Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

121. Operations Coordinating Board Report¹

Washington, December 18, 1957.

PROGRESS REPORT ON ETHIOPIA

(NSC 5615/1,² Approved November 19, 1956)

(Period Covered: From May 30, 1957 through December 18, 1957)

A. Summary of Operating Progress in Relation to Major NSC Objectives

1. Summary Evaluation. U.S. policy toward Ethiopia as set forth in NSC 5615/1 has been reviewed from the standpoint of operating considerations and in the light of operating experience to date and of anticipated future developments. No review of policy is recommended.

Progress has been made toward the achievement of U.S. objectives in Ethiopia and at present relations with the Ethiopian Government are good. Previous Ethiopian dissatisfaction with the magnitude of our aid programs and the delays in receiving military equipment has been overcome in some measure by the increased scope of U.S. aid in FY 1957 and by the acceleration of military equipment deliveries. Misunderstandings with respect to the procedures involved in the U.S. economic assistance program have persisted, however, and we are continuing to endeavor to clarify them. A continuing problem facing the U.S. is Ethiopia’s penchant for seeking special treatment in connection with various matters, particularly those involving procedures under the mutual security program. Progress is being made in fulfilling the Richard Mission aid commitments. (See Annex A, Paragraph 1.³)

Ethiopia has continued to play a small but important role in support of free world collective security measures. It retains a military liaison group in Korea and has voted for UN Resolutions regarding Hungary and postponing consideration of the Chinese representation issue. No particular problems have arisen in connection with the continued use of our existing military facilities in Ethiopia. It has now been determined that there is no urgent U.S. military requirements for additional facilities in that country. Accordingly, no further efforts are being made at this time to obtain the consent of the Ethiopian Government to the establishment of additional facilities.

Ethiopia’s first general elections for the Lower House of Parliament were held during this period, representing initial steps in the transfer from “personalized” government to one based on democratic processes. Although this may contribute to the maintenance of political stability, the rate of development of democratic processes is expected to be very gradual.

B. Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States

2. Ethiopian Expectations Regarding Air Force Aid. Although the Ethiopian Government was informed that the U.S. survey of Ethiopian Air Force requirements involved no U.S. aid commitment, the Emperor recently stated that he attaches great importance to the development of his Air Force and anticipates receipt of U.S. aid as a result of the survey. It is the Defense view that there is no valid military requirement at this time for the establishment of force goals for the Ethiopian Air Force and that, therefore, none should be established. Our Embassy at Addis Ababa considers assistance to the Ethiopian Air Force necessary to the maintenance of a strong U.S. position in Ethiopia. This question is under active consideration by the Departments of State and Defense. It is recognized that MAP aid for the Ethiopian Air Force would increase the burden of recurring costs on Ethiopian budget and that such assistance should be held to the minimum necessary.⁴

3. Ethiopian Request for Increase in U.S.-Supported Force Goals. The Emperor has formally requested MAP support for an increase in the present ground force goal from three to four commands in order to provide for the extension of MAAG assistance to the Imperial Body Guard without at the same time reducing such assistance to the Army. It is not feasible to accede to this request. The Emperor has been informed, however, that MAP support can be extended to two brigades of the Imperial Body Guard within the present force goal if MAP support for the Army is correspondingly reduced.⁵

4. Lack of Understanding Regarding Communist Threat. Ethiopia’s continued lack of real appreciation of the communist subversive threat presents an obstacle in combatting Soviet Bloc efforts to extend communist influence. Contributing to this lack of appreciation is Ethiopia’s preoccupation with political agitation by Somali nationalists for a territorial expansion by Somaliland at Ethiopia’s expense (Somaliland is scheduled to become independent by 1960) and Egyptian subversion and propaganda among the Moslem minorities generally. There also appears to be a continued lack of appreciation of the role played by Satellite Missions in furthering Soviet objectives.

5. Restrictions on Use of U.S. Information Materials. Although some editorials critical of Soviet policies and activities have appeared in the government-controlled press, the Ethiopian desire not to use USIS material which might evoke the hostility of the USSR continues to present difficulties. This problem is complicated by the lack of U.S. commercial wire service which would provide more balanced coverage from an unofficial source. Efforts to encourage such a wire service are continuing, and give promise of success.⁶

The recent assignment of a TASS representative to become the only full time permanent accredited foreign correspondent residing in the Ethiopian capital, will add to the problem of presenting American news and objectives to the Ethiopian Government and population. This move may also involve the inauguration of a TASS wire service in Addis Ababa. Presently, Reuters provides the only wire service.

Note: The latest National Intelligence Estimate is:

NIE 72–56, Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa, August 14, 1956.⁷

Attachments:⁸

Annex A—Additional Major Developments Not Covered in the Report.

Financial Annex and Pipeline Analysis.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Ethiopia. Secret. Enclosure to a memorandum from the Acting Executive Officer of the OCB, Roy M. Melbourne, to James S. Lay, Jr., dated December 23, indicating that the Progress Report was concurred in by the Board on December 18.
2. Document 113.
3. Not printed. It noted that the Ethiopians had accepted the U.S. view that the commitment of funds for broadcasting equipment was intended for internal coverage and not for international broadcasting facilities. In regard to other matters, it stated that consideration was being given to the Ethiopian request to substitute something else for the promised helicopters; it referred to USOM’s request that no police equipment be sent until the country’s principal needs were determined by a U.S. expert in the field; and it remarked finally that the pledged military aid was included in the regular military assistance program.

4. The report of the USAF survey team which visited Ethiopia in April favored extending assistance over a period of years starting with a modest jet training program. EUCOM, however, did not support this recommendation finding no military justification for it in that Ethiopia belonged neither to NATO nor the Baghdad Pact. No valid military requirement for jet aircraft or for an Ethiopian Air Force to support current U.S. or NATO war plans was perceived. Although USCINCEUR recommended support for an Ethiopian Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense on August 27 that they saw “no valid military requirement” necessitating such a program. The Department of Defense concurred on October 9. (Department of State, AF/NE Files: Lot 67 D 226, Air Force Assistance, and Ethiopian Air Force)

   The Emperor brought this matter to the attention of Ambassador Don C. Bliss (who had presented his credentials in June), on October 23. The latter commented that, while the Embassy and MAAG supported Ethiopia’s request for Air Force assistance, nevertheless a final decision had not as yet been reached. The Emperor described the matter as important and urgent. (Despatch 143 from Addis Ababa, October 23; ibid., Central Files, 775.11/10–2357)

5. At his October 23 meeting with Bliss, the Emperor asserted his view that the Ethiopian Armed Forces should be established on the basis of four commands. (Despatch 143 from Addis Ababa, October 23; ibid., 775.11/10–2357) The Department of State notified the Embassy in Ethiopia on November 5 that no justification was seen for increasing the number of commands. There was a willingness, however, to provide supplies for two Bodyguard Brigades in the hope that would accelerate their integration into the regular Army. (Telegram 294 to Addis Ababa, November 5; ibid., 775.5–MSP/10–2057) The Embassy reported on December 20 that regardless of the fact that these brigades were receiving MAP equipment, the Emperor might nevertheless proceed to organize a third, which would be non-MAP-supported. Moreover, Ethiopia had not fully accepted the U.S. proposal to confine support to the seven intact Army brigades. (Telegram 507 from Addis Ababa, December 20; ibid.)
6. At the OCB meeting on December 18, Allen Dulles commented that United Press might soon establish an Addis Ababa office. (Ibid., OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430)
7. Document 14.
8. None printed.