Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, December 8, 1956—2:56 p.m.

329. Current events including 1) Balafrej conversations Washington 2) Port Lyautey developments 3) Moroccan note (Rabat’s 340)² and 4) possible French approach to US during NATO Ministerial meeting necessitate review US position vis-à-vis French in connection Moroccan base negotiations using Secretary-Pineau June 1956 talks as point departure.

While in Washington Balafrej took initiative raising future of US-built bases Morocco. Department reiterated position US has valid and binding agreements governing use bases. Balafrej contested this, saying existing agreements with France which acted ultra vires in authorizing third power enter and build military bases Morocco without latter’s consent. Balafrej emphasized Morocco’s attitude as traditionally friendly towards US and stated Morocco wished reach bilateral settlement with US. Department explained preference trilateral discussions. Balafrej rejected this, emphasizing repugnance such approach to Moroccan sovereignty by asking dryly who third party would be. Otherwise Balafrej’s attitude toward French surprisingly friendly and demonstrated keen desire get along with them as long as they respected Moroccan sovereignty. Department informed Balafrej we would take his views under advisement.

Conversations with Balafrej made it obvious our base rights must be renegotiated to satisfaction of sovereign Morocco. Port Lyautey complications seen here as forerunner possible series incidents provoked by both sides and designed or adapted to creation friction involving US with French and/or Moroccans, as case may be, only certain result being that general atmosphere will worsen to point where effective enjoyment bases will be prejudiced.

In light foregoing, following considerations emerge:

1. US convinced permitting present situation to drift would have adverse effect US-Moroccan relations and prejudice security bases. (JCS has just reviewed and restated Moroccan bases essential US security.)³

2. Appears clear Moroccans will not agree either to tripartite discussion base question or anything other than strictly US-Moroccan arrangements re bases.

3. Therefore US immediate problem one of devising means negotiate bilaterally with minimum adverse effect US-French and French-Moroccan relations.

4. In addition substantive problems involved in preparing French for bilateral US-Moroccan relationship on bases, there are important tactical and timing difficulties. Thus, any US-Moroccan agreement prior conclusion Franco-Moroccan agreement on defense relationship would undoubtedly give rise French charges US trying replace France North Africa. Furthermore, it might well remove incentive Moroccans conclude defense agreement with France, cause them look to us for military assistance and generally seek substitute US for French responsibilities. On other hand, for US to take position it cannot negotiate with Moroccans on this subject until after successful conclusion Franco-Moroccan negotiations would put trump card in hands French who by procrastination could bring about deterioration US-Moroccan relationship.

In light foregoing, Department desires comments Embassies Paris and Rabat re US taking following line with French either through Embassy Paris or by Secretary in talks with Pineau:⁴

1. In recent talks Washington, Balafrej and Crown Prince took initiative raising base question along lines second para this telegram.

US made every effort persuade Moroccans discuss matter trilaterally in line Secretary’s conversation with Pineau June 1956, but Balafrej clear and definite in his rejection, recalling he himself had already given French same answer in response similar French suggestion.

2. US firmly convinced a) any refusal or reluctance by US to negotiate bilaterally with Moroccans and b) continued inaction re Franco-Moroccan agreement on defense matters will work to detriment US, France and West in general.

3. US therefore believes that in broad Western interests, US must be in position move ahead with Moroccans to regularize arrangements re US base rights. We would strongly prefer do this in step with French if at all possible. Ideal solution problem would be if French and Moroccans could agree undertake and conclude negotiations re definitive defense arrangements as soon as possible with US and France consulting concurrently re their respective interests US-built bases. US-Moroccan negotiations might take place either at same time or immediately after conclusion Franco-Moroccan defense agreement. This procedure would probably result three simultaneous or near simultaneous bilateral negotiations instead of trilateral discussions rejected by Moroccans and effect would probably be much same as trilateral approach. We recognize that there are serious obstacles to this procedure, particularly difficulty French and Moroccans agreeing negotiate in light differences over Algeria. However, if French and Moroccans could find means overcoming these obstacles, we believe foregoing procedure has much commend it.

4. Should foregoing procedure prove impractical, US may have proceed bilateral discussions with Moroccans in any event. In such case, we would keep in close touch with French both before and during negotiations in effort assure minimum prejudice French interests and position Morocco.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/11–3056. Secret; Noforn. Also sent to Paris. Drafted by Cyr and Palmer and cleared with AF/N, WE, NEA, EUR, L, G, RA, and the Department of Defense.
2. See footnote 3, supra.
3. A memorandum from Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson transmitting the views of the JCS on this matter was submitted to the NSC as an enclosure to a memorandum from S. Everett Gleason, dated December 4. At its September 27 meeting, the NSC took cognizance of the President’s request that the Department of Defense undertake a feasibility study to determine whether the Spanish bases might be substituted for those in Morocco. Admiral Arthur Radford conveyed the findings of the JCS to Wilson on November 21. While it was judged feasible to use the Spanish bases as substitutes for those in Morocco, a number of considerations militated against it. Most important, since the Spanish bases would not all be fully operational until 1962, the premature loss of the Moroccan bases would reduce U.S. capability to implement its war plans. The JCS reaffirmed its previous recommendation, as communicated to the Secretary of Defense on September 25, that the Moroccan bases be maintained “by all feasible means”. Wilson concurred in a memorandum for the Executive Secretary of the NSC. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, North Africa)
4. Cannon replied in telegram 363 from Rabat, December 10, that he was in “complete accord” with the line the Department of State proposed to take with the French concerning the bases. (Ibid., Central Files, 711.56371/12–1056) Dillon stressed the need for the conclusion of a defense arrangement between France and Morocco prior to any U.S.-Moroccan talks. (Telegram 2897 from Paris, December 11; Ibid., 711.56371/12–1156) Upon consideration of these communications, the Department instructed the Embassy in Morocco to encourage the Moroccans to begin defense negotiations with France. (Telegram 2392 to Paris, 351 to Rabat, December 21; Ibid., 711.56371/12–1956)