7. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State1

SUBJECT

  • United States Policy towards Africa South of the Sahara

It is my conviction that within the next ten years we shall face in Africa South of the Sahara the same acute dilemma of colonialism that we are presently facing in Asia and North Africa. I believe we should, therefore, begin planning our policy now with respect to this area.

I should like to bring to your attention a paper recently prepared in the Office of African Affairs which seeks to lay down guidelines for our policy in Africa South of the Sahara for the next decade (Tab B).2 A summary of its observations is also attached (Tab A).3 A draft of the full paper was circulated in S/P, and suggestions made there have been taken into consideration.

This paper is, in my opinion, only the first step. We need to clarify our policy with respect to the various regions within Africa. [Page 13] We also need to face up to what this policy means in our relations with the Colonial powers and in terms of money, personnel, and housing.

If you approve of the general direction which this paper takes, we would like your authorization to proceed with detailed examination of the problems.4

[Tab B]

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of African Affairs5

THE UNITED STATES IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

The Point of Departure

There runs as a theme throughout any consideration of American policy toward Africa South of the Sahara the probability that in this area, as in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, we will face in an acute form the dilemma of colonialism. This dilemma may arise from the tendency of the Metropolitan powers to become more sensitive in their attitude and more rigid in their policies, while the Africans meanwhile increase their demands for political and economic power. As a result, the United States may be constantly pressed to endorse either the European or African point of view, and we may find ourselves in a situation similar to that which currently confronts us in North Africa and elsewhere. Many of the elements of this conflict are now present in Africa below the Sahara. They have not reached the proportions of a major crisis for the United States, partly because of the nature of the situation itself and partly because we have so far had relatively little interest in much of the area. These two conditions, however, are rapidly disappearing. The potentials of conflict are becoming realities. Absence of interest is no longer feasible.

If there is any prospect of extricating ourselves from this dilemma, it lies in the development of a more independent policy in [Page 14] Africa. Such an evolution provides, as a minimum, the means to avoid being caught in an unenviable position. It would, as an optimum, entail a greater ability to influence the course of events in Africa than we now possess, in order to assure attainment of our goals in this area. Attainment of this independent posture, however, will most certainly be difficult. We cannot adopt courses of action which will directly undermine the Metropolitan powers, for not only would this action ignore the constructive work they are doing, but it would arouse such resentment on their part as to weaken our general position. At the same time, we cannot afford to ignore the aspirations of the Africans, since our silence would be construed as opposition.

The construction of an independent policy is not a question of producing a revolutionary new program, for to a considerable extent it is a matter of accelerating what has already begun. Neither would such a policy reverse the ever-growing inter-dependence of the countries and territories of the world, for our action cannot ignore this trend. Instead, this effort would seek to create a greater sphere of activity which is identifiably American. To some extent, it would be a matter of creating policy where none has ever existed. It also would mean shedding outworn views of what Africa is and can be. It would require reviewing our present relationships with both the colonial powers and the dependent peoples. And it would mean bringing order into policies which hitherto have been adopted in a fit of absentmindedness.

One of the difficulties of shaping an intelligent policy towards Africa South of the Sahara is the simple matter of determining the geographic scope of such a policy. The southern half of the Continent is so diverse that policy designed to include the entire area may poorly fit the requirements of a particular locale. It is hard, moreover, to divide this area into two or three regional groupings, since these units will also contain many different conditions, peoples and problems. At the same time if one takes as a basis each of the score or more political territories of the area, a statement of policy would be broken into so many fragments as to be meaningless.

Because of these difficulties, it is probably best to consider U.S. policy from three points of view. Certain goals and courses of action can be dealt with on a sub-continental basis. Others must be considered on a regional basis. And finally, certain courses of action can only make sense when considered in connection with a particular territory. This paper treats only the general goals and courses of action, and seeks to establish a framework for later consideration of American policy on a regional or individual basis.

American policy must also take into account the fact that the African Continent is changing rapidly. Not only is this change [Page 15] taking place faster than we often think, but the tempo is hard to determine. We can point to the incredible economic development in the Copper Belt during the past five years, the transformation of large parts of the Congo during the past half century and the remarkable political evolution of the Gold Coast. Our knowledge, however, of the Continent is so limited that our techniques for measuring these changes are imperfect. One thing seems certain. Our future interests in Africa are bound to be far greater than they are today. Our policy must be based as much on the potentials of Africa as its present condition. Thus estimates of the future more than analysis of the present should be the major determinants of our policy.

The American Stake in Africa

In searching out a policy which the United States could hope to follow in Africa South of the Sahara during the coming decade, one should, as a preliminary, seek to define the present American stake in this Continent. This interest can best be summed up as real but limited.

The American stake in Africa is easy to identify in the economic field. We obtain a wide variety of resources from this Continent: chrome, rubber, uranium, diamonds, cobalt, manganese, palm oil, and a number of lesser known minerals which are essential to our industrial output. Our trade with Africa is expanding. Our markets in Africa are increasing. In addition to this direct role which Africa plays in our economy, the Continent provides important support to the economy of our allies in Europe.

The American military stake in Africa South of the Sahara is far smaller than it is in North Africa. Nevertheless, the Air Force continues to have a general interest in Roberts Field, Liberia; we have a military mission in Ethiopia; we have an interest in the Belgian defense of the Copper Belt; and we have at least a potential concern over the availability of a supply route through this Continent in times of crises.

The political stake of the United States in Africa is less easy to define. Yet in the broad balance of world power, this Continent is an extremely important area. The long-term attitude of the 120 million people living South of the Sahara is of very real significance in our general world position. The present Western orientation of the bulk of the Africans and practically all of the Europeans in Africa is an important factor in the evolution of this Continent. At the very least, this attitude gives us time to affect the evolution of the Continent and opens up the possibility of securing an orientation basically sympathetic to our own interests and aspirations.

[Page 16]

Our cultural stake is perhaps the most indefinite of all our interests in Africa. We should not, however, discount either the historical influence of the missionary movement in Africa nor ignore its potentialities. American missionaries in Africa number some four to five thousand; while their influence can easily be exaggerated, they, nevertheless, make themselves felt in areas where otherwise the United States would be entirely unknown and American influence would be non-existent.

Despite the importance of these factors in America’s relationship with Africa South of the Sahara, we should recognize that our present stake in this Continent is sharply limited. In a short-term crisis we could make do without the resources of the African subsoil. Our trade, though increasing, is only 3.5 percent of our total commerce.

From a military standpoint, there is a marked lack of interest in the Pentagon in strategic planning concerning Africa. We have no significant military mission or any active airbase in this part of the Continent. The trained white troops on a standing basis number less than 50,000. The African reserve is largely untrained. Thus, any effort to make out of Africa either a base of operations or an arsenal of men and ammunition would require tremendous effort on our part and a great deal of time.

Even in the political field, our ties are limited. We have no alliances or other commitments to this area, except through the Metropolitan powers. We have little affinity from the standpoint of political heritage with the Europeans in Africa. We have even less in common with the vast bulk of the population, those of African origin.

In the realm of cultural or moral influence, the missionary effort appears to be on the decline. The confidence of the American public in any special “civilizing mission” on its part is far less than that of the Europeans directly engaged in colonial activities. We are, moreover, constantly subject to the dilemma of sympathizing with our European allies on the one hand, and of feeling an emotional opposition to colonialism on the other. Right or wrong, this schizophrenia makes for a peculiar combination of uncertainty, guilt complex, and emotionalism on our part when we consider our role in this part of Africa.

Factors of Major Significance During the Next Decade

The fact that the present American stake in this part of Africa is real but limited is significant, but it is less important than the omnipresent indications that our interests are bound to increase.

[Page 17]

While it is difficult to define the degree of change which the next decade will witness, it is still possible to identify the major factors which will affect this transformation. These factors will also be particularly important in considering the long-range aspects of American policy towards Africa South of the Sahara:

(1)
The four Metropolitan Powers, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal, will continue to dominate the African scene. At the same time, these Powers are going to encounter varying degrees of difficulty in maintaining their present position. In the broad, the next decade will probably witness a decline in their influence. This fact will probably pose a number of difficulties for American policy, since the Metropolitan Powers may tend to become more suspicious of outside influences, less confident that they can manage the situation, and hence less flexible in their policy towards the dependent territory.
(2)

Since the colonial powers will continue to play a significant role in Africa, it follows that our relationships with the Continent must necessarily be of a triangular nature. We shall have to take into account not only our own needs and interests but also the policies of the Metropolitan country and the aspirations and attitudes of the Africans involved.

In this relationship the United States will continue to face the dilemma of modern colonialism in varying degrees. Our ability to pursue a course of action with respect to the African area concerned will always be affected by the requirements of our policy towards the Metropolitan Powers. Assuming that the situation in Europe will not change radically during the next decade, we will not have a wide arc of maneuverability with respect to this part of Africa. By and large, if a showdown occurs between the needs of our European policy and those of our African policy, we shall have to recognize the superior demands of our alliance system in Europe.

(3)
The means available to the United States during the next decade to influence events in Africa are likely to continue to be relatively limited. To date our aid program in Africa has been minuscule. Given the present trends of American economic assistance programs, our aid to Africa is not likely to expand greatly. We will, therefore, acquire little leverage through use of economic assistance funds. While the number and strength of our missions in Africa will undoubtedly increase, we do not anticipate a radical shift in our representation in the area. In the absence of war or a revolution in alliances, moreover, it is doubtful if there will be a major change in the military appreciation of Africa. As a result of this situation, we can assume that whatever the goals of United States policy may be with respect to this part of the Continent, our means to achieve these goals will be inadequate.
(4)
The social and political ferment which is presently visible in most of Africa has only begun to make itself felt. As the standards of living go up, as the tribal organization breaks down further, as education becomes more widespread, and as parts of Africa become free, this ferment will increase both in pace and scope.
(5)
One consequence of this change will be the rise in “African consciousness” on the part of the native population. Whether this consciousness will be local, regional, or continental in scope, it is at present most difficult to determine. Whatever its exact nature, however, it will have the characteristics of young nationalism. It will be emotional, irresponsible, exaggerated and xenophobic. It will undoubtedly have these and other traits found in the nationalism of the Middle East and South Asia. It may, in fact, have fewer restraints, since the new nationalism of many parts of the Middle East and South Asia has the underpinning of an old and somewhat stable civilization. In Africa the change will be so fundamental that the older way of life will provide no balance wheel to this new movement.
(6)
Certain areas of Africa South of the Sahara will undoubtedly be the scene of tension and even conflict. In spite of the fact that the military phase of the Mau Mau movement appears to be drawing to an end, Kenya will be a country of tension and bitterness for many years to come. In South Africa the serious strain among social groups, and the apartheid policy of the nationalist government is not going to relax this tension. This friction may well spread elsewhere in the Continent, notably to the Rhodesias.
(7)
The Communists may be expected to increase their efforts in Africa. One approach they will undoubtedly follow is that of continuing to identify the Soviet Union (which has the advantage of being remote) with “the oppressed colonial peoples of the world.” They may try to substitute color for class in an African version of their dialectical materialism. Whatever the particular tactic, the tempo of their activity will undoubtedly increase.
(8)
At the same time, we may also anticipate expansion of Islam especially in those portions of Africa just below the Sahara Desert. This expansion may tend to make progress in the Western sense more difficult, because the Koranic education is ill-adapted to meet the practical needs of the African for technical education. The growth of Islam may also provide a vehicle for greater Egyptian influence in Africa, since such guidance as exists in the Islamic movement comes as much from Cairo as from any other place. Since the variety of Islam which is expanding in Africa South of the Sahara has such a large ingredient of local fetish religion, it will not have the capacity to resist Communist infiltration which is normally ascribed to devout Moslem communities.
(9)
The “Indian” problem of East and South Africa will continue to be extremely difficult. Even though immigration is restricted, those groups with their origin in the Indian sub-continent will continue to increase in numbers and economic influence. Although there is little prospect of these people acting cohesively except under extreme pressure, they will bulk large as an economic and political factor in all of East and South Africa.
(10)
As important as these factors will be during the next decade of African affairs, none will probably be as significant as the economic revolution now taking place. This revolution will at the same time intensify Africa’s basic problems and hold forth opportunities for coping with them.

Goals of United States Policy

Taking Africa South of the Sahara as a whole, the general goals of American policy may be summarized in the following manner:

(1)
That the Continent remain free from inimical foreign influences, whether Communist, Indian or Arab;
(2)
That the political, economic and social evolution of this Continent be in a manner friendly to the United States;
(3)
That the United States obtain, on the most favorable possible terms, access to the economic resources of the area;
(4)
That the United States increase its commercial, industrial and agricultural activities in the Continent;
(5)
That the United States consolidate its cultural and moral position with respect to the Africans; and
(6)
That American strategic needs with respect to the Continent be fully safeguarded.

Courses of Action

1.
Change the Tone of American Policy: In part, the evolution of an independent policy towards Africa South of the Sahara will be the result of many courses of action. At the same time, there is a broad political element in such a policy that needs to be identified from the beginning, and which helps set the tone for the rest. In its initial phase, such action may be little more than the avoidance of a monotonous “me too” attitude with respect to the colonial powers. It may also consist of a conscious attempt to develop parallel courses of conduct—courses which neither directly contest the admitted role of the colonial powers nor automatically support the desires of the Africans. Whatever the form this attitude may take, it should be viewed as a state of mind in which every action is examined critically in order to determine its place in a pattern of policy directed towards achieving our goals. Without this point of view, we cannot expect to evolve a truly independent policy in Africa.
2.

Increase the Productivity of Africa: One need not be an economic determinist to be convinced that only through a massive increase of the productivity of Africa and the Africans can long-term progress be made in the necessary transformation of the Continent. Such a transformation in the way of life of this Continent is a multiple necessity. Only in this way can the African meet his still elemental requirements of food, shelter and education. Only through such a change can the governments obtain the financial resources so necessary if the roads, dams, schools, and other requirements of a modern society are to be constructed. And only through providing a satisfactory response to these needs of the country can the present governmental structure evolve in such a manner as to head off implacable tension between racial groups.

Even though the United States will not assume in the near future a dominant role in increasing the productivity of Africa, there are at least four ways in which we can contribute to this end:

(a)
We should encourage the investment of private capital in Africa. This program should not be merely one of providing governmental statistics. It should include public information, political support, diplomatic intervention if necessary to ensure favorable conditions for investment, and establishment of a small staff of officers experienced in securing new investors;
(b)
We should support economic development loans wherever possible;
(c)
We should expand steadily, but probably not dramatically, our technical cooperation program in the area; and
(d)
We should develop this relationship with the area itself, not through the Metropolitan capital.

3.
Multi-racialism: We should set ourselves the task of supporting a multi-racial approach to the problems of Africa South of the Sahara. Any other course of action would, in the long run, meet with such domestic opposition within the United States that it would be next to impossible to carry out. Moreover, there appears to be no other course of action which holds out real prospect for harmonizing the various elements of the situation in the Continent with our general policies. Unless one assumes that the present situation—whether that of the colonial powers or the Union of South Africa—can continue indefinitely, there is no other policy except multi-racialism which can hope to produce a compromise between white or black domination.
4.
Information and Education: In no part of the world is the thirst for knowledge greater than in Africa. Perhaps this attitude is in part the product of the century of missionary activity, which though limited in scope, has penetrated into most of the hinterland of the Continent. Perhaps this desire comes from a very practical ambition on the part of the Africans to possess the means of a better life. [Page 21] Whatever the source, the demand is so great that whoever brings the African education has the power to influence him in a basic fashion. While recognizing that in primitive communities there is a point beyond which a program of this kind cannot go at any given time, we should nevertheless expand our activities in three major directions:
(a)
Increase our general information program, including libraries, press information, etc.;
(b)
Expand our exchange of persons programs;
(c)
Move to assist local education, especially in the vocational and medical fields. In view of the inevitable maladjustment of the foreign trained student, this local effort may well be the major one on our part.
5.
Private Organizations: We should encourage private organizations in their activities in Africa. Not only are there many problems which they can work on in a better fashion than the Department, but they can reach into areas far removed from our American posts. We should especially assist the foundations in their efforts in Africa, with a view to identifying their efforts with the long-term interests of the United States.
6.
United States Representation in Africa: The United States is presently handicapped in its policy in Africa by the small and scattered nature of its missions, the limitations on physical facilities, and certain morale problems somewhat peculiar to the area.

We should embark on a long-range, constant, but not revolutionary expansion of the staff of our missions in the area. In terms of officer personnel, such a program might not be larger than a five-year program of adding some half-dozen officers to the established posts each fiscal year. In addition, however, there should be a program of expansion in the number of posts, with the officer strength required for this expansion being over and above that needed for existing posts. During the coming five years, we should probably plan to open at least five new consulates, in order to keep abreast of developments in French West Africa, the Cameroons, Nigeria, Uganda, Somaliland, to say nothing of northern and eastern Nigeria, northern Gold Coast, central Africa (whether the Congo, the Federation, or elsewhere), and Madagascar.

We should make a special point of providing adequate accommodations and other living requirements for this staff, since the hazards of living in tropical Africa are unusually great and the impediments to effective work unusually large.

Finally, since we have the opportunity of building from relatively small types of establishments we should make every effort to secure well-integrated American missions. We should not establish autonomous, or semi-autonomous operations but see to it that all [Page 22] representatives are placed firmly under the principal officer. Our voice in Africa will not in any case be strong; it would be most unwise to reduce it to impotence through confusion of tongues.

Conclusion

The adoption of these proposals is obviously only the first step toward the independent policy which we require in Africa.

From the standpoint of policy, we should proceed to the extremely difficult task of applying these principles to the problems we face on a regional or country basis. Completion of this process should give us a pattern of action which would fit into our general decisions yet meet our needs in the individual territories.

At the same time, we should examine these policies to see what financial support is necessary in order to carry them out. This is not only a matter of funds for personnel and buildings, but it is even more a problem of economic assistance.

Both of these tasks will take considerable time. But if we wait for the African problems to reach a crisis stage before we set ourselves to solve them, we shall be too late to do anything effective. In Africa we still have the opportunity; it would be a putting off of our responsibilities if we fail to begin our efforts now.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70/7–2055. Confidential. Drafted by Hadsel; sent through Robert G. Barnes, Robert Murphy, and Loy W. Henderson.
  2. In the wake of the Bandung Conference, a Principal Officers Conference in Africa South of the Sahara had been planned which Allen would have attended. Budgetary cuts forced the postponement of the conference. Hadsel’s paper had been prepared for that gathering.
  3. Not printed.
  4. According to Roderic L. O’Connor, Dulles read the paper but was not willing “to be pinned down” as yet. He considered it too general to warrant his specific approval though he was prepared to authorize more detailed studies. Henderson advised the Secretary that unless more funds were obtained than were presently available it would not be possible to open new posts and assign more officers without curtailing operations elsewhere. (Memoranda by Henderson, August 23, and from O’Connor to Allen, August 30, attached to the source text)
  5. Confidential. Drafted by Hadsel.