of the Metropolitan powers with African territories. This, I believe, is the first step toward a sound and up-to-date short-range reorientation of thinking on Africa. If we can divest ourselves of the a priori thought that we need be tied to a first consideration of our alliances with Metropolitan powers, we can bring African problems more directly into focus.

Of course, it will be very difficult to make up our mind regarding the best approach to the formulation of U.S. policy vis-à-vis present day Africa. A profound knowledge of the continent, its people, resources, history and external influences is prerequisite to all considerations of policy. Mr Hadsel admits our deficiency in this regard, and since I must also admit to such deficiency perhaps much of my difficulty is thereby explained.

Over and above this fundamental factor, however, it seems to me that we are caught in the middle of the jaws of a vice of our own design and fabrication: Until we can free ourselves from this restraint we have no ability to maneuver. On the one hand are our commitments to the European powers—who are also the Colonial powers; on the other is our traditional espousal of the principle of self-determination and independence for all peoples. As in operating a vice, a turn of the handle operates both jaws at once tightening the grip. So the harder we think about the problem of U.S. policy versus Central Africa, the faster we find ourselves gripped in the vice.

We may think because our motives are honest that the African knows we favor his obtaining independence. Actually the African understands no such thing. He knows we support indifferently whatever colonial power is administering an African territory. This means we support the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique to the same political extent as the Belgians in the Congo, the French in A.O.F., F.E.A., and the British in their territories. Although there are many differences between the treatment of peoples in the Soviet satellite countries and in the colonies of Africa, we are seen to tolerate or overlook conditions in one area (Angola, South Africa, for example) that we castigate in another (Hungary, Rumania). We leave the impression that our stand on colonialism would remain static if it were not for the pressures of Soviet aggressiveness. This increases the “nuisance” value of the Soviet and makes them look even more like the champions of freedom and independence.

We are only too familiar with the bland manner in which the Soviet leaders espouse the cause of freedom only to enslave; we have seen in India and Burma recently how the Soviets easily reap the harvest that we who have sown should be harvesting. We are not succeeding in getting across to the masses the truth that the “new imperialism” of the Soviets is a greater menace—far greater than the vestigious evils of latter day European colonialism. Part of our failure is due to the techniques of Soviet propaganda which we cannot accept for our own without destroying the very ground we stand on. It is incredible to us that India, for example, should spend tens of thousands of pounds preparing popular receptions for the Soviet leaders in order to afford them a unique opportunity to sow sedition and lies, embarrass the Indian Government and castigate the West.³ The Soviets, dealing as they have with their own masses for the past forty years and schooled in the technique of mass propaganda, are skillfully playing on the emotions of those who do not think. We have yet to develop a technique that is successful with the same audience. We do not even seem to have an antidote.

If we could devise a propaganda campaign that would effectively destroy the myth that the Soviet is the champion of democracy and freedom, we might be able to continue our present African policy. But we are being attacked as “imperialists” and there is just enough substance and truth in the assertions to render us self-conscious and to others suspicious. For example, we are well aware of the oppressive and medieval practices of the Portuguese in Angola. Many Angolan Africans in the Belgian Congo are naive enough to believe that the United States, once aware of conditions in Angola, will do something about them. We who deal with these people on the spot are sympathetic and attentive, all the while knowing that our relationships with the Portuguese in Europe preclude our doing anything. Can we not see, however, that we are in effect driving these well-meaning and sincere Africans toward the Communists who will raise the cry and at least point the finger at injustice?

Now that the issue of “colonialism” is being moved front and center by the Soviets, the essential thing it seems to me is that we free ourselves from the vice—adopt an American policy versus African colonialism and use our ingenuity to get that policy across to the masses in a constructive and positive manner.

The United States should stand for freedom from all forms of oppression, for self-government, and for independence based upon self-determination. It is true that Africans are not ready to make a success of self-government. But we who threw off the colonial yoke—did we think at that time whether we were ready to assume the responsibilities of self-government? Does any oppressed people count the cost of freedom? Does it make sense then for us to say to the African that he is really not ready for independence? The more we attempt to ram this down his throat the more we open his ears to the Communist slogan—“Wake up and break the shackles of Colonialism.”

That “man does not live by bread alone” is proved by the ingratitude of the millions for the billions we give in economic and military aid. It is generally believed that we are repaid for these our gifts by some political quid-pro-quo, and our protestations to the contrary fall on deaf ears. The Soviets, whose material assistance to foreign countries is minimal, come along and “offer” the hand of fellowship in a struggle to throw off the yoke of imperialism and are everywhere welcomed and believed. So it is in Asia and so it will be in Africa unless we try a new technique or find a new policy.

Now our policy need not be novel just because it is new to us. It must be bold in the sense that we must free ourselves from the claws of the vice that has hindered our freedom of action. We should stop wooing the colonial powers (our N.A.T.O. partners) and instead let them seek us. Do we really fear that if we openly criticize proven injustices and basically espouse the cause of self-determination in Africa that we will sacrifice the cooperation and good will of those N.A.T.O. members who are also colonial powers? Does this barrier not exist really in our own minds? Is it not in fact born of our ignorance of Africa itself? The Belgian or the Frenchman who knows Africa will readily admit that the days of colonialism are numbered. Those who are liberal among them will say that the United States should bring pressures on the colonial powers; that these powers in their own interests should promptly divest themselves of the trappings of colonialism. In this connection I cite Brussels Embassy Despatch No. 430 of October 14, 1955,⁴ indicating that responsible Belgians have matured to the point where they are receptive to constructive criticism of their colonial endeavors. The word “colonial” itself is outmoded and serves simply as a convenient mechanism for Communist propaganda. What would Belgium lose, for example, by a constitutional reform that would read the word “colony” out of its political lexicon? And why should it resent a suggestion in this regard?

Therefore it seems to me that the United States should go to all appropriate lengths to ascertain the facts in a given area in Africa. If the facts prove injustices, they should be laid bare, if after quiet talks with the administering power no effort is made to correct the abuse. I am thinking specifically of present conditions in Angola. This suggestion is not so much one of policy as of technique. It is designed to sow seeds ourselves in ground that is presently bare and fertile for the Communists.

Policy-wise we should get away if we can from thinking of French Africa, Belgian Africa, British Africa, Portuguese Africa, etc. In so doing, we shall first of all prepare ourselves to think of policies that apply to all of Central Africa. If possible, we might seek to arrest the trend toward nationalism in Central Africa. Such nationalism is superficial and ephemeral at best in this vast area where primary loyalty is still to the tribe and where there are literally hundreds of tribes. Pride is more of race and religion. Why not seek to build cooperatively a Union of Central Africa? We should not start this in a political sense or even from political motives. Just as in 1947 we conceived the Marshall Plan and saw this grow into a many hydra headed thing, so an African policy devoted to raising living standards, education, economic development can lead to political inter-cooperation even among European colonial powers themselves.

Is it too late to draw up a blueprint for economic development in Africa that disregards or transcends where necessary the geographical division of the continent? There is something very challenging in a bold attempt to redress the economic imbalance of Africa. (Researchers could have reference to the Berlin Conference of 1885 that blueprinted Central Africa for fifty years.) If we of the Western World can organize for defense, why cannot we also get together and organize for development? When the heat was on we found it easy because it was imperative that we and the British aid Egypt in the Aswan Dam project.⁵ How long must we await decisions on other projects wherein we of the West have mutual interests in Africa?

It is heartening to note that the N.A.T.O. powers agreed at their last meeting to cooperate in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty. Is this the framework within which to think out quietly and then implement publicly a “new deal” for Africa? All are agreed that Africa is vital to the defense of Europe and that the loss of its land-mass to the Soviets would imperil our own security. Then why not while so much of Africa is in the hands of N.A.T.O. powers bring it within the N.A.T.O. orbit. But not only for military reasons.

Instead of an information program that is uniquely U.S., why not combine with the French, British, Belgian and Portuguese to present bi-lateral programs designed to sell the African on the idea that his welfare and future depend upon Western ideas, culture and political systems. From what I have seen in the Congo, we are not reaching the masses with our USIS material. As long as we operate alone we cannot do so. But in conjunction with the colonial powers we can reach them not with the idea of preaching America but selling ideals we hold in common with those nations from whose midst we Americans have sprung.

Perhaps, since opinions as to what to do are so honestly divided, there might be merit in the suggestion that another “Mr. X” article be prepared for publication in the quarterly “Foreign Affairs”. In it we could describe the dilemma. The writer could press heavily for a “new deal” in Africa—the last great land mass where modern techniques can be tried. If the article was properly tempered (as was the Kennan article in 1947),⁶ it would be read and bring forth some very useful observations. Then in some quiet way we could serve notice on the Metropolitan powers that we are going to move into the forefront in espousing the cause of self-government for dependent peoples; that we will use all prudent means to press for progress in this field; that we will use our vote in the U.N. in favor of such a policy and that we are doing so in the interests of the Metropolitan powers themselves; that not to do so exposes Central African territories to the undermining influences of Soviet propaganda and the Bandung powers. The dike in Africa cannot be held against the combined assaults of Asia and the Soviets without a “Marshall Plan” for the continent. In the meantime, we should so maneuver as to cut the ground out from under the “newer” by abolishing the vestiges of the “older” imperialism.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70/12–2855. Confidential. Enclosure to despatch 220 from Leopoldville, December 28. It responded to circular instruction CA–1535, August 23, which forwarded Tab B of Document 7 and invited comments from Accra, Brussels, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Elisabethville, Lagos, Leopoldville, Lisbon, London, Lourenco Marques, Luanda, Monrovia, Nairobi, Paris, Pretoria, Salisbury, and the Mission to the United Nations. (Department of State, Cental Files, 120.1470/8–2355)
2. Despite the use of quotation marks, the references to the Hadsel paper are not exact; see Document 7.
3. Khrushchev and Bulganin began their official visit to India November 18.
4. Despatch 430 indicated that Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak had been criticized by some of his fellow socialists for his defense of France’s Algerian policy. (Ibid., 320/10–1455)
5. The U.S. offer to assist Egypt in financing the Aswan Dam was withdrawn on July 19, 1956.
6. George F. Kennan’s article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” appeared in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, pp. 566–582.