183. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State 1
SUBJECT
- Personal Approach to Pinay on Moroccan Problem
Discussion:
In his personal telegram to you of September 182 Ambassador Dillon described Pinay’s negative attitude and obstructive tactics in dealing with the Moroccan question. The telegram points out that Pinay, by nature and because of his political affiliations, is opposed to a liberal Moroccan policy, has reluctantly accepted the Faure Program in principle but has continued to throw road-blocks in the way of its actual implementation. The Ambassador believes Pinay is more responsible than Koenig 3 for the delays which have thus far been encountered as the latter is of relatively minor political importance. The Ambassador cites Pinay’s precipitate departure for the U.N. ahead of the schedule as an indication of Pinay’s desire to escape responsibility. The Ambassador sees this action as a renunciation by Pinay of responsibility for the important decisions now being taken in his absence.
The Ambassador believes that opposition by Pinay, whether open or covert, could be catastrophic and could materially affect the [Page 514] outcome of the forthcoming debate in the National Assembly. Even his lukewarm support would create difficulties.
The Ambassador points out that Pinay has great pride and stubbornness but that he is very susceptible to flattery. He believes that if Pinay felt you really respected him for favoring the Faure Program and that you considered that its implementation and the decision of the French Assembly depended on Pinay’s stand, the latter might give an oral commitment to stand firm. The Ambassador further believes that Pinay would live up to such a commitment.
Recommendation:
That, as suggested by Ambassador Dillon, you talk privately with Pinay in New York early next week on this subject and make him aware of the importance which you ascribe to his position in support of his government’s program for Morocco; that you emphasize the significance of his continued strong support of the program because of the great influence which he enjoys within his party and within the Assembly and that you endeavor to obtain his oral commitment to stand firm in his position against the pressures which you know will be present upon his return to France.4
I suggest, if the circumstances at the time warrant it, you might add the following: You understand the difficulty for the French Government of introducing reforms during a period of violence as this has been interpreted in some quarters as “making concessions in response to force.” However, general order has now been maintained ever since August 20 and you feel that it is imperative to get ahead with the program for Morocco from this position of strength before another outburst of violence creates again the same embarrassment for the French Government in carrying out its present farseeing plan and thereby limits its elbow-room in negotiation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771A.00/9–2155. Secret. Drafted by George L. West, Jr. and Walworth Barbour of EUR and cleared in substance with Minister Holmes and in final form with John A. Bovey, Jr.↩
- In telegram 1251 from Paris, eyes only for the Secretary, Dillon reported that Pinay balked at giving full support to the restoration of Mohammed V and favored conservative efforts to compose the Throne Council in such a way as to impede the nationalists. Pinay was in a position to undermine Faure’s efforts at reform. (Ibid., 771.00/9–1855)↩
- General Pierre Koenig was the Minister of National Defense. As a leader of the Juin forces, he was opposed to the concession of any reforms and fought against the return of the old Sultan.↩
- Dulles conferred with Pinay in New York on September 27. In his memorandum of that conversation, Dulles noted that he had indicated his pleasure that Pinay had been able to support Faure on the Moroccan issue. In reply, Pinay stated that he had done so, but only after saving Faure from committing serious political errors. Dulles was not certain what Pinay had in mind though he thought it might be a reference to the Premier’s desire to bring back Mohammed V. In conclusion, he judged that his remarks might have produced the desired effect. (Department of State, Central Files, 771A.00/9–2755) Two days later Pinay told the U.N. General Assembly that “France intends to make of Morocco a modern, democratic and sovereign state, united with France by the ties of freely accepted interdependence.” See Official Records, 10th Sess., 1955, 528th Plenary Mtg. (September 29, 1955), paragraphs 51-54.↩