Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

309. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State¹

Damascus, April 26, 1956—noon.

1001. Embtel 998.² I called on Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Ghazzi April 25 to enquire about results Hammarskjold visit Damascus. Ghazzi stated:

(1) Satisfactory agreement reached and letters exchanged re improvement situation on Sea of Galilee.

(2) GOS had accepted Hammarskjold’s proposal for cease-fire on condition Israel agree abide by all pertinent decisions taken by SC since signature GAA. Ghazzi added that Hammarskjold would ascertain whether or not Syria’s condition would be met by Israel, and that if Israel agrees, letters will be exchanged. In response my query, Ghazzi stated these included October 27, 1953 resolution re Jisr Banat Yacub Canal.³

Following incomplete report from UNTSO source differs somewhat from information supplied by Ghazzi:

(1) Re Galilee situation

(A) Hammarskjold said that, since Israelis would not give unconditional guarantee keep police boats 250 meters from shore, he preferred phrasing to effect boats would “not approach shore”;

(B) GOS informed that Israel would permit use of lake by Syrian villagers for watering cattle and similar local purposes, but not for irrigation;

(C) GOS maintained position it would accept UNTSO control of fishing by Syrians, but would not accept permits issued by Israelis (Embtel 749⁴);

(D) Syrians agreed to increase in size of observer corps and establishment UNTSO observation posts along shore;

(E) If Israel is approved [approves], UNTSO to have patrol boat in Sea of Galilee. According UNTSO source, negotiations releasing tension in area Sea of Galilee to continue under General Burns, since they not integral part of Hammarskjold mission.

(2) Cease-fire—initial Syrian position was that cease-fire guarantees should be linked to Israeli commitment not to resume work at Jisr Banat Yacub. Hammarskjold refused discuss Jisr Banat Yacub, saying this was matter for General Burns and SC. Syrians then said they would agree to cease-fire only if Israel agreed abide by all SC decisions post-dating GAA (including inter alia May 18, 1951 decision re status DZ⁵ and 1953 resolution re Jordan diversion⁶). Hammarskjold: (a) pointed out Israelis might insist on similar condition vis-à-vis Egypt, which would embarrass latter in view its non-implementation SC decision on Suez Canal, and (b) stated if GOS would not give unconditional cease-fire guarantee under GAA, he would ask for one under UN Charter. In end Syrians agreed “unconditional” cease-fire in return for Hammarskjold’s promise negotiate with Israelis re observance SC decisions. Hammarskjold insisted, however, that two matters not be linked and according UNTSO source, appeared satisfied GOS had accepted this position.

Comment: GOS communiqué quoted reftel and Ghazzi’s comments to me indicate Syrians continue consider question of cease-fire inseparable from that of Israeli intentions re Jisr Banat Yacub Canal, even if these two questions have been separated for negotiating purposes. Article V of GAA binds Israel as well as Syria not to violate DZ and from GOS point of view resumption work at Jisr Banat Yacub (which lies on Syrian side of armistice demarcation line) would constitute violation just as would Syrian firing into DZ to stop such work (Embtel 874⁷). GOS likely regard unconditional guarantee not to fire as virtually granting Israelis immunity resume work. Syrians may, therefore, be slow give guarantee proposed by Hammarskjold unless their condition re Jisr Banat Yacub is in some measure satisfied.

Moose

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–2656. Secret, Received at 9:28 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.
2. Telegram 998 from Damascus, April 26, transmitted a Syrian communiqué issued after Hammarskjöld’s departure for Amman on April 24. (Ibid.)
3. Reference is to Resolution 100 (1953) adopted by the U.N. Security Council at its 631st meeting. (U.N. doc. S/3128) For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1389.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–1156)
5. Reference is to the U.N. Security Council resolution of May 18, 1951, which the Security Council approved by 10 votes to 0, with 1 abstention (U.S.S.R.), at its 547th meeting. For text, see U.N. doc. S/2157.
6. See footnote 3 above.
7. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–2056)