Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

294. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, April 19, 1956—1 p.m.

2087. Have carefully studied and will be guided by policy directive contained in Deptel 2404.² It seems to me however that it might be useful if this Embassy gave Department its thoughts as regards (1) the strategy underlying this policy and (2) tactics by which basic policies are to be implemented.

As regards (1) above, we note that this directive concerns itself almost entirely with Nasser’s personal responsibility for current situation in area and that it tends to regard Nasser himself as difficulty which requires correction. While without doubt he could stand correction, respectfully suggest that problem is of much broader scope; and that public and private statements of Britain and Israel, United States press, and to a certain extent area reporting should not serve to blur over underlying and fundamental issues involved. Nasser is the product of an area and an era, and has become as much a symbol of nationalistic forces as he is a leader of these forces.

While he is today the outstanding leader these forces, it is important to realize that trends have been set in motion across the roughly one-third of the world which we call under-developed which certainly go far beyond any personality. We must be very careful to bear in mind from long range point of view that efforts aimed directly at checking or eliminating his personal influence are unlikely to affect these basic forces and are in addition likely to result in increased rather than decreased prestige in symbol of his person. (In this connection wish to express my concern that we make due allowance in evaluating intelligence which has come to use through liaison channels from nations which now have a tendency to shift all responsibility to Nasser for their setbacks and in whose interest it might be to influence our policy.) I have confidence in the quality of our intelligence on this area but wish to urge that steps be taken at high level to survey our own intelligence on Nasser’s activities and influence in area. Have no doubt that incriminating evidence would be uncovered but feel that question is how much, how damaging, with what intent, and with what short and long range effect.

While doing this suggest we turn our thoughts towards the underlying causes of our difficulties. This area should be of particular interest to us as it typifies probably at present more than any other the character of the struggle of the future. It seems to us that it is here that the impact of entirely new Soviet approach is being felt most quickly in its full force and it is here that we should develop new approaches and policies of our own which may be of use through all the NEA area and beyond into south and sea. In Egypt and ME itself our problems revolve around issues of colonialism, strength against Israel and generally our attitude towards Israel, collective security arrangements which are believed to be extensions in new form of Western domination, and adverse trade patterns. These go far beyond the reflection of a personality and our action on matters such as these will determine our future position in area. It is essential that we realize the nature of our problems and that they are not primarily due to an ideological clash between our brand of democracy and Communism. Regardless of specific intelligence Department may have unknown to this Embassy, we believe that the motives for local actions and reactions stem from problems such as these and that a turn towards Communism is not the goal in itself. Some of these problems are emotional (Israel, self determination, et cetera) where sympathetic understanding is in itself of great value. Others are increasingly connected with economic patterns. A real threat in establishment of Russia’s position in Egypt, for instance, is that connected with trade and commerce. Egypt’s dollar position is intolerable even now… . Conversely trade is possible with Soviet Bloc, and under subsidization, is highly attractive. Furthermore it is a necessity. This type of tactic will succeed all across this area regardless of what Nasser does or does not do.

We must face such basic issues as what we really mean by “positions of western influence.” Have no doubt at all of our ability to exert considerable influence in this area …. We do not agree that ME oil is in danger if we follow wise policy. Continued British talk about losing it is not very wise. If oil exploitation not connected with political exploitation, there no reason believe that ME desires to see its markets in Europe and Britain lost. On other hand a policy of “we will hold it by force if necessary” seems wholly unnecessary. Furthermore we must look carefully at effect through this whole area of world, of any local action smacking of force or pressure… .

Prior to establishment of Israel we were popular in area by simply following a policy of open friendship and understanding. This will still work today and there is no drive against United States per se. Nasser and area are out to cut British (and French) influence down to size of legitimate foreign interests devoid of ability to interfere in local affairs as in past. Believe present intentions are to go no farther unless British (and other) efforts resist turn into hostile acts against what they regard with sensitivity as their sovereign and independent rights.

If we are to be successful in this area, should think first of all our general policies must now be compatible with the moderate elements of Arab nationalism. The growing spirit of area which rightly or wrongly considers it still not free from domination of west must not be minimized. The Communist tactic is to run parallel with this emotional force. If we ourselves attempt head-on conflict with it, we shall fail as surely as the British did in Jordan.

Believe credence should be given to Nasser’s own remark to me that World War II now in process taking entirely different form than heretofore. Perhaps the United States alone has the flexibility to work out policies to meet shift in Soviet tactics which has made them appear champions of local national aspirations. Would logically assume that this process may take some time. If this is true the all important thing is that we not make tactical mistakes during our period of readjustment.

This leads to (2) above. We interpret para four of Dept’s directive to indicate that our policy is to stall on all matters dealing with Egypt. …

Hope Dept will accept our judgment that as a matter of tactics this method of dealing with Nasser will be counter-productive. Assume Dept knows Nehru well enough to conclude that a policy of pin-pricking irritation, and holding out hopes which we unwilling to finalize prior to his coming to US and how he can cooperate better, would not work. Feel Dept does not know Nasser that well. There are many differences between Nasser and Nehru, but their reactions to this type of approach would be similar.

Suggest we face up to fact that this is focal area of competition with Russia and that greater resourcefulness and initiative on our part rather than less is necessary. It seems to me that the quicker we really start competing the better (by “competing” I do not mean outbidding in dollar aid). A “stall until they turn to us” approach just isn’t good enough. Furthermore, even if we believe such an approach would bring Nasser to us it would be well to work out beforehand just what we want him to do, bearing in mind again that the problems are practical and not ideological. It is somewhat ironical that due to understanding statements by President and Secretary and local efforts, United States-Egyptian relations have greatly improved in past three weeks. GOE has not yet become really aware of expanse of tactical approach in Deptel 2404 …. The effect Dept wished to obtain by this approach has been at least partially obtained through other methods. We are in as good a position as we will probably ever be to influence Nasser. It would be well therefore that we try out on Nasser now whatever it is we wish him to do rather than wait until he fully senses tactics of planned approach.

The most important example of where we think stalling is unwise relates to High Dam. It has been over seven weeks since Egypt gave us counter proposal to aide-mémoires.³ This I assume is part of producing “logic of events” philosophy, but the great danger is that by giving no response at all we may in fact be withdrawing from project. In appraising this statement please bear in mind that Nasser is not certain that United States can and will assist him with Dam to its completion, and he never has been, regardless obvious good intentions shown by Dept. He sees hesitation and delay for what he considers policy purposes even prior to concluding agreement. He undoubtedly connects this with our disillusionment his ability to move in manner we desired on Israeli settlement. Even if agreement concluded, after that he sees an unpredictable Congress, and future administrations whose policies on Arab and Israeli matters now beyond prediction. We consider it highly probable Nasser thinks he requires definitive agreement for pre-election use. In spite of fact we know Nasser wishes to work with West on this project, if there continues to be no response at all Dept should not be surprised if some day it reads in press that decision has been made to accept Russian assistance.

We believe we should face competition in cultural matters with greater and not less vigor. Am appalled in this connection that we have even been told to stop negotiating on matters such as Fulbright agreement. While we faced with area dilemmas in which our freedom of action necessarily limited, and natural obstacle on matters such as trade, certainly we have inherent capability of out-doing Soviet Bloc in cultural matters and we should lose no time in stepping up our efforts in that direction. Wish urge Dept give most careful consideration following simple propositions:

(1) We should do what we can on roots our problems in area rather that personify them in an individual. (2) We should be wary of information supplied by others having special interests. (3) We should to greatest extent possible adopt policy consistent moderate elements Arab nationalism, above all avoiding head-on conflict with it. (4) There is time for rational approach to problems and no need be stampeded by others into mistakes, (5) acceptance competition in area with the will to win is much more likely to succeed than stalling approach, and (6) before we go any further we should decide exactly what conditions we want Nasser to meet.⁴

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1956. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Omega Handling. Received at 1:16 p.m.
2. Document 238.
3. See Documents 124 and 127.
4. Dulles replied as follows: “I have read Embtel 2087 with interest.” (Telegram 2544 to Cairo, April 20; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1956)