Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

Addis Ababa, April 18, 1957—noon.

767. From Richards. My comments on Ethiopia follow:

1. Country is more primitive and isolated than anticipated although I was impressed by dignity at court. Largely cut off and self-contained on plateau and surrounding deserts, people continue to follow ancient traditional pattern of life. USOM study concluded fewer than 5000 Ethiopians possess either fourth grade or semblance technical skill. Participation in government in modern sense or contact with outside world limited to small number, mainly from dominant Amharic tribe.

2. Despite grant by Emperor of some facade of parliamentary government (direct elections for one of two houses of Parliament scheduled for early autumn), ultimate power continues to rest with Emperor. Reportedly he does not exercise authority despotically but by working out compromises among special interest groups particularly Coptic church, nobles, land-owners, tribal elements and now younger group educated Ethiopians.

3. Sense of affiliation with and dependence on US remains, dating from time of Italian invasion and subsequent events. Determination to continue this relationship appears to stem in large degree from Emperor. Other officials, perhaps less conscious of past, appear more skeptical of value of this relationship. Foreign Minister, although strongly pro-American, seemed inclined to try compromise with Egypt. However, even Emperor read bill of grievances against US similar to that presented to Vice President. Gist was US failure accord adequate aid to Ethiopia or adequate support in political controversies, especially in UN. Foreign Minister elaborated this theme emphasizing controlling position in General Assembly now held by Afro-Asian group which Ethiopia antagonizing by support of US with resultant probable loss votes Ethiopia needs especially re Somaliland issue. My impression is US will have to be more responsive in future to Ethiopian views and requests if we expect to be able to continue count on Ethiopian support on major east-west issues.

4. Ethiopia not directly threatened by international Communism as such either by reason of geographical position or internal movement. Little awareness of Communist threat exists. Ethiopian stand on world issues against USSR appears motivated by friendship for US rather than fear of Communism.

5. However, Ethiopia is confronted by what might be labeled “neutralist imperialism” led by Egypt and directed both toward advancing Egyptian aspirations in Africa and forcing Ethiopia to join neutralist camp. This campaign certainly assists purposes of international Communism. Strong radio and word of mouth propaganda directed at Muslim Somali tribesmen. Ethiopian nervousness over these attacks explains to considerable extent their decision last fall to refrain from joining SCUA, in return for understanding with Egypt to tone down campaign. India also singled out as leader of attacks on Ethiopia.

6. In private conversation Foreign Minister left no doubt of his opposition to Egyptian policies. He described Nasser as “hooked” by USSR and in grip of pro-Soviet group of army officers led by Ali Sabri.² He thought Nasser had allowed his dependence on Soviets to reach point where he no longer free agent. By contrast Foreign Minister said Ethiopia’s relations with Sudan were good and he making every effort work with Sudan. He had invited Sudanese Prime Minister³ visit Ethiopia next week after his tour of Arab states. Foreign Minister thought Sudan now awake to Egyptian designs and had no desire see itself swallowed up.

Problem of mission was to overcome feeling of neglect on part of US. Emperor and Foreign Minister made long presentations stressing this theme. I felt obliged to take up Foreign Minister rather firmly and he subsequently denied repeatedly any intention criticize US.

Ethiopia presented memorandum⁴ listing economic needs—broadcasting, helicopters, internal security equipment, cereal seeds (it was unclear whether cereals for consumption also desired), and ships, orally adding port of Assab and roads—and complete military wants. Three of economic requests fully within scope of ME proposals objective of increasing strength against subversion.

I determined to offer following package grant as is:

1. 100 KW broadcasting station with ancillary equipment and training. Cost in magnitude of $1 million.

2. Civil police equipment—$200,000, plus training to be recommended by US police consultant. Estimated cost training under $200,000.

3. Two Bell aircraft helicopters—model 47–G—two with spares.

4. Recommended PL 480 program of cereal seeds if need established.

5. Selected military items in categories contained in OASD/ISA message Defense 921104 April⁵ to include army medical equipment and naval training aids not to exceed $3 million. Chief MAAG to provide item details and is authorized make modifications within categories.

Aide-mémoire transmitted separately.⁶

During discussions I called attention to 15 day provision of joint resolution.⁷

Ethiopians appeared pleased at proposals, particularly economic assistance, which imparted sense of US recognition their problems and action to overcome them. At last meeting Foreign Minister made point of expressing appreciation adding that if discussions had been strong and frank that is way friends talk.

Re economic assistance—Ethiopians hewed closely but not entirely to lines of memo submitted. They were much concerned over internal security problem and means of countering hostile propaganda. Consequently, my approval broadcasting station and civil police equipment and provision of training services well received. Have allowed up to $200,000 for training but have not informed Ethiopians estimated cost this item. (List of equipment approved by Haney being forwarded Department separately.) Ethiopians pressed hard for helicopters, one for use of Emperor and others primarily for security control remote areas as off shore islands. I agreed provide two helicopters similar one now used by USOM here and which has proved capable safe operation at this altitude. Embassy and USOM agree this provides good impact. Re cereal seeds, USOM agricultural chief wishes study further extent to which materials shortage likely develop. I therefore agreed to recommend to USG consideration of FY 58 PL 480 program if existence shortage confirmed. Ethiopians also asked for ships, help with Port Assab, and additional aid for highway expansion program. Complained IBRD interest rates too high in respect loans for highway development. I explained ships, highways and Assab outside context my mission and with respect Assab suggested they pursue discussions regarding port requirements, either Assab or Djibouti, with USOM here. At request of Foreign Minister I undertook to bring to attention of Maritime Administration Ethiopian interest in ships at same time holding out no hope we would help country acquire mercantile marine.

Re military assistance—at meeting of military representatives mission member deflated Ethiopian hopes for financing of complete range military ambitions, pointing out mission’s objectives confined to combatting international Communism, and limitations on available funds. B.G. Amanuel Andom, J–3, and Assistant Defense Minister, Michael Imru, pressed hard for projects and demanded answer to memo presented originally to General Decker.⁸ They were told bluntly mission would not comply. While scant military justification exists for agreement to deliver additional military items at present, I decided to approve $3 million package to obtain political impact, and since items already scheduled for eventual delivery. Greater impact might have been obtained by financing projects more attractive to Ethiopians but I concluded overall interests best served by remaining within general framework DOD revised list. Chief MAAG concurs.

Difficulties developed with respect to communiqué since Ethiopians at first flatly refused explicitly to endorse ME proposals or to condemn international Communism. They argued that to do so would cost them votes of Afro-Asian group in UNGA on Somaliland issue which to Ethiopians more direct and pressing problem than communism. After prolonged discussion and referral matter to Foreign Minister they finally accepted language in text, transmitted separately,⁹ which I consider satisfactory.

Actions requested from Washington:

1. Quick delivery of internal security equipment and assignment of police consultant to USOM (already requested by IEG). I believe fast action will greatly enhance impact.

2. Contract for engineering survey and provision of broadcasting equipment.

3. Issuance of purchase authorizations for Bell helicopters. Speedy delivery most desirable.

4. Expeditious programming military equipment.

5. Favorable consideration of PL 480 program should shortage in cereals materialize.

6. Bring to attention of Maritime Administration Ethiopian interest in ships.

Simonson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–1857. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, London, and Paris, and by pouch to Rome, New Delhi, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Kabul, Karachi, Ankara, Beirut, Tripoli, Amman, Athens, Rabat, Tunis, Baghdad, Khartoum, Tehran, and Jidda.
2. Director of the Cabinet.
3. Abdullah Khalil.
4. See footnote 8 below.
5. Dated April 12, not printed.
6. Dated April 18, not printed (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–1857)
7. H.J. Res. 117, as amended March 7, provided that, for certain kinds of authorizations, no money could be released until 15 days after a report indicating the recipient of the funds, the use to which it was to be put, and its source had been furnished to the appropriate House and Senate Committees. The text of the resolution is printed in Department of State Bulletin, March 25, 1957, p. 481.
8. General George H. Decker, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, was given the memorandum on January 31. (Despatch 172 from Addis Ababa, February 15; Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/2–1557)
9. For text of the communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, p. 843.