Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, December 6, 1956—8:10 p.m.

322. Rabat’s 346.² Rather than reply formally Moroccan note at this time, Dept believes preferable first discuss matter with Balafrej (who may not have been consulted re decision make demarches US and France) in effort keep positions parties involved flexible pending further explorations among Governments concerned as to how best proceed regularize base agreements.³ Accordingly suggest you talk Balafrej along following lines, use Paras 1 and 2 being discretionary depending on your judgment whether Balafrej consulted:

1. Dept surprised both content and tone of note. We had thought as result talks in Washington⁴ that Moroccans thoroughly understood following re situation Port Lyautey: (a) US never consulted and bears no responsibility French actions Port Lyautey; (b) US concerned re French activity which poses real problem for US in terms local relationships; (c) In light legal position between US and France re bases, doubtful US has any basis demand French cease activities or any right expect prior consultation as note indicates. While we appreciate that Morocco reserves position re legality US-French agreement on bases, we had thought Moroccans understood US point of view re legal considerations which constitute problem and limitation as to US freedom action; (d) notwithstanding foregoing limitations, we have in fact been making every effort remove causes misunderstanding in talks with French and have kept GOM currently informed our efforts.

2. Moroccan note November 29 now introduces new element in situation in stating requirement for US-Moroccan reexamination base question. As was made clear in conversations Washington, US recognizes fact of assumption Moroccan sovereignty creates new situation re bases which must be taken into account. At same time US cannot ignore interest of France in this question. It was for this reason that US in talks here expressed preference for trilateral discussions on base question but in light strong Moroccan reaction this suggestion, agreed consider matter further. US had not understood that Moroccans felt any immediate urgency re resolution this problem. On contrary, Crown Prince⁵ clearly indicated GOM did not contemplate US-Moroccan negotiations re bases until after completion Franco-Moroccan agreement reached re cooperation on defense matters.

3. Question now arises as how we proceed in light Moroccan note. As we see problem, there are two distinct but related aspects: (a) short-term problem of situation at Port Lyautey; and (b) longer-term problem of regularizing situation US base facilities.

4. Re short term, US continuing make every effort settle this problem in manner consonant US-Moroccan and US-French relations. GOM may be assured we will not acquiesce in any resolution this problem detrimental Moroccan sovereignty. At same time GOM must understand that leaving aside legal considerations pointed out above, there are practical limitations on our ability bring about correction present situation. As long as French forces are in Morocco, they must obviously supply those forces. From practical viewpoint, US clearly not in position suggest alternative arrangement to this end. Only Moroccan and French Governments competent work out such arrangement and we therefore urge both Governments reach direct modus vivendi which will take account interests all parties involved, including proper respect Moroccan sovereignty, and at same time create favorable atmosphere resolution longer term problem. (FYI From US point of view, most satisfactory arrangement would be one permitting French resume use commercial facilities for normal military needs. End FYI)

5. Re long term, we not yet in position give definitive reply Moroccan statement its position which are studying as we promised Balafrej in talks here. As Balafrej seemed understand and accept we cannot ignore position of France with whom we must consult re future course of action. Such consultations necessary, not from point of view presenting Moroccans with joint US-French front, but in order carry forward search for practical solution of problem which will meet interests all three parties concerned and which began with valuable and amicable talks with Moroccan Foreign Minister here. We therefore prefer delay any formal reply to Moroccan note and would urge Moroccans be patient and help us avoid situation in which interested parties become frozen into formal positions which may complicate eventual resolution of problem. We would ask Foreign Minister in same spirit not meanwhile to publicize his notes to French and ourselves and intend ask French similarly postpone formal reply and avoid publicity.

For Paris:

A. Confirm to FonOff at highest available level substance our talks with Balafrej (Embtel 2756).⁶

B. At same time reiterate strong US concern re French activities Port Lyautey and emphasize our belief that all recent exceptional French activity there should cease in interests interrelationships US, France and Morocco. In this connection, Dept does not believe French position set forth Paris’ 2602⁷ constitutes satisfactory resolution problem. Although we recognize practical problem faced by France in supplying its forces, we believe this should be solved between French and Moroccans on basis modus vivendi. In this connection, you should inform FonOff of Para 4 above.

C. Inform FonOff of substance Para 5 above and urge they not reply Moroccan note or give matter publicity pending further consultations re base negotiations problem which we hope be in position undertake soon. FYI We shall as soon as possible send Rabat and Paris for comment possible basis for approach to French on substance of problem. End FYI.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/12–156. Secret. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Paris and to London for CINCNELM. Drafted by Palmer and cleared with AF/N, L, RA, WE, and the Department of Defense.
2. Telegram 346, December 1, summarized the oral remarks of the Acting Moroccan Foreign Minister Abderrahim Bouabid on November 29 when he presented a note protesting the Port Lyautey situation. (Ibid.)
3. The substance of the Moroccan note was conveyed in telegram 340 from Rabat, November 30. The fact that the United States had permitted the French to use its portion of the facility was considered a grave affront to Moroccan sovereignty. The Moroccan Government asserted that the situation required a reexamination of the base agreements on a bilateral basis and U.S. action to compel the French to cease their military expansion. (Ibid., 711.56371/11–3056) Cannon reported in telegram 344, December 1, that France considered the note the start of a campaign to begin bilateral base discussions. (Ibid., 711.56371/12–156)
4. In the course of Rountree’s discussion with Balafrej of November 27, Balafrej made clear his government’s unwillingness to discuss the bases with France. (Memorandum of conversation by Norland; Ibid., 771.5–MSP/11–2756)
5. Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, during a private visit to the United States, conferred with Acting Secretary Hoover on November 29. He maintained that the bases, which had been agreed to by France without the knowledge of the Moroccan Government, would have to be given legal status.
6. Telegram 2756, December 3, reported that the French had already been briefed by their Embassy in Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/12–356)
7. In telegram 2602, November 26, Dillon indicated that the French position was that barracks for troops definitely would not be constructed, but no decision had been taken in regard to the supply shed. (Ibid., 711.56371/11-2656) On December 8, Dillon once again took up this matter with the French Foreign Ministry. He outlined U.S. objections to the French position as stated in telegram 322. De Beaumarchais gave assurance that no construction was immediately contemplated, but traced the problem to the Moroccan Government’s inability to compel the UMT to abide by an agreement which Rabat had concluded with France on October 18 to permit the entry of military supplies at Casablanca. (Telegram 2856 from Paris, Dec. 8; Ibid., 711.56371/12–356) Hoover advised the Embassy in Paris to make representations at a higher level of the Foreign Ministry and instructed the Embassy in Rabat to indicate that labor peace in Casablanca was needed to solve the problem. (Telegram 2274 to Paris, 337 to Rabat, December 14; Ibid., 711.56371/12–1356) Balafrej responded to Cannon’s approaches by admitting the protest note was inexact and by agreeing that a formal response was unnecessary. He conceded it was unwise for his government to give the impression that it could not exercise control in Casablanca, but he blamed its difficulties upon resentment of the French military buildup at the time of Suez which, he asserted, had been intended for the occupation of Rabat and Fez. (Telegram 381 from Rabat, December 19; Ibid., 711.56371/12–1956)