Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

35. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State¹

No. 29

Jerusalem, January 25, 1956.

1. We were advised Monday evening that our next meeting with Ben-Gurion would be desirable at 11 o’clock Tuesday² in order to give Ben-Gurion, Sharett and their associates an opportunity to talk privately. … I met with Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Kollek and Herzog for more than an hour.³

2. Ben-Gurion inquired if I still had hopes for peace. I replied that I thought the continuation of hope and optimism was necessary. That all of us owed primary oblig make supreme effort achieve peace. That I thought we must not be unduly discouraged by opening positions if both sides maintained a willingness to try to reach rapprochement. That I was not an expert in psychology, especially Oriental, and that we must not overlook the psychological factors of bargaining which could motivate each side in taking a position. Ben-Gurion indicated that he agreed that every effort must be made to reach settlement.

3. I then asked Ben-Gurion if after our talks of yesterday, he felt we are nearer to peace. Ben-Gurion started to reply but Sharett interrupted and replied instead.

4. Sharett made following points: He stated that as the result of the talks of yesterday and my coming to Israel, the IG now feels most determined to attempt to arrive at an understanding. In order that there can be an effort to deter the situation rolling into “an abyss” he stated that they attached the most decisive importance to direct meeting at the highest possible level since this would constitute an earnest or token of good will by Nasser. Otherwise, he stated, the IG would be suspicious that Nasser will be misleading the President and the Israelis and enemies into sense of false assurance. This he said, would result in blunting our senses of apprehension and in time we lose while they gain. He explained that the meeting was not merely symbol but that it would clarify and feel out the future courses and possibilities for peace. For example, on the territorial question he stated “Let Nasser explain to us what his real interest is in Arab land continuity. Let us develop our view why it is not necessary.” He observed that even if meeting failed there would be some progress since certain difficulties would be better understood and at least communications will have been established. Sharett emphasized that they attached primary significance to the meeting itself rather than the issues discussed or solutions accomplished, elaborated that progress would be made if their discussions only revolved around secondary issues leading up to primary issues which could be discussed later in a better climate of understanding.

5. I then inquired if Sharett had learned anything of value from his conversation with Hammarskjold.⁴ He replied that he was seeing Hammarskjold at 4:00 o’clock with Ben-Gurion and would report to me tonight.⁵ Sharett stated he inferred that Hammarskjold felt Nasser had made a commitment to him accepting Hammarskjold’s proposals. However, he could not be sure until he talked to Hammarskjold directly.

6. I then asked if he felt that really worthwhile progress had been achieved if we secured unilateral declarations resulting in a cease fire, followed by secret conversations at the highest obtainable level. They thought so. I suggested that such a course should be coincident with discernible evidences which would ease tensions such as refraining from inflammatory statements, refraining from retaliation, confiding in an emissary and working toward an atmosphere of understanding. They agreed.

7. Ben-Gurion then stated that there were only two problems. The first was peace; the second was prevention of war. All of us wanted [peace?]. Israel was determined to try. He tried to appreciate Nasser’s position and understood that Nasser faced political difficulties in making peace. Ben-Gurion’s primary concern, however, was with preventing war. This could only be accomplished by creating a situation in which war would not occur. They now faced the realization that Egypt was acquiring arms. These arms could only have one purpose. It was necessary for Israel to be placed in situation where they did not fear this flow of arms to Egypt. The situation which will prevent war, he said “your govt, can accomplish alone. This is message which I want you to take home to your govt.”

8. Ben-Gurion continued his discussions saying “there is no inherent conflict between us and Egypt” if we can sit down together, we can work out our problems. Meanwhile war must be prevented.

9. I then asked Ben-Gurion if I understood correctly that he was concerned both with the facts of strength on the respective sides and assurances by the respective sides that their strength would not be used. This he said was the substance of his concern but currently the situation of relative strength was the most important element. Neither side could be content with assurance alone, either from the opposite side or from outside powers.

10. Reverting to possibility of conversations, I pointed out if secret conversations become possible they might not include same official reps on respective sides because of differences govt, organization. They replied protocol was not important, only that the Egyptian rep have Nasser’s confidence. I further suggested if secret high level conversations were not possible at this moment they should participate in secret conversations at any level obtainable, looking to an improvement in the level. This they agreed to. I then reverted to possibility of unilateral statements by each side in order to focus attention to the effort of settlement. This they agreed was desirable and significant. However, they emphasized that it must not be regarded as an act of “absolution” by Nasser. Other discernible efforts must be coincidental.

11. While agreeing to secret conversations at any level, they continually emphasized the importance of high level, and expressed willingness to hold such conversations in Egypt in order to lessen the problem for Nasser.

12. Their preoccupation with arms issue is always apparent. Their overwhelming desire for some direct communication is uppermost in their minds.

13. The tone of our conversations seem to have swung from an initial reaction of disappointment by Israel to one of real determination to make the most of what they call this “decisive effort.”

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret.
2. January 24.
3. Memorandum of conversation by Anderson, not printed. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Meetings with Israeli Officials. January 1956–March 1956)
4. Hammarskjöld was in Israel January 23–25.
5. According to the memorandum of his conversation on the evening of January 24 with Ben Gurion, Sharett, Kollek, and Herzog, Anderson was informed by Sharett “that Hammarskjold had not obtained a cease-fire from Nasr, … but rather an explanation of why Nasr could not issue one.” (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Meetings with Israeli Officials. January 1956–March 1956)