Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

32. Message to Washington¹

No. 22

Cairo, January 24, 1956.

1. … During discussion Nasr reactions to Anderson’s proposals of the evening before² emerged as follows:

A. … in December, he made most tremendous and difficult decision of any Arab leader this generation; that is he resolved make peace with Israel. This is firm decision.

B. As Nasr understood the agreement … that he agreed procedure comprised three phases: First, a period during which a negotiator had discussions with both sides in order to narrow the differences and join the issues; Second, a phase wherein Nasr would get the Arab leaders in line and ensure that they would follow along with whatever agreement is worked out with Ben Gurion; finally, actual negotiations with Ben Gurion. Since December, Nasr has been feeling out his own supporters and other Arab leaders as well. He had always thought that the second phase would take “Many months” and he now thinks that it may take still longer and cannot be accomplished at all unless preceded by a “Tension reducing period”.

C. Though Nasr has been most impressed by Anderson’s sincerity and obvious stature, he is “Nervous” because Anderson seems to be introducing a new time element into the understanding. “This problem is seven years old and many people have tried to solve it. Mr. Anderson seems to think that only three days after his arrival he can get us to agree and arrange an immediate meeting with Ben Gurion”.

D. Nasr does not understand why Anderson was so upset about position he took with regard to Negev. “Does not Mr. Anderson understand that this is the position I am taking at beginning of negotiations?” Nasr then indicated that he would “Probably” be willing to settle for “Beersheba South”. After I needled him he finally hinted this was still an asking price. (I do feel any further retreat he makes will simply be minor alterations of proposed line.)

2. … pointed out that during their December talks Nasr seemed to envision faster progress through phase one and two than he apparently now expects. Nasr admitted this and gave as reason that his attempts since December to feel out views of various Arab leaders had evoked overwhelming insistence that no peace with Israel at any time or under any circumstances is possible. (That very afternoon in fact he had gotten this line from Nazim Qudsi, Akram Hourani and Leb FonMin³) “In spite of our determination”, he said, “This will be a long and difficult task and if we are to succeed we must go into it with full realization that this is the case”.

3. Nasr then reminded us that what he had promised … was that he would go as far in compromising with Israel as was possible and at same time maintain a position he could sell other Arab leaders. Our intelligence on public opinion throughout the Arab World could not be so adequate as to lead us to believe that he has any chance whatever of getting away with accepting a “Heads of Agreement” settlement just now. He is convinced, as he feels we must be convinced if we have any appreciation of the present mood of the Arab people, that he could not possibly admit publicly his intention to recognize Israel until the present tensions are eased. The two factors causing these tensions are the refugees and the absence of a land link between African and Asiatic Arabs.

4. Nasr reminded us that over a year ago he had suggested … that a “Secret Committee” of Egyptians and Americans be set up with the task of ironing out all problems between us which stood in the way of American-Egyptian cooperation in the area.⁴ He said that he now needs some individual to work with him on just such a basis, and that when he talked … in December he had this sort of arrangement in mind rather than one involving working with a Presidential representative for a “few days”. He is ready to launch upon a full scale program, one objective of which will be peace with Israel. He added that his approach to the problem would succeed, whereas our approach (i.e. that of having an immediate announcement of his intentions to recognize Israel) would certainly fail and that if we wish to work with him at solving the problem on this basis he suggests he is prepared to set about doing his part immediately.

5. I pointed out we were in no position to dispute his views on the situation in the Arab World and his capabilities for dealing with it. On the other hand he is in no position to argue with us on the question of our position and the many factors affecting it. What we have to do is to arrive at a solution of the problem which takes into consideration both his capabilities and ours. The plan he suggests totally ignores our problems. More specifically it does not recognize the dilemma we will all be in should Israel launch a preventive war. To this Nasr replied that in taking into consideration his own capabilities, he could think of no way of proceeding other than what he had already proposed. (See Para 1B above) He would be most interested however in seeing a proposal from us which takes into consideration our capabilities and at the same time our views of his capabilities. It is difficult for Nasr to believe that the proposal Anderson made was in any way based on an understanding of his present capabilities. The only result would be to give Nuri Said a weapon with which to destroy him.

6. Nasr then said he had told … in December that he was willing to discuss settlement of the Israel problem as part of the area wide problems and that he could take a constructive attitude only so long as the discussions were on this basis. “Once the threat of Israel is raised”, he said, “I have no choice but reply that I will face this threat with all my energies and to give you my conviction that we will defeat the Israeli if they launch an attack upon us.”

7. We then took up the question of the letter. After considerable quibbling over some of the passages we finally agreed upon the text forwarded in Message No. 20.⁵ He said that even this however must be in the form of a message sent via our channels to the President (rather than a signed official letter) and that it must be regarded as Top Secret. He would not be able to consider putting this letter in the form of an official document until given the assurances as indicated in Message No. 20. He pointedly reminded us of the fact that several times in the past we had given sensitive info to American Embassy and that it has subsequently leaked to his and often our extreme disadvantage.

8. When I pointed out that he was now agreeing to something less than what we had understood the evening before, he replied that he had later been disturbed at the possibility that he may not really have understood Anderson’s proposal nor had we understood his reply to it. We then discussed briefly the problem of understanding one another and he remarked that there were very few foreigners that he could talk to with any confidence that they were understanding him and he was understanding them. He said that he used Fawzi as a device for delay. Since Fawzi is powerless to make decisions having him conduct negotiations assures Nasr of an opportunity to study carefully any propositions that are put to him and to make sure he comprehends them. It is evident that he regrets the absence of such a device in dealing with Anderson, for … this does not give him time for study and consequently he cannot be sure of avoiding giving a wrong or easily misunderstood answer to propositions put to him, e.g. Anderson’s “Heads of Agreements” Proposal.

9. There are still numerous loose ends arising from our conversations which we will eventually get around to reporting separately. I believe however that in this discussion with Nasr we have gotten more nearly to the heart of the problem than we have up to now. My own view … is that the problem before us is that we have a chance of solving the Palestine problem provided we are able to give Nasr the capability of doing so. I also feel that if we are not able to work on this basis we must plan for the future on the assumption that the Palestine problem will not be solved for many years to come. I feel we have made many points with Nasr (certainly we made a major point when we got him to agree to work actively toward making peace with Israel) but he has also successfully made one point with us. That it is useless to get an agreement from him which he has no chance of selling to other Arab leaders and that he has no chance of selling to other Arab leaders any agreement except after going through the phases he envisions.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. Also sent to Anderson in Jerusalem.
2. See Document 27.
3. Salim Lahoud.
4. No record of such a suggestion has been found in Department of State files.
5. Document 30.