Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

34. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Jerusalem¹

Washington , January 24, 1956 .

Following are my thoughts in connection your messages of January 23 and 24 and … of January 24:²

1. Problem as it appears from your talks to date divides into: (a) ascertaining extent of agreement between two countries and extent of divergence on questions where there is not agreement; and, (b) maintaining atmosphere in which negotiations can continue for minimum period necessary to work out terms of settlement and area acceptance. Suggest you take position with both Ben Gurion and Nasser that your first round of discussions has been for purpose of hearing their general views and statement of principles on which they approach problem; that, as you anticipated when you came to area, problem of working out a settlement will prove to be an extremely difficult one requiring, quite possibly, numerous interchanges; that you would like in second round of conversations to discuss in more detail what appear to you to be the eight or ten items on which agreement will be essential so that you and they may ascertain exact extent of agreement and differences.

2. For purpose of check-list, of ascertaining extent of agreement and disagreement, and possible direction toward which thinking of both sides might be directed where there is a divergence, you may find useful Alpha materials sent to you at Cairo³ and on which Burdett, who is arriving Cairo today, conversant.

3. In discussions with Israelis concerning Negev, suggest you take position that we believe some concession toward principle of land contact between Egypt and rest of Arab world is necessary if Nasser’s cooperation on settlement is to be obtained and that position by IG of no alterations in Negev boundaries would, in our opinion, foreclose possibility of a settlement. We hope they will give most serious thought to possible alternative arrangements which would make possible establishment of principle of Arab land contact with minimum lessening of Israel’s vital interests in area, assuming an overall settlement and consequent security treaty by U.S. and possibly other powers.

4. It is, of course, indispensable that both sides refrain from any armed action during period necessary for working out a settlement. I am inclined to believe, however, that a specific agreement to a ceasefire through you as channel would raise complicating issues which might derail your main effort and which, even if achieved, could prove illusory since relaxed border may always be at mercy of acts by unidentified individuals. Would recommend, therefore, that you confine your efforts along this line to emphasizing need for continued relaxed situation, leaving problem of specific agreements on this question to Burns and Hammerskjold.

5. With respect to point (b) in paragraph 1 above, believe you should take position, especially with Nasser, that it will probably be impossible to delay agreement in principle upon terms of settlement for more than next month or possibly two or three at very most, but also, and this point should be stressed especially with Ben Gurion, Nasser will be faced with very real problem of making sure of Arab acceptance of any settlement which may well take some time. If agreement in principle is reached soon, the problem of assuring Israel’s security during period required for announcing and implementing agreement should not prove insuperable.

6. Nasser’s agreement to send communication of general nature indicated by … message January 24 is step forward. Obviously drafting of it should await determination of extent to which you ascertain agreement is possible and should incorporate all points of agreement or progress toward some compromise position.

7. Nasser’s agreement to reduce propaganda against Israel also encouraging.⁴ With respect point 6 in … message January 24, it should be stressed with Nasser that points you may make with him pursuant my message to you of January 20⁵ are in broadest sense a discussion of “area-wide problems” and constitute effort to “iron out problems between us which stood in the way of American-Egyptian cooperation in the area” referred to in paragraph 4 same message.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Secret. Approved by Byroade, Hoover, and Dulles.
2. Documents 29, 31, and 32, respectively.
3. Not further identified.
4. According to Message 23 of January 24 from Cairo to Anderson in Jerusalem, Nasser had agreed to order a reduction of Egyptian propaganda against Israel. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Jan. ’56—memos, etc.)
5. Document 24.