184. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 3, 19551

SUBJECT

  • French North Africa

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Secretary
    • Assistant Secretary MerchantEUR
    • Mr. Julius Holmes, American Minister to Tangier
    • William J. Porter, American Consul General at Rabat
    • EUR—Mr. Jones
    • AF—Mr. Cyr

Mr. Holmes informed the Secretary that he was submitting his recommendations concerning French North Africa. They include, he said, a recommendation that the Secretary coordinate with the British in an approach to the French on this subject at the Tripartite meeting in Paris in October, just prior to the NATO Council meeting which precedes the Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva. Mr. Holmes recited the various considerations contained in his attached memorandum to the Secretary which had led him to make this recommendation.2 He referred particularly to the recent evidences of Soviet interest in North Africa, i.e., sale of arms to Egypt,3 establishment of diplomatic relations with Libya, and the possibility that the Russians could decide to take their seat on the Committee of Control in Tangier. The Secretary expressed special interest in the latter possibility and Mr. Holmes explained the procedure as governed by the 1945 Amendment to the Tangier Statute.

Mr. Merchant said that it had just occurred to him that it might be well to modify the proposed approach to the French in such a way that we would not give them the impression of having ganged up against them. Mr. Holmes agreed that it might be better for us and the British to make the same but separate approaches. In response to the Secretary’s request, Mr. Holmes stated that the French Chamber will be in session tomorrow. In response to the Secretary’s inquiry, Mr. Merchant indicated that he had been informed by de Margerie that Faure has cancelled his trip to Moscow.

Reverting to the local Moroccan situation, Mr. Holmes said that the renewed fighting was more serious than the press has indicated. In the last two raids small arms depots have been captured by [Page 516] Moroccan guerrillas. Mr. Holmes said he did not believe, as the French claim, that the raids are organized in the Spanish Zone, although it was probable that individuals who had fled to Spanish Morocco were now taking part in the raids. He felt that this was the beginning of fellagha-type fighting in Morocco. He pointed out that the fighting is taking place very near the Algerian border and that the French could soon find themselves engaged in frontier fighting along a 1500-mile border. Resident General Latour, he said, has asked for more troops. Mr. Holmes indicated that he did not think the current raids were a result of the Sultan’s departure from Rabat, but rather related to a deadline set some time ago by El Fassi4 for French implementation of agreements reached at Aix-les-Bains.5 Mr. Holmes said it was too bad seeing the French destroy themselves. The Secretary agreed but said that it was not surprising since they were following the same pattern that he had tried to get them to abandon in the 1920’s in relation to the Germans. The Secretary said that the French seem temperamentally unable to make changes peacefully before they are forced to do so. This procedure requires a certain strength, he said, which the French may not have.

Mr. Holmes referred to a statement made recently by Balafredj6 to the effect that Morocco is an international problem and should be the subject of an international conference attended by France, Spain, Morocco, the United States and even the United Kingdom, if possible. According to Balafredj, Mr. Holmes said, the French are more inclined to listen to the UK than to the U.S. because they consider the UK more competent in the colonial field. The Secretary agreed that we know less about colonialism than the British. They are experienced in colonial administration, he said, while we instinctively are not sympathetic to its problems.

The Secretary observed with seriousness that French North Africa is an awful mess to get into. Mr. Holmes agreed indicating that we should nevertheless do all we can to help. He felt that by so doing, we would gain advantage with the nationalists. He mentioned our concern over the 12,000 Americans in Morocco and explained that arrangement had been made to have all dependents on base by [Page 517] next April except those located in Rabat, Port Lyautey and in the outlying radar stations.

In response to the Secretary’s request for his views, Mr. Merchant submitted that we have no choice but to get into the Moroccan problem for the reason that we want to keep France a great power and we have our bases to protect. He reiterated his view that we and the British should make the same but separate approaches to the French in this connection. The Secretary observed that our approach would be one reflecting our desire to be of assistance to the French. Mr. Holmes agreed and reviewed the arguments to be made in an approach to the French. What we want, he said, was to have the French in Morocco do what they have done in Tunisia. Faure has been on the right track but has been sabotaged by his own people. Mr. Holmes said that he did not know how much support we want to give to the Faure Government in general but that, in his opinion, we certainly should support him as far as Morocco is concerned.

After considerable reflection, the Secretary stated that this is a terrible thing to butt into when you are not invited. Mr. Holmes suggested that possibly we do have an invitation in the fact that MDAP equipment is being used in North Africa or in the fact that the French have asked us for help in relation to helicopters.7

The Secretary asked what the British think on this subject of French North Africa. Mr. Merchant said that he had not discussed it with the British. Mr. Holmes referred to the recent exchange between Messrs. Macmillan and Jebb on the subject of Algeria as a part of Metropolitan France.

After further consideration, the Secretary stated that he would be willing to feel out the British concerning the course of action laid out in Mr. Holmes’ memorandum but that he would make no further decision at this time. The British know more about this subject than we do, he said. Mr. Merchant expressed the view that the approach to the British should take the form of having Mr. Holmes stop at London on his way back to Tangier. Mr. Holmes called attention to the fact that the British do not have to worry about bases in Morocco as we do. The Secretary said that maybe we should get out of the bases. Mr. Holmes stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated that they consider continued use of the [Page 518] Moroccan bases to be necessary from the military viewpoint.8 In response to the Secretary’s question, Mr. Holmes indicated that he would be proceeding to London this week where he will brief Ambassador Aldrich for an approach to the British on this subject. On leaving the Secretary’s office, Mr. Merchant expressed the opinion that the Secretary will want to take a second look at this subject after Ambassador Aldrich and Mr. Holmes have discussed it with the British. Mr. Merchant and Mr. Holmes agreed that Mr. Holmes should see Ambassador Dillon in Paris but that the French Government should not be approached at this time.9

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/10–355. Secret. Drafted by Cyr.
  2. Document 29.
  3. The arms sale was announced just a few days earlier on September 27.
  4. Mohammed Allai El-Fassi was a leader of the Istiqlal Party and one of the more radical voices opposing French colonialism and in favor of the restoration of Mohammed V.
  5. The agreements reached by the French and Moroccan representatives at Aix-les-Bains between August 22 and 27 were upheld by the French National Assembly by a vote of 468 and 139 on October 9. They paved the way for Mohammed V’s return and Moroccan independence. On October 1, Arafa departed Rabat for Tangier. Thereafter on November 16 Mohammed V arrived in Rabat.
  6. Ahmed Balafrej was one of the founders of and the titular Secretary General of the Istiqlal Party.
  7. On May 25, Pinay asked for U.S. consent to transfer helicopters provided for French use in Indochina to Algeria. The French Second Division, upon moving from Nancy to Algeria, introduced MDAP equipment into the struggle against the insurgents.
  8. On September 15, Murphy had conveyed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as endorsed by the Department of Defense, to the Secretary. They concluded: “The present U.S. air and naval bases in French North Africa are essential for the most effective implementation of U.S. Emergency War Plans.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371A/9–1555)
  9. Holmes accompanied Ambassador Winthrop W. Aldrich to a meeting with Macmillan on October 6. Macmillan promised to consider the recommendation that a joint approach be made to France. (Telegram 1380 from London, October 6; ibid., 123–Holmes, Julius C.) On October 14, he informed Aldrich that he preferred to wait and discuss the matter with Secretary Dulles in Paris, because the situation was so uncertain. (Telegram 1503 from London, October 14; ibid., Central Files, 771A.00/10–1455) Dillon advised in telegram 1632, October 10, following his meeting with Holmes, that he favored strong but sympathetic intervention on the part of the United Kingdom and the United States. The major objective, as he saw it, was to keep the region free of Soviet influence and “available to western world.” (Ibid., 771.00/10–1055)