238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
2404. Eyes only Ambassador Byroade. USG at highest level has had under intensive study US policies in Near East in light recent disturbing developments. Crucial factor in determining policies and attitudes has been clear evidence Egypt under Nasser has by various means endeavored disrupt friendly relations between US and other countries of area, notably Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Our determined efforts to work with Nasser in reducing area tensions appear to have produced no results. Whatever his earlier intentions might have been, he now seems to have fixed a course contrary to ours. His Czech arms deal, his attacks against Baghdad Pact, and his assumption leadership in fight against Israel appear to have impressed him to point where, in present circumstances, he will not appreciably change. More important than the fact that it now appears we cannot look to Nasser for area leadership in bringing about a settlement with Israel is clear evidence that Nasser’s policies have opened the door to the Soviets in the Near East and, unless changed or effectively countered, situation could lead to a major catastrophe.
Theoretically there are three general lines of policy which we might pursue: (1) continue along present lines; (2) use all means at our disposal to make it clear that we do not intend to cooperate with Nasser and openly oppose him; or (3) endeavor by quiet means to reduce Egyptian influence, demonstrate to the Egyptians that international cooperation must be a two-way affair, and concentrate upon building positions of greater strength in other countries of the area. We believe course (1) likely fail in stemming deterioration in our relations with other Arab states and would permit creation [Page 454] situation in which Soviet penetration of area would thrive. Even if course (2) were consistent with US policy, we believe inadvisable since prospects success at this time not good and public issue would be drawn with Egypt at time Egyptian assets are at peak and would be used in all-out effort counter Western initiative throughout area. Third course offers best chance success and has therefore been basis current planning.
While we plan appropriate coordination with British in implementing our respective policies, consider it important that impression not be given that US–UK policies identical or linked. Supporting validity of this decision are facts: (1) US wishes insofar as possible avoid being tainted with brush of “colonialism” which now operates to the extreme detriment of British in area; and (2) there may be fundamental disagreement with British on certain specific tactics to be employed in carrying out program. In latter connection British statements have already given public notice that UK “fed up with Nasser” and is seriously considering substantial revision UK policies of cooperation with him.
Generally speaking, we intend make no public statements at least for time being …. Rather, we intend proceed quietly with certain steps which should demonstrate to Egyptians that expected cooperation from US entails cooperation with US. Thus, in period immediately ahead US will go slow on economic aid to Egypt; hold up export licenses for military equipment and spare parts, as well as approval export civilian type equipment obviously designed for military purposes (such as several hundred jeeps now on order); prolong negotiations Aswan Dam project without, at this time, breaking them off and thus providing Nasser with public excuse for signing contract with Soviets.
It is hoped, as result these measures, Nasser will conclude relations with US not proceeding smoothly and raise question with American officials. If this should occur, you should seek specific guidance from Department as to response, although it anticipated general line would be that friendly relations between countries are reciprocal and if Nasser’s over-all policies are changed in their anti-US aspects in the area it reasonable to assume US will adopt more cooperative attitude. Our concern will be expressed on the broad basis that we view with alarm Egyptian policies which, regardless of their real motivation, are leading to a situation in which the independence and integrity of several nations are being undermined by Soviet penetration.
For time being your own and Embassy’s attitude toward Nasser and other Egyptian officials should remain unchanged. It highly important you report currently and fully indications effect US policies [Page 455] and any reactions which you receive from Nasser and other officials, as well as public relations.2
Information concerning this matter is being strictly confined on “need to know” basis. You should therefore discuss matter only with your Deputy ….
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–356. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Rountree and Allen, approved by MacArthur in substance and by Dulles in draft, approved by Hoover, and signed for Dulles by Rountree.↩
- Byroade reported on April 4 that he had already “started operation directed on Nasser by seeing that he received from sources in addition to Fawzi” evidence of U.S. concern regarding the situation. In order to avoid officially criticizing the Egyptian Government, Byroade left with Nasser the impression that Byroade’s present mood was not the result of new instructions, but due to his personal and friendly concern for Egypt’s reputation in the West. Byroade reported some signs that this line was already having a good effect and stated he would see Nasser the next day. (Telegram 1978 from Cairo; ibid., 684A.86/4–456) Byroade met with Nasser on April 5; see Document 252.↩