Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

201. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, November 13, 1956—10 p.m.

2356. French have recently made series of approaches, all of which are related in that they involve greater French use of or role in Moroccan bases. Among these are: (1) French proposals for use Port Lyautey as off-loading point, including construction storage sheds;² (2) French pressure (which continues strong) for greater participation in Moroccan air defense;³ and (3) new French proposal to USAFE authorities for use air bases as safe havens in case emergencies. (On last, Department’s attention called to USAFE to USCINCEURE–CINC 17606 repeated information Chief of Staff USAF November 6.)⁴

Embassy believes time has come when we must have frank discussion on these matters with French at appropriately high level in Paris. Purpose would be to convince French of adverse effect on base negotiations of efforts by them to upset present status quo in their role on bases. We plan make approach along following lines. (1) We continue regard Franco-American agreements 1950 and 1951 as valid legal basis for Moroccan bases and our position on base negotiations remains as stated by Secretary to Pineau.⁵ (2) From point of view of our relations with Moroccans over future base negotiations, we cannot afford at this time to agree to any significant new steps increasing French use of bases, particularly for French military purposes. Moroccans have already given indications that they are thinking in terms of a completely bilateral arrangement with US on bases. If Moroccans gain impression that French are seeking to expand their involvement in bases used by US at this time, their position will become much more rigid. (3) In view these considerations, we would like to make certain comments on specific proposals French have recently made regarding US-used bases. As will be seen, we are by no means opposed in principle to all these proposals, but we do feel that caution must be exercised on any steps which would arouse such strong Moroccan reactions as to affect adversely our interests in base negotiations. (4) Re French proposal over using Port Lyautey as facility for off-loading supplies, we have already received démarche from Moroccans on this, indicating Sultan personally concerned.⁶ Therefore, we feel there should be no steps by French to expand use of Port Lyautey, or to take similar steps for French military use of other bases by US. Would obviously be preferable make use existing French port facilities.⁷ (5) Re further French participation in Moroccan air defense, we are fully prepared to study carefully this step and are prepared now hold technical level talks necessary to prepare for next steps. However, we feel that this particular moment would be inopportune from point of view our mutual interests for actually increasing number of French personnel in air defense.⁸ (6) We also understand that French authorities have inquired as to availability US-used bases as safe haven for French civilians in case of local emergency Morocco. We consider that under base agreements French have full right of decision re using bases for such purpose. If US did have right of decision in this matter, it would not refuse access to bases for any persons seeking refuge in an emergency.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/11–1356. Secret. Repeated to Rabat and USCINCEUR.
2. Cannon reported in telegram 252 from Rabat, November 1, that France would seek the right to off-load military cargoes from civilian and military ships within that facility. The base accord was silent on the matter of commercial ships and the U.S. expectation was that the French anticipated using military personnel to unload the ships. Cannon opposed the French plans and urged that the French be asked to change them. (Ibid., 711.56371/11–156) The Department responded that the matter would best be settled locally by the respective commanders. (Telegram 230 to Rabat, November 3; Ibid., 711.56371/11–356) Cannon indicated in telegram 274, November 6, that the French intended to construct storage facilities within the American portion of the base because it could be defended more easily. Cannon thus renewed his plea for high-level intervention to dissuade the French Government. (Ibid., 711.56371/11–656)
3. Dillon reported in telegram 1750 from Paris, October 12, that the French had approached the Embassy with a request for greater participation in radar sites in Morocco, to which they felt entitled for having approved the increased U.S. troop ceiling. (Ibid., 711.56371/10–1256) Telegram 1827 from Paris, October 19, reported French insistence on technical talks to work out the increased French role. Dillon recommended holding a planning meeting so as not to alienate the French. (Ibid., 711.56371/10–1956)
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. See Document 195.
6. Balafrej called Porter to the Foreign Office on November 7 to express the Moroccan wish that the United States not permit French “military expansion” at Port Lyautey. He indicated that the Sultan opposed a larger French presence on any U.S. base. (Telegram 276 from Rabat, November 7; Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/11–756)
7. Cannon reported in telegram 290, November 13, that the French had moved into the U.S. sector of the base and begun construction the day before despite U.S. requests for delay while a local solution was sought. The Ambassador suggested that the United States should publicly disassociate itself from the French action. (Ibid., 711.56371/11–1356)
8. The Embassy in Morocco supported putting off any technical talks believing that the negative political repercussions of a greater French air defense role outweighed any commitments to convene such a meeting. (Telegram 194 from Rabat, October 17; Ibid., 711.56371/10–1756)