293. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
2366. Embtel 2357.2 Whether Soviet April 17 statement on Middle East3 is precisely responsive to President’s statement of last week4 might be arguable; but one cannot doubt that the statement is a genuine expression of Soviet purpose to participate in any efforts at settlement of Near Eastern problems and particularly and immediately of the Arab-Israel conflict. In both content and timing the declaration must be considered a serious and astute diplomatic move.
The propaganda aspects are merely normal, including distortions, for Soviet statements and do not becloud the seriousness with which the Soviet Government intends to play its role in the Middle East. These aspects, e.g. the placing of the blame for the situation on pacts and groupings, pressures and interferences by monopolies, colonialism, seem largely to serve their purpose of disassociating the Soviet Union from responsibility for causing the situation. They are then tempered by the statement intended to have the appeal of objectivity that “no matter how the causes of the outbreak of this conflict are [garble].” The Soviet Government nevertheless faithful to its UN obligations, is prepared to help preserve the peace.
The statement combines a hardness to be expected in a definition of position on the eve of important negotiations, with ostensible flexibility. The Soviet Government warns the Arabs to muffle their strident voices as it takes cognizance of British (and French) actions which had contributed to the attainment of sovereignty of the parties to the conflict, specifically including in list of such countries [Page 556] both Israel and Iraq; balances its call to both factions to respect the truce, and recognizes that Israel’s existence is a fact of life.
However we may regard the legitimacy of Soviet pretentions, it is awkward and impracticable to ignore Soviet offer to support UN and “appropriate” decisions by the Security Council, their appeal to refrain from exacerbating the situation, and their assertion that matters must be directed towards a firm peaceful settlement.
Therefore, whether or not we regard Soviet statement responsive to President’s, we, and particularly other two powers of the 1950 declaration, are left Hobson’s choice of accepting Soviet participation now, under terms formulated by the Soviets themselves, or of ignoring fact of Soviet presence in Middle East and to compete with them for support from the area for settlements which will eventually involve Soviet participation anyway in the UN.
Here in effect is another instance where the Soviet Union had contributed generously to the creation and exacerbation of a situation which it then uses to demonstrate its peaceful intentions by offers to help settle. There is, however, the possibility that the Soviet Union is worried lest the Arab-Israel conflict, which it has helped to inflame, become unmanageable with a threat of spreading with unforeseeable and grave risks to themselves, as well as to others. While it would be perhaps unwise to assume that this fear is present in the Soviet position it could well be that in the London discussions more evidence will surface in this regard.
Department pass as desired.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1956. Confidential; Priority. Received at 12:20 p.m. Repeated priority to London and Paris.↩
- In telegram 2357, April 17, the Embassy in Moscow reported that it had not yet seen it but surmized that the Soviet statement on the Middle East “must be at least a disappointment to the more militant Arab states, and secondly a move which because of its importance must have been under consideration for some time and was designed to clarify Soviet stand on issues involved coincident with arrival Soviet visitors to UK.” (Ibid., 684a.86/4–1756) The Embassy in London on April 19 reported that the “Foreign Office considers that there is little basic change in Soviet attitude which continues to be characterized by strong hostility to Baghdad Pact… . Foreign Office suspects statement may be designed pave way for Soviet proposal for complete arms embargo to all Middle Eastern countries, which would of course be inacceptable as this would mean end of arms aid to Baghdad Pact countries.” (Telegram 4757 from London; ibid., 684a.86/4–1956)↩
- See Document 291.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 258.↩