Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

291. Paper Prepared by Elbert G. Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff¹

Washington, April 19, 1956.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT OF APRIL 17 ON THE MIDDLE EAST

The Statement

The Soviet statement of April 17 may have been issued solely for propaganda purposes-—to improve the atmosphere for the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to the UK and to win the USSR general approbation as a protagonist of peace. If this is the case, it should become apparent in the course of the British-Soviet talks on the Middle East.

For the purpose of this paper, however, it is assumed that the Soviet statement, at least in part, conveys a serious invitation to the West to seek an accommodation in the Middle East. Two aspects of the statement make this a not unreasonable assumption. First, in contrast to recent Soviet support of the Arabs, the statement is neutral in tone as between Israel and the Arab states. (This neutrality was emphasized by the presence of Molotov and Mikoyan at an Israel Embassy reception in Moscow on April 16.) Second, the statement—again in contrast to the previous Soviet position—recognizes that the Arab-Israel situation presents a real threat to international peace.

The significant points made in the statement may be summarized as follows:

1. The major reason for the tense and dangerous situation in the Middle East is the attempt of “some states” to extend military alignments, such as the Baghdad Pact, into the area.

2. The USSR is “unswervingly opposed” to any breach of the peace in the Middle East.

3. The USSR considers “illegal and inadmissible” attempts to use the Arab-Israel dispute as a pretext “for introducing foreign troops in the territory of the Near East.

4. The USSR will support UN measures to strengthen peace “in the area of Palestine” and to implement “the corresponding decisions of the Security Council.”

5. The USSR calls upon the “interested parties” to refrain from action that would worsen the situation on the Palestine Armistice lines and to “alleviate the difficult position” of the Arab refugees.

6. The USSR considers it essential “to direct efforts toward a stable peaceful settlement of the Palestine question on a mutually acceptable basis, taking due consideration of the just national interests of the interested parties” and is ready to contribute “with other states” to these efforts.

Soviet Motivations and Objectives

It would appear that the Kremlin has estimated that war between the Arab states and Israel would have adverse consequences for Soviet interests, primarily, it may be assumed, because this would in its view lead to military intervention by the Western powers who would remain and re-entrench themselves in the Middle East. This development, in Soviet eyes, could only worsen the existing unsatisfactory situation in which the US and UK by virtue of the Baghdad Pact and other military arrangements in the Middle East are able to threaten the security of the Soviet regime and state from bases in the area.

The Soviet objectives in any negotiations would accordingly be to ensure against Western military intervention in the Middle East, to eliminate the Baghdad Pact and other Western military arrangements and to create conditions favorable to a further expansion of Soviet influence in the area.

US Western Interests and Objectives

Before considering the possibility of useful negotiations with the USSR, a brief recapitulation of the basic interests of the US and its Western allies in the Middle East is required. These interests are access to oil resources, rights of passage, peace and stability, and predominance of Western Soviet influence. As recently as a year ago the last point might have been phrased “exclusion of Soviet influence”. It has become clear that, given the tensions and rivalries prevailing in the Middle East, it was not, and is not now, within Western capabilities peacefully to exclude Soviet influence from the area.

To protect basic Western interests, our objectives in negotiations with the USSR would be to maneuver the USSR into a position with respect to the Arab-Israel issue that would disabuse the Arabs of their present belief that the USSR is their champion, to preserve the Baghdad Pact and other existing Western military arrangements and to create conditions favorable to the restoration of Western influence in the Middle East. Of prime importance for the latter objective are the fixing of permanent boundaries between Israel and the contiguous Arab states and a solution of the Arab refugee problem.

Locus of Negotiations

The Soviet statement refers specifically to UN measures only with respect to strengthening peace and implementing “corresponding decisions of the Security Council” in the Palestine area. In its references to settlement of the Palestine question the statement says only that the USSR is ready to contribute “with other states” to a solution. This leaves the door open to a quadripartite approach or to an Indochina-type conference.

From the point of view of the US and its Western allies it would be desirable to keep any negotiations with the USSR on the Middle East within the UN framework—more specifically under the aegis of the Security Council. This, of course, would not preclude private discussions or even private understandings on the side. The use of the Security Council where the USSR is already present would save us the psychological and propaganda defeat of having to invite the USSR into what had previously been a tripartite forum or to acquiesce in Soviet participation in a general conference of “interested states”. The Soviet statement with its one specific reference to UN measures and its several general references to the UN Charter provides a basis for approaching the USSR through the Security Council.

It may be doubted that the USSR would be eager to utilize the quadripartite forum as it would then have to share with the three Western powers the onus of solutions “dictated by the great powers” and its desertion of its erstwhile Arab proteges would be highlighted. The USSR might well, however, be attracted to an Indochina-type conference, believing that it could in such a forum obtain majority support for its objectives of eliminating the Baghdad Pact and ensuring against Western Military intervention in the Middle East, This would be a real danger from the Western point of view and we should avoid a general conference.

Possible Bases of Negotiation

After coordination with the UK and France, the USSR could be informed privately that the three Western powers are prepared to seek with the USSR through the Security Council a general stabilization of the Middle East. We could propose as a first step that the four powers support the UN Secretary General’s recommendations following his present survey and that, whether or not the Secretary General so recommends, the four powers support an arms embargo against Israel and the contiguous Arab states. We could agree to extend the embargo to Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the ground that they participated in the 1948 fighting.

We could say that we had in mind as subsequent steps that the four powers would sponsor Security Council action to induce the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute to fix permanent boundaries and to solve the Arab refugee problem. If necessary, we would be prepared to support Security Council action under UN Charter Chapter VII,² not including military sanctions, to enforce settlement of these two issues. We would also be prepared to support a Security Council guarantee against alteration of permanent boundaries between Israel and the contiguous Arab states except by agreement of the states where boundaries are involved.

It may be anticipated that the USSR would raise the issue of the Baghdad Pact either obliquely or directly at an early stage. If obliquely, it might take the form of a counter-proposal that the arms embargo be applied to additional Middle East states including Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. In this event, we would make it clear that Western relations with Turkey, a NATO member, are not negotiable in a Middle East context. As regards Iran and Pakistan we would point out that they have never been parties to the Arab-Israel dispute and no basis exists for an embargo against them. This stand would presumably bring the Pact issue into the open if the USSR had not broached it directly.

The USSR would attack the Pact as an aggressive alliance threatening Soviet security. We, while insisting that the Pact was purely defensive, could intimate that we were not insensitive to Soviet security interest in the Middle East, but that the Western powers also had basic interests in the area, oil being the most obvious, that they were not prepared to relinquish. If there were reciprocal recognition of and forbearance toward these respective interests, which were not necessarily conflicting, some accommodation might be reached.

The negotiation of such an accommodation would present exceedingly difficult problems to the West. If it appeared that we had abandoned the Baghdad Pact and other Western military arrangements in the Middle East without a substantial and evident quid pro quo the Middle East Pact members would charge us with betrayal and SEATO and even NATO would be shaken to their foundations. Even if we obtained a quid pro quo, neutralist sentiment within SEATO and NATO would be strengthened and voices raised urging similar accommodations in their areas. We could not, therefore, at this stage of the development of free world-Communist bloc relations accept the dissolution of the Baghdad Pact as part of a Middle East accommodation. We could not, moreover, agree to the merger of the Baghdad Pact into a larger indigenous Middle East collective security arrangement unless we were prepared (1) to relinquish existing US and UK military arrangements in the area and (2) to accept a de facto neutralization of the whole Middle East.

It might well be impossible to reach any accommodation with the USSR without the sacrifice of the Baghdad Pact. Assuming for the purposes of discussion, however, that it would be possible and bearing in mind the desirability of staying with the UN framework, the following possible bases of negotiation are suggested.

1. All arms shipments into the Middle East, Turkey excepted, would be reported to the Security Council prior to delivery. The Council would not, however, attempt formally to control arms shipments, although resolutions recommending against specific shipments could, of course, be introduced.

2. All proposals for the establishment of new binational or multinational bases or for the placing of armed forces of one nation in the territory of another (expecting training missions, etc) in the Middle East, Turkey excluded, would be reported to the Security Council by the participating nations. Resolutions recommending against specific proposals could be introduced in the Council.

3. The Security Council would guaranty all Middle East boundaries against alteration by force.

4. All non-Middle East nations interested in contributing to the development of the area by financial and technical assistance would provide such assistance through existing or new international agencies.

We can determine whether or not we would be prepared to negotiate on the foregoing or similar bases, which would obviously restrict our freedom of action in the Middle East, only in the light of our assessment of (1) probable developments in the area and (2) our capabilities of influencing those developments in varying circumstances. If we estimate that a stabilization of the Arab-Israel dispute would afford us the best opportunity of restoring Western influence in the Middle East and that we probably could not achieve such a stabilization if the USSR works actively against it, we may conclude that some limitation on our freedom of action would be an acceptable price for Soviet cooperation. As this limitation would apply particularly in the military sphere, it may be the more acceptable if we estimate that there is small likelihood of Communist military action in the Middle East.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #3. Top Secret; Omega. At the Middle East Policy Planning Group meeting on April 18, it was agreed that Mathews would draft a paper analyzing the implications of the April 17 Soviet statement. The statement was issued by the Soviet Foreign Ministry at a press conference. It called for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute and offered Soviet support for measures to facilitate a settlement. A translation is ibid., Omega #2.

   At the Group’s meeting of April 26, Kirk was asked to circulate copies of this paper to all members. (Ibid.: Lot 59 D 518, Omega--Meetings of MEPPG (agenda, memos of conv., etc.), 4/9/56 to 6/30/56)

2. For text of the U.N. Charter, signed on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, and which came into force on October 24, 1945, see 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.