Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

33. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State¹

No. 26

Jerusalem, January 24, 1956.

1. I met with Ben-Gurion and Teddy Kollek at 5 p.m.² We remained alone for two and half hours. Our early discussions concerned agricultural developments in Israel and various problems of agriculture in the U.S. and elsewhere. Ben-Gurion then asked if I minded “talking shop”. I told him I was delighted since this was my purpose in being here. He stated that during my earlier conversations I had referred to both Egypt and Israel maintaining a position of “flexibility” in order that a solution of their problems might be arrived at. He wanted to make clear that in his mind this term meant different things when applied to the opposite sides. In the case of Egypt flexibility meant that they should not be too demanding in asking concessions of Israel territory; while in the case of Israel flexibility meant that they must be willing to give up territory without receiving territory in exchange. He wanted to emphasize that he was not asking for any part of Egyptian territory although they had great areas, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula, of which they were making little use and which would be to his great advantage. He was only asking that he keep the territory which he now occupied. He thought, therefore, that there was a danger in arriving at solutions through formulas since they did have different meanings as in this case. He elaborated that true flexibility would mean each side keeping its own territory as now occupied and sharing lines of communication, cultural exchanges, educational opportunities and like areas of mutual helpfulness. That in this respect he was entirely flexible and wanted to be a good neighbor and in fact a partner in improving the lot of people in this part of the world. He then stated that he would like to discuss the question of freedom of choice on the part of the refugees between repatriation and compensation. That freedom of choice in his judgment was unthinkable. That if he gave his word it would mean in his mind an ultimate responsibility for the repatriation of large numbers of refugees. He wanted me to know that after the defeat of the Arabs in the Gaza area, Israel had offered the refugees the right to remain in the country if they would lay down their arms. They sought advice from Arab leaders who told them to get out of the country because their lands would be retaken by conquest. He said that a similar occurrence was applicable to the refugees in the area of Tiberias. He wanted me to understand that Israel had taken refugees from all parts of the world and had provided homes, lands and employment for them without asking anything in return. He believed that the refugees were not [?] entitled to compensation but that any “freedom of choice” was not possible as a matter of principle or practice for Israel.

2. Ben-Gurion stated that he appreciated the great concern of the President in trying to achieve peace in this area. He too wanted peace but felt that realism required almost a miracle to achieve it. He stated “you have undertaken the most difficult task of modern times but the most noble one.” He felt we should never say that “peace was impossible” but that we should look at it realistically and when so examined it presented almost insuperable barriers.

3. While he was not endeavoring to advise the U.S. in the determination of its own policy, he thought we should realize two dangers which confronted us. The first of these dangers was that the Russian penetration of Africa had already begun. Their arms trade with Egypt was a part of a well-conceived plan for penetration which would continue. He pointed out that we had taken action in Iran just in time to prevent the penetration of that country but that in Egypt he fears that we were “too late.” He stated that he now fears that we were in a position of being “lured” to Egypt in the hope that we would make commitments to their advantage after the penetration had already progressed to the point that it could not be halted.

4. He expressed the fear that the philosophy was growing that “Israel should be sacrificed in order to achieve Arab alliances with the Western powers.” He thought this was a great mistake. He felt that the course of wisdom required the continued strengthening of the free countries in the Middle East and those who supported democratic forms of government. He was quite sure in his own mind that the Arab States would make their decisions on alliances quite independent of any action which we might take in support of Egypt.

5. The second danger which he wanted to point out to us was that resulting from an increase in the strength of Egypt as compared to the strength of Israel. Under these circumstances he feared the temptation to use its power would be too great for Nasser to resist. That we might be promoting the feeling on Nasser’s part that a “settlement was unnecessary.” That Nasser as a soldier had once been defeated in battle with Israel and would therefore be moved to take revenge if he secured equality or superiority in arms.

6. He then asked if I had the impression “not from what has been told you by either side but from your understanding of the issues involved” if I felt there was any real hope of achieving settlement. I replied that I thought it essential that we keep the hopes for peaceful settlement alive. That war could only do damage to both sides. That the very best men in both countries might be lost regardless of the outcome. That in any event the damage would set back the countries for a long time to come. That I felt we must regard the decisions which would be made now “as fateful choices” having great implications for the survival and progress of the countries involved. That we approached this difficult problem fully realizing the severity of the issues but were concerned with each country surviving, making progress for its people, and achieving an important place in the community of nations. That war could only promote turmoil and confusion in this area of the world and offered the best hope of the Soviets extending their sphere of influence. That our country faced very important decisions in connection with these issues. That I realized the necessity for facing the problems realistically and that the price which might have to be paid for peace could be exceedingly severe but that it should always be measured against the consequences of war or the long-term implication of a flow of arms to the Arab countries with its population advantage over Israel. That on a long-term basis this could only place Israel in an untenable position. He stated that these problems were very much on his mind and he was continuing to give the most serious thought to them.

7. As I was preparing to leave, Ben-Gurion said he wanted to make two statements. The first was that he thought every effort should be made to secure peace. That whether or not peace was secured could not be entirely decided through any efforts by our country alone. The second statement was that our country could, through its own decisions, “be responsible for the prevention of war.”

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret.
2. January 23.