276. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 5, 19571
SUBJECT
- Tunisian Arms Question
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Mongi Slim, Ambassador of Tunisia
- Mr. M’hamed Essafi, Counselor, Embassy of Tunisia
- Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF
- William J. Porter, Director, AFN
- Arthur B. Allen, AFN
Ambassador Slim had been asked to come to the Department to receive information concerning recent developments in connection with the question of arms for Tunisia. Mr. Palmer therefore began by explaining that we have been very busy working on the problem of Tunisia’s request for assistance in obtaining arms and that over the past weekend we decided that, despite the great patience and understanding which have been exhibited by the Government of Tunisia and despite the fact that the French governmental crisis had not been definitely resolved, we should nevertheless proceed with definite plans to bring this problem to a conclusion. In coordination with the British we have therefore instructed our Embassies at Paris and Tunis to inform the French and Tunisian Governments that we propose to proceed with a token delivery of arms on November 12 unless the Governments of France and Tunisia meanwhile reach an agreement on arrangements for the purchase of arms by Tunisia which will make our proposed action unnecessary. Provided that agreement can be reached on the conditions and terms of sale, we are planning to deliver on November 12 500 rifles and 50,000 rounds of ammunition costing approximately $60,000. Mr. Palmer stated that the British also plan to offer a token shipment and Mr. Porter stated that the British plan to provide sub-machine guns, machine guns and ammunition for both.
Mr. Palmer explained that Ambassador Jones had already been authorized to inform President Bourguiba of our plans and that we understood that he had done so at 11:00 a.m. that day (November 5).2 He stated that our Embassy at Paris had also informed the French Foreign Office of our plans on November 4 and that the only reason why the two approaches were not simultaneous was that [Page 733] President Bourguiba had been unable to receive Ambassador Jones earlier than November 5. He went on to emphasize our desire that our proposed action be kept secret as long as possible and our hope that even when we reach the delivery date of November 12 any announcements can be handled in such a way as to hold publicity at a minimum. Obviously, we hope that the French Government will still find it possible to move in some fashion which will permit them to identify themselves with this action. We think that this would be highly desirable in terms of U.S.-French relations, in terms of the French position in the Free World and in terms of Franco-Tunisian relations. We think that there is a good chance that the French may find it possible to do something. They are obviously in a difficult position with the United States and the United Kingdom both having told them that we plan to go ahead on November 12 and we believe that they will decide to go ahead also. We hope that if France does so the Tunisian Government will react in the same spirit.
Mr. Palmer concluded by saying that we seem to be reaching a climax in this matter. We are very encouraged by the attitude shown by the United Kingdom, and especially gratified that the United Kingdom agreed with us on the basis of the same principle. The decision has been difficult for both of us but we believe that we have acted correctly on a matter of principle.
Ambassador Slim began by thanking Mr. Palmer for the news he had just received. As he had said over a month ago, when the United States was directing its efforts toward helping Tunisia obtain arms from France, Italy or Belgium, he, himself hoped that arms might come from the United States also because of our common principles and community of outlook. He was delighted at the attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom. He was happy to detect in this attitude not only assistance to Tunisia in this specific instance but also the possibility of greater action which could prevent the occurrence of other difficulties in other states of the world. He hoped that this was the case because he has seen other states, which have no sympathy with the East, obliged to resort to the East for assistance. As Mr. Palmer was aware, for the past two months Tunisia had been the object of offers from Eastern countries which have been refused in the first place for ideological reasons and also because Tunisia did not desire to have heterogeneous arms for its army.
The Ambassador continued that the Tunisian Government greatly appreciates the action of the United States, not only because of the conclusion reached (in spite of difficulties which he fully understood), but also because now that the decision has been reached it may even help Tunisia obtain from France what it needs. [Page 734] The Ambassador stated that he, personally, was not confident that France would actually deliver arms to Tunisia, but he agreed that it would now be easier for France to do so. He expressed the hope that France would be led to offer arms to Tunisia, and stated that an offer would not be refused.
Ambassador Slim then asked if the token shipment of arms would be made by the United States on November 12 even if France makes Tunisia an offer of arms. Mr. Palmer replied that we have agreed in principle that we will make the delivery unless a Franco-Tunisian agreement makes such action unnecessary. The Ambassador said that he wished to be precise. Was he to understand that if a Franco-Tunisian accord were reached before November 12, there would be no delivery of arms from the United States? Mr. Palmer stated that such an accord would obviously have to meet with the wishes of both sides.
Ambassador Slim then said that he would be very happy also if the decision in principle which the United States has reached applied to other matters as well, such as matériel for the police forces, whose requirements are now being surveyed by a United States mission. Mr. Porter commented that this would have to be considered in the light of the report which the survey mission will make, and added that we have been delighted to hear that the mission is receiving the full cooperation of the Tunisian authorities. Ambassador Slim asked if he was to understand that, now that the decision on principle has been made, the determination of what items may or may not be supplied for the police awaits the submission of the report of the survey mission. Mr. Palmer explained that the decision which has been taken by the United States relates to the list of arms which Tunisia needs as we received it from Mr. Ladgham. There is now the problem of negotiation between the Tunisian Government and the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom concerning what specific items the Tunisian Government desires to purchase for its armed forces. He explained that the police survey should be considered as a separate matter. The survey mission was sent without any commitment as to matériel. He was sure that the Tunisian Government would wish to study the mission’s report carefully and, of course, the United States would wish to do so.
Ambassador Slim explained that he completely understood that the question of arms was separate from the question of equipment for the police forces. However, his point was that, when Ambassador Richards visited Tunisia, the United States was unwilling to provide certain equipment which Tunisia desired for the police because these items were considered to be of a military nature. Now that the United States has decided to help Tunisia with arms this obstacle would appear to have been removed. Mr. Palmer stated that the [Page 735] principle established is that the United States agrees that Tunisia should be free to acquire the necessary means of legitimate self-defense. This holds whether the means are arms, transportation equipment or communications equipment.
Mr. Palmer said that he wished to repeat our appreciation of the understanding shown by the Government of Tunisia during this period and to assure the Ambassador that our admiration for President Bourguiba and his Government, already at a high level, has only been enhanced by the understanding, moderation and statesmanship they have shown in this matter. He felt that the Ambassador’s role in helping us understand the problem had also been most helpful. The Ambassador thanked Mr. Palmer for his comments and said that the Tunisian Government has always been conscious of the role the United States has played and the position it has taken on Tunisia’s problems. He has always been convinced that, because of the ideals Tunisia and the United States have in common, no other outcome was possible in spite of all the difficulties. He wished to say that he found the United States’ attitude not only understandable but also logical and self-consistent. Sometimes it was possible to understand why a nation took a particular position, but impossible to agree that the position was logical. In the present instance, however, he agreed that our approach had been the logical one of first, trying to persuade France to provide arms for Tunisia, second, attempting to arrange for deliveries from friendly Western powers in order not to offend French susceptibilities, and finally, arranging to provide the arms ourselves.
After leaving Mr. Palmer’s office, the Ambassador told Mr. Porter that he had forgotten to assure Mr. Palmer that Tunisia would keep the proposed arrangements secret. He would, however, send a message to Tunis at once asking that this be done.