278. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
2360. Gaillard called me in this afternoon to make most strong and solemn plea for further two or three day delay in delivery arms to Tunisia. He made similar démarche to British Ambassador earlier today.
Speaking with utmost seriousness, Gaillard said that if US and UK were to deliver arms to GOT on November 12 before French Government had had opportunity to take decision on this matter, it would be considered “an unfriendly act”. The reaction of French public opinion would be extremely sharp and bitter. This action on our part seemed particularly inopportune coming shortly before special NATO meeting designed to reinforce solidarity of Atlantic alliance. It would be moreover most disagreeable for him personally coming at very outset of his tenure of office. Therefore, he most solemnly urged us to delay few more days in order to permit his government to act.
He said that he is unable, since his ministers have dispersed for Armistice Day weekend, to hold Cabinet meeting on this subject before November 12. He will, however, hold meeting on that day and will himself urge that decision be taken at that time to supply arms to GOT. Quantity he has in mind is that for one battalion which he believes sufficient to meet immediate Tunisian needs. Since these arms are already held by French forces in Tunisia, delivery can be effected at once.
I told Gaillard that I would transmit his request to Washington immediately but added, as I had to Pineau, that I could not hold out much hope that at this late date delivery could be delayed. I described for his benefit long delay which has already occurred in response to Pineau’s pleas. I indicated that I was fully aware of considerations which prompted his démarche and would recommend that, if possible, delay of two or three days after November 12 be granted.
I also mentioned further possible complication which has occurred to Embassy, i.e. that our negotiations with GOT may by this time have reached such point that US would feel obliged to deliver token quantity of arms next week even if affirmative French decision were taken. Gaillard was obviously astonished in light position US has hitherto taken on this point, at this possibility. He said that [Page 738] he had supposed that, if French Government had decided to supply arms which Tunisia needs, it would [not?] be necessary for any other government to do so. He expressed fear Bourguiba would exploit separate deliveries by US and France as evidence of differences between them on North African policy. I replied I was merely indicating possible complication and suggested that, if it occurs, we might take joint action to minimize its ill effects. Gaillard agreed and said he would inform us of French Government’s decision immediately after Tuesday Cabinet meeting. If decision is in negative, we would be free to take such action as we deem necessary. If decision is in affirmative, as he believed it will be, and if US nevertheless feels it must proceed with token delivery, we would concert together means of coordinating our action. He made it quite clear, however, that damaging repercussions are bound to occur if US delivers arms to Tunisia under present circumstances.
He closed by emphasizing again great gravity with which he regards this matter and by reiterating his earnest hope that we will in interests of Atlantic solidarity accord this further very brief delay.
Comment: I cannot too strongly stress firmness and solemnity with which Gaillard made this démarche. His use of expression “unfriendly act” was clearly deliberate and considered. Failure on our part to respond favorably would have worst possible effect on him personally and on his colleagues in government. In view role we hope Gaillard will play in providing France with stable government, I consider of particular importance maintenance of good personal relations with him.
I believe also he is entirely correct in estimating gravity of its effect on French public opinion. Coming as he points out just at time when we are about to make concerted effort to strengthen bonds of Atlantic community, such action might well have effects all out of proportion to its real significance. Even from viewpoint effective implementation of our North African policy, in which France is inevitably a major factor, I believe demonstration of consideration and good will on our part in this case will make possible much more successful US-French cooperation in support of Tunisia and Morocco than would be the case if we reject Gaillard’s plea.
I, therefore, most earnestly recommend that we agree to wait two or three days, as may be necessary, after November 12 in order permit France to act. I would emphasize this new delay is for maximum of two or three days, which would not seem excessive favor for Gaillard to ask. We would hope that, in view understanding and patience Bourguiba has so far shown, he might agree to this further very brief delay for sake of common interests all four countries involved. I also hope that, if US and UK do find it [Page 739] necessary to deliver arms even though French also do so, these deliveries and publicity in regard thereto be carefully coordinated with view to assuring that deliveries appear to be complementary and not competitive.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/11–957. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Tunis. Received at 5:06 p.m.↩