Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, November 19, 1956—12:05 p.m.

275. Rabat 257,² 270,³ Paris 2111.⁴FYI. Department believes positive response Moroccan aid request entirely in keeping NSC directives⁵ and French Government position as last explained (Paris 366, July 20).⁶ Precise level aid would be worked out during negotiations in light (1) Progress on base rights problem (2) Availability funds (3) Progress Morocco in making economic arrangements with French, on whom it appears they must continue depend for bulk outside help (4) Information concerning economic conditions Morocco. Reply indicated below also goes as far as Department can to counteract Faure’s apprehensions re US supplanting French in economic field. End FYI.

1. Embassy Rabat may therefore tell FonOff that in response to request conveyed through Ambassador Ben Aboud, US position is that indicated in penultimate paragraph your 257; that is, US prepared in principle extend economic and technical assistance to Morocco with extent and type such programs to be determined by on-spot studies and conversations between two Governments, and ICA prepared send survey team.⁷ Rabat should make clear however this in no way implies US acceptance any amount or time periods hitherto mentioned.

2. Moreover in order avoid arousing undue expectations Rabat should make clear GOM that as matter principle and owing statutory and budgetary limitations based on world-wide commitments US policy encourages other Western nations and international agencies share responsibilities economic aid. FYI. Funds already tentatively earmarked up to $30 million FY 57 for Morocco and additional funds will be sought for 1958 but US cannot undertake three-year commitment of type indicated by Ben Aboud. End FYI. Rabat should add it does not appear likely we could undertake at this time anything on order amounts previously discussed with French. Therefore GOM should also conclude such economic arrangements as they feel they can with French and should be told we are urging French expedite these arrangements.

3. Department taking same line with Moroccan Embassy Washington.

4. Upon receipt this telegram and related telegram Tunisia,⁸ Embassy Paris should inform French of request conveyed through Ben Aboud and nature foregoing reply making clear we acting on Moroccan request and that our decisions in working out program will be facilitated by rapid conclusion Franco-Moroccan arrangements with which we desire coordinate our own. Believe that by responding positively to Moroccans and making clear our limitations to both them and French we will be in better position get both parties take more favorable view re conclusion economic and financial arrangements with each other. Moreover by informing Moroccans our intention tell French we acting positively on request we would hope minimize effective French exploitation such approaches as “clearance” and chronic Moroccan suspicions this regard.

5. We cannot of course neglect related problem bases. Embassy Rabat should therefore make clear GOM that continuing favorable Moroccan attitude toward matters affecting US interests in Morocco will be essential element in implementing agreed economic programs.

6. Material requested last paragraph your 257 being air-pouched.⁹

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5–MSP/11–356. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Tunis.
2. Telegram 257, November 1, indicated that a Moroccan approach for economic aid was expected. Cannon asked for permission to respond affirmatively with the kind and extent of such aid to be left to negotiations. (Ibid., 771.5–MSP/11–156)
3. Telegram 270, November 3, reported that the Moroccan Ambassador to the United States, Dr. El-Mehdi Ben Aboud, had indicated to the Embassy on November 2 that approximately $70 million in aid would be required for each of the next 3 years. (Ibid., 771.5–MSP/11–356)
4. In telegram 2111, October 31, Dillon recommended against a commitment which would alienate the French and which might also encourage them to suspend their assistance. (Ibid., 771.5–MSP/10–3156)
5. Reference is to NSC 5614/1, Document 36.
6. Telegram 366 reported that Savary had made it clear that France would not oppose the United States listening to and studying Moroccan aid requests, but preferred that no commitments be made until Franco-Moroccan negotiations were further advanced. (Ibid., 772.5–MSP/7–2056)
7. In a meeting with Acting Secretary Hoover in Washington on November 27, Balafrej expressed Morocco’s need for economic assistance. (Ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) Following this conversation, Palmer assured Balafrej that an ICA Survey Mission would depart for Morocco in a day or two. (Memorandum of conversation by Palmer, November 28; Ibid., Central Files, 771.5–MSP/11–2856) Press reports to this effect caused the French to protest to the Embassy in Paris the onset of aid negotiations at a time when Franco-Moroccan financial conversations were suspended. (Telegram 2757 from Paris, December 3; Ibid., 771.5–MSP/12–356)
8. Telegram 1891 to Paris, November 19, set forth the U.S. response to Tunisia’s request for assistance. (Ibid., 772.5–MSP/11–1956)
9. Reference is to model draft bilateral aid agreements in both English and French and copies of any ICA preliminary studies that might exist.